

# Imperial Formations

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### Introduction

#### *Refiguring Imperial Terrains*

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For us, an agricultural colony [*colonie*] is a rural institution that extends its benevolence to all those who have access, whatever their title, and where the benefits are shared.... That obligation may consist of the work of clearing or of ordinary cultivation, of more or less demanding service, or the obligation of a simple stay, it basically does not matter: the rule applies to all, to obey is required of all. Each contributes according to their ability, according to the contract or obligation they hold. Everyone who inhabits a colony is a colon whatever role they play, whatever work they perform, whatever particular rights are granted to them.

—*A. de Tourdonnet*

In the early and mid-nineteenth century, a *colon*—a term that would be more firmly fixed later in the century to overseas settlers throughout the French empire—conveyed multiple referents. *Colon* could refer to a “pioneer settler” in Algeria, as one might expect, but as frequently to a member of a state-run establishment for paupers in central France, a penal colony inmate in New Caledonia, or an orphan child in a rural residential shelter in Provence.<sup>2</sup>

The semantic slippage displayed in the French treatise on the “agricultural colonies of education” quoted above captures a feature of colonization that contemporary studies of colonialisms and empires have since lost or discarded, namely that different notions of a colony and who its members were coexisted, were contested, and were actively

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compared. Imperial expansion and modes of confinement, resettlement of delinquents, pauper programs, and the recruitment of empire's pioneers were not separately conceived and executed projects with wholly different architects and different names.<sup>3</sup> The spectrum of meanings implicit in the words *colonie* and *colon* was diffused across overlapping collaborative projects. Government planners and social reformers themselves were concerned that the term *colonie* covered such a wide range of institutional arrangements.<sup>4</sup> They too asked whether pioneer colonies should be treated alongside long-settled agricultural ones, whether colonies of rescue for foundlings, of punishment for criminals, and of education for industrial and agricultural pioneers were not all forms of social relief designed to moralize those who would inhabit them.<sup>5</sup>

The social etymology of *colonie* draws us to something else: a strikingly broad scope of imperial comparison developed through the exchange of principles, practices, and technologies between empires in their metropolitan regions and far-flung domains.<sup>6</sup> If etymologies highlight the careers of words, social etymologies reveal the contexts of these comparisons. Social etymologies register which practices these concepts illuminated and gathered into commensurable form. As the epigraph above suggests, French blueprints for agricultural and pauper colonies drew on strategies of empire, strategies that scholars have often presumed followed European models. However, French observers in the nineteenth century, for example, also considered initiatives by Catherine II and her successors in Russia to be exemplary efforts to create a reasoned empire through colonization.<sup>7</sup> As France turned to Russia, Russia in turn looked to the American West for models of settlement and expansion.<sup>8</sup> Such borrowings that stretched from France to Russia and Russia to the United States of America mark a competitive politics of comparison that accelerated circuits of knowledge production and imperial exchange.<sup>9</sup>

Yet, for students of European empires, what constituted the objects of comparison is perhaps more arresting than the comparisons themselves. French planners admired both the programs that housed abandoned children in rural "colonies" on the outskirts of St. Petersburg and Moscow as well as those that recruited the urban poor and foreign workers to colonize Russia's steppes and vast eastern territories.<sup>10</sup>

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Russian programs to house orphaned children were relevant both to making an orphaned underclass productive in France and to producing from that group “colonists” suitable for North African homesteads. Envisioning three stages of physical acclimatization and moral education, French planners proposed “preparatory colonies” for children one to twelve years of age (outfitted with nursemaids and a bovine population), “colonies of transition” for those aged twelve to fourteen, where adolescent bodies might be first “bronzed by the sun in Provence, Roussillon or Languedoc,” and finally “colonies of application,” where those aged fourteen to twenty-one would be primed for cultivation of the soil and already equipped for a disciplined cultivation of the self.<sup>11</sup>

Such a range of comparisons is dissonant to students of European colonial cultures for it references and revives long-buried connections. What were once politically tethered terms—components of related but diverse reformist state projects—now appear as mere homonyms dislocated from each other and from the commensurabilities that once linked them. Much of the scholarly space in which studies of the colonial are profiled and concentrated, the field of “colonial studies,” with its abiding focus on late nineteenth- through mid-twentieth-century European empires, misses those untidy connections. Its default model of empire fails to address the fact that ambiguous terms and opaque criteria for intervention have been fundamental structural features of European and non-European imperial states alike. Indeed the reference to “refiguring” in our title is intended to address a refiguring of several sorts: of our approaches to and understandings of empire, shifting both our analytics and the scope and scale of imperial forms to which we pose our queries.

The fact that French commissions on the education of impoverished children could look at once to the Saratov colonies on the Volga and to Crimean colonies in the Russian south alongside those established in the Amur basin on the Chinese frontier underscores the inclusive and changing breadth of their comparative frames.<sup>12</sup> This dynamic, nonstatic quality demands that we attend less to what empires are than to what they did and do, for these transformative practices altered their relations with other empires and with their own subject populations. Cross-imperial knowledge acquisition and application included a poaching of practices, a searching for new technologies, an

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invigorating of categories of exception and difference, and a competing for status. Such cross-imperial scrutiny shares recognition of the portability of practices and ideas, be it in form or in goal, across imperial systems and within them.

French social planners and state officials did not imagine that all these sorts of colon were the same. In this mid-nineteenth-century moment, when officials were as preoccupied with getting rid of certain segments of the metropolitan population as they were with conquest, some distinctions were in flux, and others were not yet operative. That historians offer discrepant and confused accounts of the numbers of colon who left for Algeria between 1848 and 1851—and the conditions under which they did so—is itself instructive. According to some, “14,000 Parisian workers” were sent by decree in September 1848, followed by three thousand “republicans” after the 1851 coup d’état of Louis Napoleon.<sup>13</sup> Others state that in 1851 the Second Republic arrested nearly fifteen thousand people, of which six thousand were “deported Republicans.”<sup>14</sup> How many of those arrested were also deported as “political undesirables” is hard to say: “disorder” in Paris led to 450 political deportations to the Algerian penal colony of Lambese, and deportations to at least six former *colonies agricoles* newly converted into *colonies pénitentiaires* (penal colonies).<sup>15</sup> Colonists from Malta, Italy, and Spain as well as “other Parisian workers encouraged...to emigrate voluntarily” were added to the mix of French soldiers established in *villages-militaires* in 1840.<sup>16</sup> Thousands more were recruited under an intensive colonization program to make colon out of a lethal mix of unprepared urban poor alternately referred to as the unemployed (*les sans-travail*), the insurgent (*les revoltés*), and the rootless and dispossessed (*déraciné*). The changing connotations of colon reflect this movement of people and projects. Here the colony emerges less as a geographic space than as a political one with directionality.

