Much has been written about the Hopi Indians of the American Southwest. The persistence of their village life and ceremonial system has attracted the attention of a wide variety of observers. Despite the numerous publications describing Hopi life, however, and a general agreement about the outlines of Hopi society and culture, virtually every aspect of that life has provoked discussion and disagreement among anthropologists. One of the early and enduring debates concerned Hopi character and personality. More recently, questions have been raised about the accuracy of ethnologists’ descriptions of Hopi social organization and about the reasons for the fissioning of the Third Mesa village of Orayvi early in the twentieth century.

It is possible, of course, that the more that is written about a people, the more controversy is generated, as scholars of different theoretical persuasions using a variety of research methods become involved in the research (Heider 1988). Alternatively, the data may not yet have been analyzed fully, and a more thorough examination may serve to resolve some of the issues. This book represents just such an attempt. By reanalyzing material gathered by earlier scholars, two questions are addressed: Was Hopi social organization lacking in integrative mechanisms such that it could be characterized as fragile? and, Was the Orayvi
split brought about by acculturative or by environmental and demographic pressures?

Fred Eggan (1950:116) noted that “Hopi society, despite appearances, is not completely integrated”—that because there is no centralized political superstructure, the clans tend to “assert their position at the expense of the village.” Moreover, according to Eggan (1966:124), “crises involving the possibilities of major change were handled through the development of factions, which might lead to village splitting and the establishment of new communities.” Titiev (1944:69) described Hopi social organization in much the same terms: “Such a social system rests on unstable foundations, for the more firmly people adhere to clan lines, the weaker must be their village ties. . . . Theoretically, the Hopi towns are in constant potential danger of dividing into their component parts.” Yet when Orayvi split in two, it was not along clan lines; and no other Hopi village fissioned despite the fact that all were facing similar pressures. In several publications Whiteley (1985, 1986, 1988) has disputed Eggan’s and Titiev’s characterization of Hopi social organization, contending that neither Hopi clans nor the lineages they comprised were corporate units in any sphere of Hopi life. This dispute over the nature of Hopi social organization raises fundamental questions: Is there some aspect of that organization which has not been investigated in sufficient detail that differences of interpretation can be resolved, or have the theoretical biases of the observers obscured the reality, as Whiteley contends.

There is also considerable disagreement among anthropologists over the causes for the Orayvi split of 1906. Bradfield (1971) has proposed that a long period of drought in conjunction with over-population were the most important variables. Parsons (1922), Clemmer (1978), and others attributed the factional dissention to acculturative pressures; some Orayvis adopting a hostile attitude toward the federal government’s demand that Hopi children attend school, others a more compliant policy. Titiev and Eggan have accepted both sources of stress as contributing to the ultimate demise of the village, but they implicate the fragility of the society itself as the principal reason.

Several ethnographers have noted that Hopi society is stratified, but other than recognizing the existence of social inequality they have
“by and large written about the Hopi as an apolitical, egalitarian society” (Whiteley 1988:64). The reasons for this neglect may be several. On the one hand, anthropologists have tended to the view that social classes arise as a consequence of the production of an economic surplus; those groups that control and manage the distribution of this surplus become an elite, a class of managers. Less technologically advanced societies were, almost by definition, egalitarian. On the other hand, neither Titiev nor Eggn was an evolutionist, and both were aware of the many community studies undertaken by American sociologists that investigated the presence of class in the United States—a society that preached equality and considered itself classless. One wonders if these ethnographers were blinded by the received wisdom of their discipline or if the data at hand were too incomplete to allow them to investigate the matter further.

The major contention of this book is that a restricted and tenuous resource base required that Hopi society structure itself on an inequitable distribution of land, and that Eggn and Titiev recognized this and accurately described the methods devised to “preserve the core” of the land-controlling descent groups by sloughing off the excess population in an orderly manner during times of scarcity. But if land and water resources were so restricted that they could not be distributed equitably, these same constraints demanded a high degree of cooperation and social integration. In effect, an internal contradiction was created that kept the society in a state of dynamic tension, a tension that intensified or eased as droughts alternated with wet periods.