How ethnic, religious, and social differences mattered varied, as did the management of these differences. Administrative attention to social differentiation and the complex taxonomies intended to secure it did not necessarily congeal only around racial distinctions or instill the intensities of political anxiety associated with late nineteenth-century European colonialisms. In the 1850s, frames of imperial reference were mobile and migratory, moving across geographic and polit-

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ical space as well as institutional arrangements. This was true of Ottoman and US empires as well as European ones.<sup>17</sup> As social imaginaries and political arrangements shifted focus from empire and emperor to empire and nation, they were joined by new programs and policies of containment and expansion. Paradoxically, these new projects required both the production and protection of social categories and social kinds, and often anxious defense of such distinctions by those they privileged.

In this volume we see analytic purchase in staying close to the specifics of these arrangements. Still, our collective effort is as much about what such imaginaries afford for thinking beyond the skewed templates that have guided study of imperial governance, forms of sovereignty, and their acquisitive states. We begin, therefore, with a French genealogy, not to dwell in iconic European models but rather to underscore what has shaped both scholarship on empire and its frames of reference. Scholars from many quarters now stress the problems inherent in taking Europe as either a historical or conceptual paradigm for how empire—if not the world—works.<sup>18</sup> The strong undertow of European history and its epistemic frames has methodological consequences as well. Challenging this pull requires more than acknowledging its ubiquity. It requires new assessments of what have been treated as defining coordinates of imperial rule. A number of the essays included here question both earlier imperial logics and the contemporary analytics in which past coeval empires such as the British and Ottoman or Dutch and Japanese are not considered equally (or even) imperial.

The critical points raised by our brief turn to the ambiguities of the term *colonie*, then, are not confined to the French context. First, these ambiguities capture a range of social experimentation that would later be rendered as incommensurate kinds. Etymological entries for *colon* (cultivator, pioneer, colonist, settler, boarder, camper) convey a truncated genealogy of the social forms represented by the term.<sup>19</sup> Second, these ambiguities suggest a differently circumscribed meaning and space of “colonization” that would later be narrowed in common convention. Third, such ambiguities counter the prevailing narrative of “Western Europe as the ultimate model of the advanced and enlightened civilization.”<sup>20</sup> Instead, they move toward a shared analytical space

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for forms of rule not predicated on a West versus the Rest dichotomy or on a Victorian India model.

### **ON AN ANALYTICS OF IMPERIAL FORMATIONS**

We focus less on empires than on imperial formations. The term “imperial formations” is common, but the analytics of our choice is not. We think here of Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar’s use of “social formation” to signal the “concrete complex whole comprising economic practice, political practice, and ideological practice at a certain place and stage of development.”<sup>21</sup> We include cultural practice in this configuration to stretch our concerns to a broader set of practices structured in dominance. Raymond Williams’s sense of a “formation” as a social form suggesting “effective movements and tendencies” that have “variable and often oblique relations to formal institutions” also motivates us here.<sup>22</sup> We take up the notion of imperial formation as a critical analytic to underscore not the inevitable rise and fall of empires, but the active and contingent process of their making and unmaking.<sup>23</sup> Our interest lies less in institutions and fixed ideologies than in the prevalence of blurred genres of rule and partial sovereignties. Empires may be “things,” but imperial formations are not. Imperial formations are polities of dislocation, processes of dispersion, appropriation, and displacement. They are dependent both on moving categories and populations. Not least, they are dependent on material and discursive postponements and deferrals: the “civilizing mission,” imperial guardianship, and manifest destiny are all promissory notes of transformation. As states of deferral, imperial formations manage and produce their own exceptions, which can be easily named: conditions of delayed sovereignty, temporary intervention, conditional tutelage, military takeover in the name of humanitarian intervention, or violent intervention in the name of human rights. Imperial formations thrive on deferred autonomy, meted out to particular populations incrementally, promised to those in whose lives they intervene. They create new subjects that must be relocated to be productive and exploitable, dispossessed to be modern, disciplined to be independent, converted to be human, stripped of old cultural bearings to be citizens, coerced to be free.

Imperial formations are not steady states, but states of becoming,

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macropolities in states of solution and constant formation.<sup>24</sup> Several of the tacit notions that have informed characterizations of European colonialisms over the last two decades distract us from appreciating the features that imperial forms may share. One such problem is a fixation on empires as clearly bounded geopolitics, as if the color-coded school maps of a clearly marked British empire were renderings of real distinctions and firmly fixed boundaries. As Thongchai Winchakul has observed, however, imperial maps were a “model for, rather than model of, what they purported to represent.”<sup>25</sup> Imperial ventures are and have been both more and less marked, opaque, and visible in ways that scholars of European empires have not always registered or sought to see.

It is not coincidence, however, that some models of empire have a tunnel vision quality to them, for such perspectives are, in part, scripted and endorsed by imperial states themselves. Rather than considering empire as a steady state, we posit these formations as ongoing politics of dislocation, dependent on refiguring spaces and populations, on systemic recruitments, transfers, and promotions of governmental and nongovernmental agents, on the reassignment of native military forces away from their colonies of origin, on a redistribution of peoples and resources in territories, contiguous and overseas.<sup>26</sup> Imperial formations may present themselves as fixed cartographies of rule. This volume insists that they are not. At any one time, the designated boundaries were not necessarily the sole force fields in which imperial formations operated or their limits of governance and authorization.<sup>27</sup> With this in mind, we turn attention in this volume to a range of imperial actors—to people on the fringes of empires as well as at their centers, to designated subjects as well as colonial administrators, to those with companion and countervailing motivations to empire, and to those who reside at the categorical edges of the imperial.

Gradations of sovereignty and sliding scales of differentiation are hallmark features of imperial formations. The British empire was not merely “in” India;<sup>28</sup> its historical coordinates pass through Wales, Scotland, Protestant Ireland, the Caribbean, and the Americas.<sup>29</sup> Nor was the French empire, as Frederick Cooper contends in this volume, located in the colonies; the French empire was a single but differentiated France, in which Napoleon’s continental expansion was part of an

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older and more recent pattern of expansion overseas. As Ann Stoler has argued, “blurred genres of rule are not empires in distress but imperial polities in active realignment and reformation.”<sup>30</sup> The insight that different “semblances of sovereignty” characterize the relationships of both domestic native American peoples and the inhabitants of US overseas territories, as legal historian Alexander Aleinikoff holds, has a wider relevance than just to the United States.<sup>31</sup>

What is striking in the historical record is not the absence of these liminal and disparate zones but the exceptional treatment and scholarly misrecognition of them. Ambiguous zones, partial sovereignty, temporary suspensions of what Hannah Arendt was later to call “the right to have rights,” provisional impositions of states of emergency, promissory notes for elections, deferred or contingent independence, and “temporary” occupations—these conditions lie at the heart of a broad range of imperial projects.<sup>32</sup> If the expanse of spatial sovereignty is unstable so are the terms for the inclusion and exclusion of peoples. Imperial formations are founded on sliding scales of basic rights, as Jane Burbank shows so clearly in the case of Russia.<sup>33</sup> Such conditions required constant judicial and political reassessments of the criteria for affiliation, distinctions that invariably exceeded any clear division between ruler and ruled.

Sometimes empire-states were intent to establish their order by clarifying borders but as often they were not. Agents of imperial rule invested in, exploited, and demonstrated strong stakes in the proliferation of geopolitical ambiguities.<sup>34</sup> The observation invites a re-viewing of what counts as imperial expansion and what does not. Those terms signaling the unclarified sovereignties of US imperial breadth—unincorporated territories, trusteeships, protectorates, possessions—are not the blurred edges of what more “authentic,” nonvirtual, visible empires look like, but variants on them.<sup>35</sup> Uncertain domains of jurisdiction and ad hoc exemptions from the law on the basis of race and cultural difference are guiding and defining imperial principles, as students of colonial history should know well.

Edward Said’s insistence that specific empires claim to be unlike all others critically identifies discourses of exceptionalism as part of the discursive apparatus of empires themselves.<sup>36</sup> We extend Said’s insight: imperial states by definition operate as states of exception that vigilantly produce exceptions to their principles and exceptions to their



laws.<sup>37</sup> What scholars have sometimes taken to be aberrant empires—the American, Russian, or Chinese empires—may indeed be quintessential ones, consummate producers of excepted populations, excepted spaces, and their own exception from international and domestic laws.

As we expand our notion of imperial force fields to early modern forms of empire, to imperialisms without colonialism, to empires by other names, and to imperial formations outside of Europe, efforts to do so without sacrificing historical specificity and theoretical validity come with risks. If so many of the elements long considered imperial are called into question here, the reader might rightly ask, What are the attributes that still mark something as imperial?

There is consensus on some points, but differences in emphasis remain. In this volume, most of the contributors agree on inequitable treatment, hierarchical relations, and unequal rule.<sup>38</sup> Fernando Coronil insists that empire is a concept that identifies “relatively large geopolitical formations that establish dominion by hierarchically differentiating populations across transregional boundaries.”<sup>39</sup> All agree that the forms of domination and exploitation go beyond economic exploitation and geopolitical domination, that empire-states, as Frederick Cooper writes, “determine the forms in which opposition could gain a foothold and the terms in which (cotemporaneous and our current) analysis of colonization could be articulated.”<sup>40</sup> Jane Burbank turns to the vast “organizing capacity” of imperial states, to the scope and scale of intervention, violent or otherwise. A hierarchical sense of difference organizes and also informs imperial practice. As Ussama Makdisi demonstrates, American missionaries in the Ottoman Middle East believed in “the righteousness of their cause [and] the inevitability of their triumph.”<sup>41</sup>

One thing that these perspectives share is an emphasis on how knowledge is organized and conceived. Imperial projects are predicated on and produce epistemological claims that are powerful political ones. Coronil aptly sums up a prevailing premise of new scholarship on empire: it is “the privilege of empires to make their histories appear as History.”<sup>42</sup> Just how they do so may vary, but “modalities of representation predicated on dissociations that separate relational histories, that reify cultural differences and turn difference into hierarchy” are critical epistemological features with deep political effects.<sup>43</sup> Dissociated

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histories sometimes appear blatant, once identified, as in the case of Haiti's part in the French Revolution;<sup>44</sup> sometimes the lineaments that connect remain harder to track, as Peter Perdue argues for the unintended endorsements of subsequent racial politics by successive Qing emperors<sup>45</sup> or as Nicholas Dirks contends in the case of the missed importance of empire for the development of modern sovereignty.<sup>46</sup> But as the cases in this volume underscore, imperial polities are not, as we once imagined them, based on fixed forms and secure relations of inequity: they produce unstable relationships of colonizer and colonized, of citizen to subject, and unequal struggles over the forms of inclusion and the principles of differentiation.<sup>47</sup>

There is nothing comprehensive about this list of imperial attributes, nor is definitional satisfaction the goal of this particular volume.<sup>48</sup> In fact, we focus in some sense on the very opposite; namely, on disparate nomenclatures as well as shared ones, on contexts in which "national interest" and "human rights" are the terms that replace and efface imperial intervention; on situations in which unequal rule corresponds to the imperial attributes mentioned above but those polities call themselves by other names. The varied terms empire-states give to their interventions and forms of sovereignty may stymie scholarly attempts at definition, but these creative vocabularies too are part of the imperial game.

Claiming exceptionalism and investing in strategic comparison are fundamental elements of an imperial formation's commanding grammar. As we expand the imperial forms to which we look, it is increasingly clear that overt comparison and claims to exceptionalism went hand in hand.<sup>49</sup> At the same time that architects and agents of empire sought comparison, they claimed exceptional status for the imperial ventures of which they were a part. In the cases of the Ottoman, Chinese, Dutch, US, and Russian empires most notably, searches for comparison and claims to exceptionalism were not contradictions but compatible conventions. Comparison provided the legitimating grounds for exceptional status, immunity, and exemption from international law—hallmark features of imperial statecrafts. Thus our widened perspective underscores the common emphasis on exceptionalism across imperial time and space. Alongside the inclination to appraise and compare, to borrow and share across empires, was—and

is—the claim to exceptionalism that occupies academic projects as much as imperial states.

### THE POLITICS OF IMPERIAL COMPARISONS

The lexical intricacies of *colonie* provide insistent reminders that some of these features taken to be fundamental to late nineteenth-century European empires at an earlier moment were particular, distinct, and not long entrenched. Those features that provide the template of European colonial empires and the scholarship about them—sharp distinctions between metropole and colony, an abiding preoccupation with race over other exclusions, the incessant proliferations of distinction in the pursuit of profit—look less like imperial universals when considered across a thicker swath of imperial ground.<sup>50</sup> Our goal, however, is not to simply turn universals into particulars, but to question the logic supporting universal claims. We specifically, therefore, bring together scholars of European and non-European empires—British, Chinese, Dutch, French, Japanese, Ottoman, Qing, Russian, Soviet, Spanish, and US—to reexamine the theories and imaginaries, the histories and politics upon which our understandings of colonies and colonialism, empires and imperialism have been and continue to be worked out.<sup>51</sup>

We use the term “colonial studies” with a specific body of literature in mind: that which developed out of Edward Said’s enabling challenge in the late 1970s to put specific forms of cultural production and regimes of truth at the creative center of imperial politics. We are less concerned with Said’s intervention, one that pointedly included US empire in its purview, than with subsequent scholarship that has focused almost solely on the ways in which certain European states—France, England, and the Netherlands most notably—framed their imperial projects.<sup>52</sup> Several of the contributors here—Dirks, Cooper, and Stoler—are among those whose work at one time steered colonial studies in that prevailing direction.<sup>53</sup> Anthropology and history were not the only disciplines interested in European colonialisms. The impetus came from postcolonial theory as well, from cultural studies, English departments, and philosophers whose take on empire derived from an unacknowledged and often unexamined European prototype.<sup>54</sup> Many analyses are still wed to this constricted model, not least

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new studies of non-European empires and the sorts of relations those polities establish with their subject populations.