An ideology was developed that stressed the importance of both commoners and ceremonialists. The authority of the ceremonialist was balanced by his responsibilities to his “people.” Each individual was responsible for his own actions and, of course, cooperation and non-aggression were highly valued. In addition to ideology and values, however, two social mechanisms worked to promote social integration and lessen potential conflict. Numerous marriage restrictions precluded the possibility of alliances among a few ceremonialist families; and the ceremonial societies, although controlled by specified clans, opened their membership to everyone. Every individual was encouraged to participate in ceremonial life and was given the opportunity to do so in
personally meaningful ways. Even the ceremonies performed by these societies were integrated into the annual ceremonial calendar by a sharing of symbols and cooperation among societies.

Opposing these integrative mechanisms was the system of land control. The fields used to grow corn, the staple crop, were of unequal quality. They were assigned to various clans, some of which controlled the best fields, others fields of medium quality, and still others poor lands or none at all. There was, then, a ranking of clans that was sanctified by myth and ceremonial position: the highest-ranking clans owned the most important ceremonies; the lowest-ranking held at most a single position in a ceremony or no ceremonial duties at all.

Clan ranking, however, was not sufficient to deal with the pressures resulting from inordinate population growth. Each clan was composed of a hierarchy of lineages. The most senior lineage controlled the clan's ceremony and had the authority to assign farm plots within the clan fields. This senior, or “prime,” lineage was supported by closely related “alternate” lineages which could assume its responsibilities should the senior lineage die out. “Marginal” lineages were expendable in times of crisis (Eggan 1966:124–25). In consequence, a marginal lineage of a highly ranked clan could be in a more tenuous economic position than a prime lineage of a less highly ranked clan if the population of the highly ranked clan exceeded the carrying capacity of its allotted land.

These characteristics of the social system were described by Eggan and Titiev based on observations they made during the 1930s, by which time this system of landholding had ceased to exist. Their conclusions were stated as assertions, but not demonstrated except insofar as their data were reasonably consonant with their conclusions. Had more data and better methods of analysis been available, these generalizations could, in my opinion, have been demonstrated with more certainty.

The Data

The material presented in this book tests the views of Eggan and Titiev, using, in the main, data gathered by them—many of which have never been thoroughly analyzed or published in their entirety.
The Titiev Census

In the course of two visits in 1932 and 1933, Mischa Titiev made a census of Orayvi which is probably the most detailed and informative census of an American Indian population prior to the modern period.¹ The census lists over one thousand individuals, grouped by household, who were either living or recently deceased in 1900. For each individual there is information on clan affiliation, ceremonial society membership, ceremonial offices held, marriages, children, factional allegiance, and where the individual went at the time of the Orayvi split in 1906. The handwritten notes were transcribed and entered into a personal computer. A data base composed of all individuals 18 years of age and above was constructed from the census and used to facilitate statistical analysis.

No ages are provided by Titiev, although whether or not the individual had died before 1906 is noted. Marriages are generally listed in order of occurrence, but there is no way to know which marriages took place after 1906. The approximate ages of individuals provided by the federal census of 1900 were assigned to the individuals identified by Titiev. One consequence of this approach is that the adult population used for analysis here consists of 566 people over 18 years of age, alive or recently deceased in 1900, compared to 622 people used by Titiev in his computations. His data base included a large number of individuals who were under age 18 in 1900.

All households in the census were located on a map of the village made by Alexander M. Stephen around 1880 and updated to 1900 by Titiev.² The material was provided by a single informant, the village chief of Orayvi, and checked by one other informant of a different clan.

The Census of 1900

The enumerators’ schedules of the 1900 United States census list almost every individual living in the Hopi villages by household. An estimated age is given for each individual, and the relationships among members of each household are noted. For women, the number of children ever born and the number surviving as of June 1900, the month the census was taken, are noted (U.S. Census of Population 1900). The adequacy
of the census has been evaluated by Johansson and Preston (1978). The population count is remarkably close to that made by Titiev some thirty years later. Some of the males of the "Hostile" faction were not counted, although we know from several sources that they were alive at the time. All but two of the adult women in the census were found in the Titiev census. Titiev estimated a total population for Orayvi and Munqapi of 863 (Titiev 1944:52); the United States census counted 858. This is the one major source of information that was not available to Titiev.