Insisting that the structures of imperial rule should not be drawn solely from late nineteenth-century Europe invites entry into far wider geographic and historical fields.<sup>55</sup> Imperial agents themselves employed ideas from earlier or other polities, albeit often with different intentions and results. While they modeled their practices on those of other polities, their modeling was less a wholesale replication of practices than a selective bricolage. Such administrative work entailed a refunctioning of practices in different places and to different ends. Imperial architects talked about models, but comprehensive borrowing was rarely what they had in mind.

What might be awkwardly termed “modular modeling” is a more accurate description of what imperial agents actually did in specific contexts and at specific times. This term implies piecemeal projects that partially adopted certain practices while carefully leaving other parts behind. What they retained is of as much interest as what they discarded. The modular quality of political forms, a characteristic Benedict Anderson has identified in the making of nineteenth-century nationalisms and that Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler have used loosely to describe the fashioning of new colonial projects, captures such comparative labor in the uneven stratigraphies of the imperial formations themselves.<sup>56</sup>

Attention to modularity foregrounds convergence and counter-intuitive comparisons: a French empire that looked to Russia and Australia, a Russian one that looked to Spanish Creole communities in Latin America, a Qing empire that looked to the Ottomans and the Portuguese, and an Ottoman empire that was keenly aware of American missionary activities in Hawai`i. Attention to such lateral, oblique, and global visions does something more: It undercuts both developmental and linear models. It allows us to think with multi-dimensional movement rather than with the one-dimensional clarity of maps; with different densities of concern and with different surfaces coming into contact.

Comparison, however, was strategic and situational, relevant and revelatory in some times, irrelevant and to be avoided at others. Our analytic turn, thus, does not aim to resurrect a comparative imperial

studies based on national character, as Cooper and Stoler, among others, criticized over a decade ago.<sup>57</sup> Nor are we intent to provide a model or formula for how these comparisons should be carried out. Rather, our sights are set on developing questions that treat comparison as an *active political verb*. Those questions might include when comparisons are enlisted and set aside, for what reasons, by whom, and to what effect. What commensurabilities are required and what differences are effaced? What kinds of new knowledge are mobilized in making new comparative claims? Such questions do specific analytic labor: they demand reflection on the work that comparison does as an act of governance and as a located political act of analysis.<sup>58</sup>

Inviting attention to the politics of comparison does not mean that we expect these comparative ventures to be pursued in parallel ways. Nor do the contributors here do so; in fact, some do not explicitly compare at all. Some attend to comparison and convergence at the same time. Some look more to shared imaginaries and intentions, others to shared structural consequences and economic effects. Nor is there consensus as to whether we should be comparing those policies envisioned but unrealized, or those that were effectively enforced.

We call for an appreciation that the shifting references for what constitutes comparison are at once historical and political issues.<sup>59</sup> They are not benign. The fact that some contributors found their materials more amenable to comparison than others is also due to the nature of archival formations themselves. Dutch authorities who sought comparisons with Australia's colonization of its hinterlands or with Spanish authorities in the Americas rarely did so across the board. Comparisons were invoked to legitimate acts of violence and interdiction and to counter specific social reforms. Thus the will to compare on the part of scholars may be thwarted by the nature of archival organization, by the idiosyncratic contexts and events for which comparative frames were enlisted in the techniques of governance.

### THE NATIONAL, THE GLOBAL, THE IMPERIAL

If colonial studies has produced a representational archive of empire that seems to mimic that of well-bounded nation-states, it has also generated debate about the relation between empire and nation. Frederick Cooper argues that we have overemphasized the national

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impulse for empire,<sup>60</sup> while Prasenjit Duara contends that we have not recognized that impulse enough.<sup>61</sup> Duara argues that as developed in Manchukuo, the prevalent modern imperial form is empire without colonialism, that is, empire beholden to a nation-state project rather than to an expansionist or territorial one. For the most part, empire has been viewed as an extension of nation-states, not as another way or even a prior way of organizing a polity. Irene Silverblatt counters with the argument that nations and nationalism were “born from colonial processes.”<sup>62</sup> Cooper also sees it otherwise: even those model empires of western Europe were not simply extensions of a home polity.<sup>63</sup> In the case of France, he maintains that empire was not seen as a monolithic or even coherent project, but as a series of projects, of relationships with different peoples and polities. Inclusion and differentiation were not stable across French imperial territories, but widely varied and subject to debate.

The common notion that imperial formations build on old differences and foster new ones underwrites much of recent imperial historiography. Yet empire-states are not always invested in escalating differences between social groups. Using the case of Ottoman religious tolerance and American missionary intolerance, Ussama Makdisi contends that neither Ottoman nor American colonial sensibilities were secular, liberal, or modern. If the Ottomans tolerated difference, Peter Perdue shows how Qing China accommodated difference through a series of shifting paradigms for civilizing projects. In the case of Russia, Jane Burbank contends that the right to difference grounded imperial organization. In assessing that logic, Burbank suggests that we pay more attention to what constitutes an imperial habitus, “the unrecognized self-reproducing and adjusting field of practiced empire.”<sup>64</sup> Adeeb Khalid, however, argues that what looks like colonial difference in the Soviet Union may be part of several different state projects, only one of which—the imperialism of benevolence—is indebted to empire or its state practices.

It is not only nation-state projects that get melded with imperial ones. Those policies, personnel, and practices of multinational corporations and globalizing technologies can become so entangled and embedded that they seem indistinguishable as well. However, there is a newness to globalization that no one would want to disavow in its

present form. But imperialism is not globalization. We do not suggest that emergent forms of global networks reiterate familiar networks from earlier nineteenth- and twentieth-century imperial forms. Those emerging now are animated by new forms of global consumption, marketing, and communication and should not be reduced to earlier forms that depended on different technologies of production and exchange. What Arjun Appadurai calls “the rush to history,” the refusal to reckon with what is located in *this* moment, should grab our collective attention.<sup>65</sup> We wrestle here with how new innovations make room for and may build on specific recuperations, longer genealogies of which they are a part. As Inderpal Grewal similarly observes, US strategies for accumulating global power were dual—first, the generation of new forms of regulation across “transnational connectivities,” and second, the recuperation of “historical inequalities generated by earlier phases of imperialism,”<sup>66</sup> such as “older colonial legacies” surrounding racial categories.<sup>67</sup> As Foucault reminds us, however, the word *legacy* can conceal more than it reveals. We press such connections and recuperations to identify which features of earlier imperial forms were most durable and then ask why.<sup>68</sup> In the present day, such connections are made not only through the traces of past imperial circuits but also through new transnational routes and global networks.

### EMPIRE BEYOND EUROPE

We are not alone in questioning European models of empire and their late nineteenth-century templates. Recent works in the burgeoning field of empire studies take as their vantage point the Qing rather than the British,<sup>69</sup> move from Saint Petersburg through the Americas to the Russian steppe rather than from Amsterdam to Batavia,<sup>70</sup> or start in Korea, Manchuria, or Taiwan and look to Japan.<sup>71</sup> Such studies do not just rein in European models. Rather, these vantage points reset our temporal clocks at the same time that they redirect our geographic attention. The Qing empire is historically deep, coterminous with not just modern Dutch and French empires but with the early modern Spanish empire in the Americas.<sup>72</sup> This temporal stretch of empire demands a rethinking of colonialism’s “modern” roots, as Laura Hostetler and Irene Silverblatt respectively argue for Qing China and Spanish Peru.<sup>73</sup> Geographic shifts generate new questions about imperial practices and

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effects. How does our understanding of the civilizing mission change upon recognition that the civilizing mission is as Chinese a marker of empire as it is a European one?<sup>74</sup> Does the politics of sympathy that so characterizes the benevolent projects of European colonial reforms produce similar distributions of sentiment or wholly different ones in other locales?<sup>75</sup> In posing these questions, our goal is not so much to provincialize Europe or a European form of empire<sup>76</sup> as it is to push our clarifications of imperial formations outside *and* inside of Europe.

Attention to imperial formations during their moments of transition is also on our agenda. Empires may be simultaneous or successive, that is, geographically adjacent such as Portuguese Macau and British Hong Kong or temporally successive such as Burma under the British and the Japanese. In such imperial configurations, cooperation appears as valued a strategy as comparison and competition. We clearly see this in Tibet, where cooperation, comparison, and competition were all tactics “against empire, not just of it.”<sup>77</sup> British imperial reach in Tibet turned into American imperial shepherding, both of which engendered Chinese imperial action; on the against-empire side, non-colonized Tibetans residing in India drew on pan-Asian anti-imperialist models (from India, China, and Japan) to critique British rule there.<sup>78</sup> New work on such multiplicities of empires includes Korean experiences in writing history between successive periods of Chinese and Japanese reign,<sup>79</sup> Mongolian experiences of a community split between independent Mongolia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC),<sup>80</sup> simultaneous Indian experiences of rule by the British, French, and Portuguese,<sup>81</sup> and Eritrean and Somali experiences under Italian, British, and Ethiopian rule.<sup>82</sup>

What changes as empires shift? As Sudan, for example, transited from Ottoman rule to shared Egyptian and British colonialism, with brief interludes of Belgian and French rule,<sup>83</sup> the Sudanese people (themselves a diverse population) lived with and through these changes that were not of their own making. Complications and contradictions not only plague imperial rule but also get played out between metropole and colony. For the Sudanese, Egyptian anxieties surrounding their status as “colonized colonizers” had real effects felt in everyday life, in administrative decisions, as well as in relations between the two countries today.<sup>84</sup> The crafting of an everyday of empire is a joint but



not shared project, one that continues beyond any supposed “end” of empire. Certain imperial dispositions and categories more easily outlast the legal and political forms of empire than others. Turning to this particularly shifting ground of empire, to an exploration of how colonized peoples maneuvered within and between empires, suggests a new set of questions. How did ordinary people conjugate the dislocative tense of empire? To whom did it matter when street names changed but property lines did not? What imprint did successive empires leave on a population? As with Sudan, Tibet’s twentieth-century history is one of multiple empires—British, Chinese, and American.<sup>85</sup> For both Tibet and Sudan, our histories are written in and of the geopolitical haze generated by a century or more of competing (and at times cooperating) imperial interventions. In both cases, current political situations require an analysis of empire in the present tense as well as the past imperfect one.

In Taiwan, a similar politics of dislocation has a different set of consequences. Drawn into the imperial realm of the Qing empire, colonized by Japan, and claimed by the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan is not widely recognized as independent, nor is Taiwan a member of the United Nations.<sup>86</sup> This erratic genealogy is not alone in unsettling attachments to and estrangements from communities in and out of Taiwan. The very categories of empire and colony are similarly disruptive to contemporary Taiwanese reckonings of imperial pasts. Neither Japanese nor Qing colonialism in Taiwan was recognized as such by European states. Ironically, despite Japan’s efforts at global political significance through colonial rule in Korea,<sup>87</sup> Japanese colonialism was not considered equal to European colonialism by Western viewers. As a consequence, “decolonization” was not applied in the Japanese context. With no explicitly named decolonization process for the Japanese empire as there was for European empires,<sup>88</sup> there was also no public discourse on empire and its aftermath in either Taiwan or Japan (or in Taiwan and Qing China).<sup>89</sup>

In China, as elsewhere, imperial vocabularies have a particular politics. Successive polities—Chinese, Mongol, Manchu/Qing—are unproblematically labeled “empires.” Twentieth-century China, however, can neither comfortably be considered “colonized” in the time of European empire nor “colonizer” as the People’s Republic of China.

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Tani Barlow explains this trend as one generated as much by claims of both successive Chinese regimes and multiple European empires to exception status as by Cold War academic politics (as played out in the “Fairbank School” of China scholars).<sup>90</sup> The defining of China as neither colonized nor colonizer reproduces the idea that colonial empire is a European domain. A new generation of scholars argues, however, that twentieth-century China was not outside the European imperial sphere, that is, not “outside the ‘real’ colonial world.”<sup>91</sup>

Colonial histories rarely play out as originally intended. Peter Perdue contends that the Qing emperors ironically laid the groundwork for current tensions of national and racial difference in the People’s Republic of China.<sup>92</sup> Despite the pan-Qing adherence to a model of universal culturalism, Perdue argues that added together, different policies of each emperor contributed to the fashioning of a “racial definition of the state and the people it ruled.”<sup>93</sup> This contradiction within the Qing empire has its parallel in the visible complications and contradictions of the British colonial project in Qing China.<sup>94</sup> In his studies of British imperial “pedagogy” in China, James Hevia maintains that China was not peripheral to European colonizing or globalizing forces.<sup>95</sup> Where Hevia claims that China was an important part of the European colonial world, and Perdue contends that Qing China was an imperial power (and not just a “Chinese” empire habitually set apart from others), Laura Hostetler maintains that Qing China was a colonial power as well as an expansionist imperial one.<sup>96</sup> How might we analyze these parallel British and Chinese colonialisms? Was the “colonial” of Western activities in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century China the same as that of the Qing empire, which ruled from 1644 through 1911? Is it that familiar features of administration and organization—the naming and managing of difference, the claims to exceptional status, the strategies of comparison—mark each? Or is it not so much this similarity that matters as it is the deployment of these features, the means through which they are put to specific ends?