Third Mesa Genealogies

During the summer of 1932, Edward Kennard (n.d.) collected genealogies of all the inhabitants of the Third Mesa villages. Both he and Titiev were, at the time, members of the field party in ethnology led by Leslie A. White and sponsored by the Laboratory of Anthropology, Santa Fe, New Mexico. The genealogies made it possible to identify the lineages—prime, alternate, or marginal—to which most individuals in Titiev's census belonged. Prime lineages were identified by Titiev's information concerning clan houses and ceremonial offices held. Kennard never analyzed or published this material. By themselves the genealogies tell us little, but integrated with Titiev's material they become an important part of the puzzle.

THE ANALYSIS AND ITS TABULAR PRESENTATION

One consequence of merging these data sets is that the number of individuals for whom there was sufficient information varies depending on the specific analysis undertaken. Although, for example, there was a total of 566 individuals 18 years of age or more alive or recently deceased in 1900, only 556 had been born in Orayvi. Because only marriages among Orayvis were analyzed, the total in the appropriate table does not agree with the total population of adults. Rather than enumerate the nature of the missing data for each table, table 1.1 is presented here as a guide to the great variability of the totals displayed in each table in the text.
**Table 1.1**

*Disposition of the Orayvi Population 18+ Years of Age, Ca. 1900*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total including recently deceased by 1900</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orayvi born</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orayvi married to an Orayvi</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alive in 1900</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alive in 1906</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alive in 1900, fertility history known</td>
<td>197</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lineage known</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lineage and lineage of spouse #1 known</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age, lineage, and lineage of spouse known</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The Argument**

After a review of what is known of Hopi prehistory, a speculative reconstruction of the evolution of Hopi society is presented in chapter 2. Special attention is paid to the history of drought, epidemics, and population, and to the early evidence for factions and intervillage conflict. A general outline of Hopi society and culture as they have been described in the literature is then presented to orient the reader to what is to follow. One is impressed with the fact that far from being a stable, slowly-changing society, Hopi seems to have been almost constantly in a state of change, adapting to an environment that seems eminently unsuitable for agriculture.

In chapter 3, “Social Stratification,” I examine the Hopi agricultural system, the types of fields and their varying quality, and the system devised to control and distribute this resource. The results of a computer simulation of the system in effect on Second Mesa in 1928 show that household survival was not ensured either by sharing equitably among all households in the village or by each household going it alone. Instead, limited sharing among a few households appears to have provided the maximum chance of survival. On average, these few households would approximate the size of one or two lineages. Although the extent of sharing among the households within a lineage or lineage
segment or among affinally related households is not known, this sharing is taken to be the source of the clan and lineage system of ranking which I propose underlies the fact that no system of total village integration was ever devised. The fields allotted to each clan are identified and ranked according to their quality, resulting in a hierarchy of clans based on the productivity of the fields each controls.

The various ceremonies and ceremonial offices each clan controls are examined next, and each clan is given a score based on its ceremonial responsibilities. A simple regression analysis shows an almost perfect correlation between the ceremonial scores and the quality of land controlled. The system of clan ranking by ceremonies is nothing more than a translation of economic reality into the realm of the sacred, serving to sanctify the exalted position of a limited number of clans. Finally, the demographic consequences of this inequitable distribution of land are examined. Lineage position is the crucial factor determining fertility and survival of children. Women of prime and alternate lineages from high-ranking clans have high fertility rates but poor survival rates of their children. Having survived childhood, however, members of prime and alternate lineages lived longer than those from marginal lineages. The importance of lineages is confirmed, but this is definitely not an elite in the most often used sense. It appears that the need for heirs pushed high-status women to produce more children, thus inadvertently displacing an older sibling from the breast too early and exposing it to infectious disease. This also accounts for the often observed fact that high-ranking clans were usually very small and in danger of extinction.

In chapter 4, I look at the institutions that promoted social integration. The village was almost entirely endogamous. The numerous marriage prescriptions and the diverging goals of men and women in acquiring mates resulted in a system of marriage alliances which cut across rank and lineage position. Marriage was, as Eggan proposed, a strong integrating mechanism. The degree to which the factional schism increased the divorce rate and led to marriages with proscribed partners for political purposes is also discussed. The other integrating mechanism, that of the ceremonial societies which drew their membership from all ranks and clans, is also analyzed. Although the ceremonial system was integrated symbolically and ideologically, the societies were
less of an integrating mechanism than has often been thought. The majority of members in each society were drawn from its controlling clan or from related clans within the phratry.

The final chapters of the book examine the disintegration of Orayvi in 1906. Chapter 5 outlines general theories of factioning among North American Indians and the explanations proffered for the Hopi split in the anthropological literature, and briefly reviews the major events leading to the split itself. Most often such divisions have been viewed as responses to acculturative stress. In the case of the Hopi, several authors have suggested that the social organization was fragile and broke down in the face of population pressures during a period of severe environmental stress. More recently, a Hopi explanation has been offered as worthy of equal consideration.

In chapter 6, the structural-environmental hypothesis is tested and confirmed. Lower-ranking clansmen joined the Hostiles in significant numbers. Where clans of high and middle rank were split, prime and alternate lineages remained loyal to the village chief while marginal lineages joined the disaffected. Lower-ranked clansmen tended to be Hostile regardless of lineage position. The composition of the factions suggests that the Orayvi split was nothing if not a revolt of the landless.

The rhetoric of opposition to the White man and how the Hopis explained the traumatic events of the split and the years leading up to it are examined in chapter 7, which attempts an interpretation of events and motivations in historical perspective. The deterioration of the land and the onslaught of smallpox epidemics took place during a period of “unorthodox” village leadership. The Hopi interpretations of these events involve the shaping of myths to account for the position taken by the opposition faction. The traditional style of Hopi diplomacy constrained the village leadership to adopt a conciliatory stance toward the Anglo-Americans, which was used by the opposition to gather support. How the traditional leadership responded to these attacks and how some of the leaders of the Hostile faction were also constrained to adopt a conciliatory attitude are examined. Each side sought to buttress its position by appeal to tradition rather than to contemporary argument. Myths were politicized and prophecies formulated. Those announced prior to the events were never fulfilled, while post-factum prophecies were constantly adjusted to take account of events. Ultimately, the
generally accepted Hopi explanation conformed to the general structure of Hopi myth and construction of history.

In the final chapter, after recapitulating the argument, I attempt to reconcile discrepant views of Hopi social organization as well as to reconcile Hopi and anthropological interpretations.

In large part, this book is a restudy of Titiev’s (1944) Old Oraibi: A Study of the Indians of Third Mesa. Like that ethnography, this is a community study suffering from several of the limitations of such works in general. Community studies have been faulted for their lack of quantitative data, which makes comparisons with other studies difficult at best. Where such data have been collected, a lack of definitional clarity also makes comparison difficult. According to Bell and Newby (1972:16–17),

the weaknesses of the community study method can be easily listed: it all too frequently rests on the observations of a single person, the procedures of observation are not systematized, there is no guarantee that another investigator would produce similar results, and the values of the observer cannot be disentangled from his data. In short, there must be some question about the scientific validity of the community study method.

It is my hope that by using Titiev’s data in a quantitative manner this restudy is comparable to his. It is also my belief that his and Eggan’s definitions of such phenomena as households, lineages, clans, and phratries are sufficiently clear that what confusion still exists may be clarified with a minimum of effort. In another respect, however, the lack of controlled comparisons with other communities limits some of Titiev’s generalizations. What, for example, does he mean by a lack of integration, or a “fragile” society? This is surely a matter of degree that can only be evaluated by comparison with a society or societies with differing social organizations but facing stresses similar in degree as well as in kind. I have attempted to cope with this problem by providing some limited comparisons with other Hopi villages that had the same social structure but did not fission.

Although not dealt with directly in this book, one dispute of long standing among anthropologists concerns the nature of the typical Hopi personality and the degree to which it may be characterized as anxiety
ridden. Concerned as the controversy is with characteristics of personality, it is remarkable that it relies entirely on inferences about personality traits and not on direct observation or testing of such traits. It is also concerned with generalizations that depend for their validity on comparisons with typical personalities in other societies. The discussion then may be dismissed as exemplifying only too well some of the criticisms leveled at studies of single communities. Nevertheless, all those who have entered into the debate appear to have come intuitively to the conclusion that its resolution may be important for an understanding of the Hopi, and the student of the Hopi is constantly reminded of the issue. It may, in consequence, be proper to recapitulate here the highlights of the controversy in the hope that the reader may arrive at some reasonable judgment after a reconsideration of Hopi social adaptation.