The Manchu Court’s interest in European knowledge systems complicates the received historiography of Chinese–European interactions.<sup>97</sup> The Kangxi Emperor’s techniques and philosophies of rule were neither Manchu nor Chinese nor best understood as European. Instead, Hostetler suggests that Qing practices of geographic and

ethnographic mapping are best understood in a temporal continuum—as early modern as opposed to indigenous or modern.<sup>98</sup> Assigning a temporal classification to these practices places Qing and European imperial technologies within the same analytical and historical realm, rather than within a binary or derivative cultural or geographic framework. Qing China was not isolated from the rest of the world but, as with other imperial formations of the time, participated in, responded to, and shaped similar world forces.

Such specific histories should direct how we write about empire and what we do and do not assume about its shared features. As the nation form increasingly “captured” history,<sup>99</sup> imperial histories became nationalized in manners that obscured specific aspects of imperial formations or even obscured them altogether. The nation “erases” empire in service to new strategies for managing difference, highlighting national unity, for example, rather than imperial variations among a state’s population.<sup>100</sup> Moreover, the historiographies one must write with—and against—are rarely confined to any single empire. As Fernando Coronil demonstrates, current articulations of US imperialism are often contingent on the claims and effects of other imperial formations.<sup>101</sup> One such effect was the enabling of mid-twentieth-century US imperialism by the period of European decolonization.<sup>102</sup> For both the United States and the People’s Republic of China, the anticolonial and anti-imperial rhetoric associated with decolonization deflected charges of imperialism at the same time that it facilitated new imperial projects.<sup>103</sup> Yet not all anti-imperialism generated a new imperialism. In the Soviet Union, Adeeb Khalid sees not a socialist empire but an “activist, interventionist state that seeks to sculpt its citizenry in an ideal image.”<sup>104</sup> Khalid’s argument regarding common Soviet citizenship builds his case against Soviet empire and is parallel to other arguments that citizenship is not possible within empire.<sup>105</sup> Carole McGranahan takes a different stance—that while it may rarely be a genuine privilege of empire, citizenship “does not rule out colonization.”<sup>106</sup>

## THE PRODUCTION AND PROTECTION OF DIFFERENCE

Students of European imperial formations have long taken the construction of difference and consolidation of distinctions as central

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to the political viability and organization of those polities. But from a non-European center, that hallmark feature is more open to question. All empires are composite polities of varied human social forms, but not all are invested in producing differences to the same degree. New studies of Chinese, Russian, and Ottoman empires set our sights on a different tension: that between the production of difference and its protection, resting less on exclusion alone than on a principled tolerance of religious, cultural, and linguistic variations. The production of difference in the Ottoman case operated in different manners and over a far greater span of time than did the nineteenth-century European empires that have so preoccupied colonial studies.

Imperial formations practiced tolerance and discrimination to different degrees. This statement would be less striking were it not for the fact that studies of European empire rarely imagine the concept of “tolerance” as a relevant one. Ussama Makdisi traces a genealogy of tolerances that turns conventional historical accounts on their heads. Ottomans accommodated religious difference, unlike US imperial agents, who more often refused different forms of faith. Here the “politics of comparison” is played out at several critical levels: one, between Ottoman and US agents of empire but also among different and seemingly incommensurate US imperial ventures themselves. US officials and missionaries viewed their choice of strategies in the Middle East in direct light of what they could not accomplish among Native Americans in the 1830s.

As importantly, Makdisi’s essay confronts the task of thinking creatively about convergent and dependent histories. It is not only that failed efforts in one place open the possibility for another venture: traces of that earlier, seemingly distant Native American history are plaited through the later Ottoman one, the knowledge of one shaping how historical actors once knew and how historians today can know the other. Makdisi’s essay demonstrates the vast gap in understandings of religious difference between Ottoman communities and Protestant missionaries. The Ottomans embraced tolerance of different religious communities under assumptions of hierarchy, rigid separation, and no crossing of boundaries. Missionaries, on the other hand, based on their experience with Native Americans in the United States, assumed uncritically the superiority of Anglo-Saxon peoples. They embraced a

transformational ideology that stressed the need for total conversion from one faith to another and saw the Ottoman empire as filled with oppressed people who longed for liberation from their backward, stagnant religious and social environment. Focusing on the ambiguous case of one individual, As'ad Shidyaaq, who seemed to have converted to Protestantism, Makdisi's account underscores the dramatic intersection of different visions of what imperial subsumption entails.

Imperial formations neither imagined uniform sorts of rule nor subscribed to uniform vocabularies. Thus they demand that our analytic lexicon stretch to these shifting spaces as well. Jane Burbank argues that what constitutes a "composite state" or "composite empire" in Russia does just that, offering a compelling vocabulary with which to think about the enduring and varied politics of difference and particularity that guided some imperial polities more than others.<sup>107</sup> Key to her analysis is recognition of a differential distribution of rights based on the granting of privilege by the state to the various groups that comprised it. The tsarist state kept control of a polity containing extraordinary degrees of cultural difference without creating comprehensive classifications coherently organized around religion, ethnicity, territory, or language. Equally, its legal codes allowed local courts to recognize a range of customary practice. Stressing imperial practice instead of official ideology, Burbank highlights the great diversity of the empire instead of the later monotonal autocracy of a centralizing ideology dominated by Moscow.

The accommodation of difference, the importance of legal categorizations of subjects' privileges, and the "ongoing tension between universalizing, homogenizing ends and pragmatic differentiated practices" are key issues that empires beyond Europe bring into relief. What Burbank calls the "pragmatic politics of social inclusion" ensured long life for the Russian empire in ways that demand we ask why and how people chose to participate in it. Even rebellions against the imperial order, for example, often only claimed to reassert privileges guaranteed by the tsar and did not try to overthrow the tsarist state. The persuasions and comforts of habitus explain this in part, but most provocatively, Burbank posits an "imperial social contract" that may account for the enduring qualities of an empire-state, a social contract that not only allows but also actively supports social particularity.