Although the Hopis have generally been described in the anthropological literature as peaceful, sober, and cooperative, for a time there was considerable disagreement about the existence of covert aggression and hostility, and the degree to which Hopis may be psychologically maladjusted. On the one hand, Laura Thompson and Alice Joseph (1947) were of the opinion that most Hopis actually lived up to social ideals and that their typical personality was gentle, cooperative, modest, and tranquil. Not only was the society highly integrated, but values and world view were consistent and harmonious. Dorothy Eggn (1943) and Esther Goldfrank (1945), on the other hand, concluded that the maintenance of such a highly integrated society was achieved at considerable psychic cost to the individual. These observers have described Hopi personality as marked by covert aggression, tension, suspicion, anxiety, hostility, and even competitive ambition.

These contrasting interpretations have been discussed by Bennett (1946) and Redfield (1955:132–48), who agree that it is not the facts that are at issue, but the different value orientations of the anthropologists: the one group approving the moral unity of Hopi life, the other disapproving Hopi society’s authoritarianism and repression. Both Bennett and Redfield believe the issue demands more explicit recognition of investigators’ values and personal preferences.

Without disputing the influence observers’ values may have in shaping the interpretation of the data, Aberle (1967:80) suggests that
Hopi society was capable of displaying both sets of features depending upon the degree of stress a given community was undergoing at the time it was observed. According to Aberle, these contrasting features are closely related to one another and the truth does not lie somewhere in between but rather in understanding how these two aspects are bound together. Aberle, it seems to me, is placing emphasis on the often observed discrepancy between ideal and actual behaviors, noting that during hard times it is more difficult to live up to the ideal than it is during good times. The traits that fall short of the ideal would appear to be the unavoidable consequences of life in a generally harsh environment.

Siegel (1955) also relates the inferred anxiety and repression to the stresses generated by the Hopis’ precarious adaptation to a harsh environment. According to Siegel, Hopi survival necessitated the development of a high degree of cultural integration, strong ties of communal solidarity, and a conscious conformity to expected conduct. Hopi methods of socialization demanded conformity early in life and emphasized the need for conscious control of emotions. In addition to internal controls, the community also recognized the authority of the ceremonialists to interpret and regulate behavior. At the same time, however, there were few sanctioned outlets for the anxiety and hostility generated by this process of subordinating the individual to the needs of the group. In sum, Siegel believes that these less than ideal personality traits are a direct consequence of the adaptive cultural mechanisms necessary for survival. This is similar to Goldfrank’s (1945:535) belief that these traits are the “price” paid by the individual for achieving the social ideal. “For the individual the gains of such adaptive behavior are measured in a high degree of emotional security, the losses by the comparatively high level of anxiety which he must sustain” (Siegel 1955:47). But Siegel goes further and concludes that the maintenance of relatively high anxiety levels is conscious and is itself an adaptive pattern.

The problem, of course, is the difficulty in determining whether these personality traits were ever characteristic of precontact Hopi society, whether the strains placed upon the Hopi during the nineteenth century were more or less severe than similar strains placed on other North American Indian groups, and whether the anxiety generated by
such stresses was more or less than, or qualitatively different from, what is found among other Indian societies.

It is possible that the reader, after considering the effects of drought, high infant mortality, and factional dissension, may wish to conclude that something may be gained by speculating about psychological states. Equally likely is the conclusion that such debate should be confined to studies for which psychological data have been gathered.

A final question, posed by the discussion of Hopi interpretations of and reactions to the events of the latter half of the nineteenth century presented in chapter 7, concerns how the anthropologist is to deal with the emic, or “native,” point of view. Postmodernists have criticized ethnographic accounts for presenting the “etic,” or observer’s, view to the exclusion of the emic. Whiteley’s handling of this issue in his book Deliberate Acts asks the reader to accept the emic interpretation on a par with that of the social scientist without further examination. Indeed, this seems to be the conclusion of several anthropologists in recent years. In his study of the Navajo Nightway ceremonial, for example, Faris (1990:13) faults Clyde Kluckhohn for not transcending functionalism, never “abandoning rationalism,” and continuing “to tell readers what Navajo beliefs really meant and what such beliefs really did.” Kluckhohn, Faris maintains, “could not admit alternate belief systems on their own terms.” Again, readers must decide either to accept their own cultural boundaries, which constrain them to attempt to understand the Hopi according to the criteria of social science (as Hopis must attempt to understand non-Hopis according to their own criteria), or to accept the Hopi view as an alternative reality to which, presumably, the social scientist may also subscribe.