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If from a Russian perspective, one could hold “difference as normal,” from a Soviet perspective it was decidedly not. Adeeb Khalid, impatient with the quick rush to write Soviet history as an imperial one, makes a strong case, from the vantage point of Central Asia, for why an expanded notion of empire may be neither accurate nor appropriate. Khalid demonstrates how the Soviets broke sharply with tsarist accommodation by introducing, with great violence, a radical modernizing project designed to pull all the Soviet Union’s diverse peoples toward common Soviet citizenship in pursuit of the ultimate goal of building communism. He denies, however, that this developmental project was Russian imperialism. Throughout Central Asia, Soviet goals overlapped with those of many native intellectuals. Unlike the historiography on European empires in which the distinction between citizen and subject is more often taken for granted, Khalid reminds us that the threshold between the two is wider and more ambiguous than is often acknowledged.

Khalid identifies a critical distinction between imperial technologies of rule that operated in nineteenth-century Russia and those used by a Soviet macropolity. He asks not how to assess empire outside of Europe, or how to reassess European empires, but when and why the category of empire is historically applicable. “Where,” he queries, “does empire end and other forms of nonrepresentative or authoritarian polities begin?” Khalid’s skeptical approach to the current vogue of colonial and postcolonial theory in Russian studies provides welcome pause to our overall project. External domination is not a guaranteed indicator of imperialism, nor do once imperial polities seamlessly morph into new imperial formations. Thus territories once colonized by Russia were not simply converted into Soviet colonies under the USSR. Instead, Khalid argues that the genealogy he traces for the Soviet state is not an imperial but a modernist one in which the “activist, interventionist state...seeks to sculpt its citizenry in an ideal image.”<sup>108</sup> Khalid’s attention to the politics of the label “empire” in the tsarist/Soviet context further focuses our attention on post-World War II, Cold War framings of imperialism. As he states, the “lines connecting empires to mere states are not easy to discern.”

Why has the passage from empire to nation produced such a violently racist ideology? Peter Perdue asks this critical comparative ques-

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tion, but in a way that students of European imperial history might pose quite differently. He looks at how Han Chinese writers in the 1900s drew new sharp distinctions between themselves and their Manchu rulers, mobilizing a virulent form of racial nationalism. Three converging global processes supported their project. These were the latent discourse of racial exclusion in the Chinese classical heritage, as reinterpreted by activist scholars and students at the end of the Qing Dynasty, global ideologies of scientific racialism, transmitted from Europe and the United States to China via Japan, and the experiences of Chinese overseas students and migrants in Japan, Southeast Asia, and the United States.

Chinese discussions of “barbarian” nomads had always alternated between visions of racial exclusion and cultural inclusion. The Qing Dynasty, as a Manchu conquest dynasty bringing both central Eurasian and Han peoples under a single imperial gaze, faced these tensions of empire in particularly heightened form. The late nineteenth century and first decade of the twentieth century sharpened the contradictions so much that the Manchu empire could not survive. Anti-Manchu mobilization was not simply a passing moment in Chinese nationalism but one of its foundational principles. These imperial contradictions, which echo European racial discourse since the sixteenth century, still persist in the nationality policy of the People’s Republic of China today. Even though modern China perceives itself as heir to a two-thousand-year-old continuous imperial tradition, this tradition contains tensions in its ideology and practices that are fully recognizable as characteristics of more recent imperial formations across Eurasia.

## RETHINKING BOUNDARIES, IMAGINARIES, EMPIRES

Imperialism is not always a colonial endeavor. Indeed, Prasenjit Duara contends that empire without colonialism is the “new imperialism” of the twentieth century. In his formulation, imperial strategies of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan depart from the organizing strategies of European colonial empires. Instead of colonial polities marked by difference and extraction, this new imperialism creates or incorporates peripheral states, modernizing and developing these regions in service to their own global aspirations. If Duara’s specific case of Japanese Manchukuo fits this model, its extension to the

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United States cannot sidestep difference or extraction so quickly, nor remain solely in the twentieth century. Fernando Coronil pushes us back further, calling for a renewed analytics of earlier American imperial formations. The multiple configurations of US imperialism index an imperial agility not beholden to the obligations of a publicly acknowledged empire. As Coronil argues, this flexibility is evident in a historical trio of imperialisms—colonial imperialism, national imperialism, and global imperialism—that may coexist within any one imperial power. These forms are not historically prior to one another. In the present world, he contends, all three forms are operative.

What sort of subjects does an empire without colonialism produce? What does it mean, as Carole McGranahan asserts, that “to be an imperial subject was not necessarily to be a colonial one?”<sup>109</sup> It is not just a matter of a direct versus indirect relationship to empire, nor a question of one status being more pernicious than the other. Both categories signal an imposed relationship to empire, an imposition that persists even as the categories and relationships themselves shift. In Latin America, Fernando Coronil suggests that the relationship to empire is experienced as “a common sense understanding of reality” in that US imperialism is an unmarked category.<sup>110</sup> As imperialism folds into everyday life, it is simultaneously diffuse and tangible. This does not always mean it is subtle. A short list of US imperial domains alone—Okinawa, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Philippines, and Iraq, to name but a few—provides evidence of this. It is not only the United States or other postcolonial empires that create and maintain noncolonial imperial subjects; European colonial empires did as well. Relationships to empire are never of one’s own choosing, but there are individuals, whole communities even, who did choose to “live in someone else’s empire.”<sup>111</sup>

British India is one example: in the early twentieth century, the Himalayan hill town of Kalimpong had a diverse community of colonized and noncolonized peoples (along with a range of British citizens, Europeans, and Americans with varied connections to the empire). Tibetans resident in Kalimpong were imperial but not colonial subjects and thus were both safeguarded from and disadvantaged by a colonial list of rights and regulations. McGranahan’s narrating of the dilemmas of Tibetan noncolonials in British India emphasizes the “troubled importance” of the imperial–colonial gap for subjects and imperial



agents alike. McGranahan suggests that these sorts of imperial experiences are “out of bounds,” that is, askew to received notions of where imperial interests lie. The noncolonial and other supposedly peripheral spaces of empire are not easily factored into standing discussions of colonialism, yet the unease they introduce is itself an important facet of imperial projects and scholarship. Given that the imperial boundaries were never limited solely to directly colonized territories, studying empire out of bounds should sharpen rather than dull the extent to which analytic frameworks capture imperial effects.

Categorical boundaries for such imperial formations extend in several different directions. In the period following decolonization, certain spaces opened for imperial subterfuge while others closed. Empire did not necessarily go away (as the terms *decolonization* and *post-colonial* each imply), but reorganized itself in forms publicly contrary to the classic European model of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As McGranahan specifies, decolonization provided a cover for new imperial formations, allowing them to refuse the labels “imperial” and “colonial.” For Tibet, imperial formations of both the People’s Republic of China and the United States fit this category. China’s current rule of Tibet is certainly imperial, if not colonial, yet Chinese disavowals of either category go mostly unchallenged. If China established its anti-imperial stance as an anticapitalist one, then the United States asserts its anticolonialism in developmental terms. “Interventions” by the United States on behalf of development and democracy may be a different sort of imperialism, but one no less influential for Tibet than the interventions of British officials in earlier decades. For example, CIA efforts to support Tibetan resistance against China drew Tibetans into the orbit of yet another global power, whose interests were not the same as their own. Like many of the authors contributing to this volume, McGranahan zooms in on local manifestations of imperial force fields, showing how grand plans hatched in metropolitan centers turned into quite different projects on the ground and in the minds of Tibetan actors.

Such domestic disconnect might itself be a historical project, what Prasenjit Duara calls the “fault lines” of empire. In considering how Japanese interpreted the possibility of the incorporation of non-Japanese as equal citizens, calls for assimilation ran up against claims

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of the primacy of blood and race. This story—one familiar also to China, as Peter Perdue demonstrates—blurs boundaries between empires and nations. Duara sees imperialism as both a goal of nationalism and an important means of its formation. His focus on different forms of affiliation with empire underscores one of our central claims: that gradations of sovereignty are the rule of empire-states, not the exception. Duara places Manchukuo, the independent state established by Japan in northeast China in 1931, beyond the nominal borders of the Japanese empire or the Chinese nation-state. In this out-of-bounds sense Manchukuo resembled Tibet. In the realm of international geopolitics, what was Manchukuo? Was it a nominal nation not recognized by any state except Japan, a “client-state” lying between full colonies such as Korea and truly independent nations under military rule, or an inalienable part of China taken over by alien military conquest? Japan’s multiple forms of domination in East Asia show many similarities to European forms elsewhere.

The developmental state was also an important component of many imperial formations. Japan set up Manchukuo as an independent nation but imposed on it programs of industrialization and agricultural development to serve its own military needs. Some Chinese, however, endorsed the Japanese project and worked with it to serve their own goals. Manchuria, a region that had only recently been colonized by Han Chinese prior to Japanese colonization, became a frontier space of experimentation, where imperial promoters invoked discourses of civilization, pan-Asianism, racial war, and pseudokinship to mobilize East Asians in a common enterprise. In Duara’s view, Japanese practice actually recognized and promoted difference, in the form of popular religion and local ethnicity, more actively than did the Chinese nationalist regime, which tried to suppress both ethnic and religious diversity to strengthen a centralized state.

Such imperial circuits, the exchange of tactics and practices among imperial officials, past and present, persist with or without our debates over categories and classifications. Fernando Coronil asserts that imperial circuits were never rooted only in empire but also in the spaces between regions, in the networks of capitalism that linked empire to imperial territories as much as to colonial ones. Capitalism, he argues, is central to imperial formations in their present and past

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forms. Other volume authors, especially McGranahan (but also Perdue, Duara, and Khalid), find significant imperial activities beyond the bounds of European capitalism. Coronil's arguments, however, hinge on using capitalism to reassess categories of empire, to see where and how capitalism interlocks with imperialism as a political formation defined by domination, be it political or economic, formal or informal. Here it is not so much a question of the form of a given imperial formation but its effects among people trying to "make sense" of their "experiences of inequality, exploitation, and domination."<sup>112</sup>

Of the many blueprints available for assessing imperial formations and effects in the present, Coronil turns to September 11. Specifically, he thinks through the differences in September 11s—9/11/1973 in Chile and 9/11/2001 in the United States. If the September 11, 1973, overthrow of Salvador Allende with US complicity draws our attention to imperialism, the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States draw our attention to empire. Coronil urges us to tend to both, to continue asking how much US imperial domination is founded on the denial of that history. His argument extends beyond the Americas to ask how to make the concept of imperialism "useful" in the present. As a first step, he suggests a broadening in chronological as well as geographical terms. In extending empire's temporal scope backward to sixteenth-century Spain and forward to the twentieth-century United States, those empires without colonies assume "singular relevance for considering the present."

## NEW GENEALOGIES OF EMPIRE

Perhaps one of the most important contributions of colonial studies over the last decade is to reverse the trajectory that imagines the modern as a European invention. More than just "laboratories of modernity," as Gwendolyn Wright once called the colonies,<sup>113</sup> colonial situations demand a recasting of the relationship between empire and the modern. The contributions here take that impulse in new directions. Empire primed the modern state through expectations, habits, and tribulations. Bureaucracy, sovereignty, nationalism, and other attributes of the modern state were developed—at least in part—through imperial practices abroad and in response to the anxieties they often generated in Europe.

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Rethinking statecraft is one critical way of unbracketing imperial practices from what has been cordoned off as European history proper. In so doing, this rethinking challenges claims to what constitutes the originary modern. New work on the Spanish empire pulls our modern genealogies back from the nineteenth century and south of northern Europe, while work on cornerstone empires such as those of Great Britain and France shows how empire threatened rather than merely supported or proved a training ground for the European state.

Irene Silverblatt sees the Spanish Inquisition as a key source of modern practices of statecraft.<sup>114</sup> The Inquisition, as implemented in colonial Peru, developed a large bureaucratic institution stuffed with paperwork as it attempted to purify the empire through well-documented legal procedures. At the same time, the Inquisition reflected deep-seated fears about disloyalty of subject populations as it mobilized the “pure-blooded” colonial elite against those with suspect allegiances. Hannah Arendt argued that totalitarian states in twentieth-century Europe used racial ideologies to support bureaucratic state interests in a racial system that could be traced back to Inquisitional Spain;<sup>115</sup> Silverblatt relocates those racial practices in colonial Spanish policies in Peru. The contest for control over the dreaded outsider, the heretic, or the racial alien, which lies at the heart of modern state formation, expressed itself very early in European colonial history.

Indeed, Silverblatt argues that we must trace modernity back to the seventeenth century to fully grasp the effect of colonialism on the European state. Shifting our focus from Britain and France to Spain and Portugal reveals that “the mix of ‘civilizing,’ bureaucracy, and race thinking at the heart of modern experience” developed out of the empires of southwest Europe.<sup>116</sup> Challenging this northern European dominance of the imperial form upsets genealogies of modernity that start both earlier and elsewhere. Silverblatt is careful to show the multiple ways that practices of the Spanish Inquisition fashioned a modernity suitable for Europe and the colonies, albeit one that has been overlooked in favor of other times and other empires, and of our experiences and relations.

Nicholas Dirks “writes empire back into the history of the West” in yet another fundamental way.<sup>117</sup> Suggesting that our understandings of sovereignty have been dislocated from their imperial underpinnings,

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he traces the expansion of the East India Company on the South Asian continent and the discussions in Parliament about the relationship between company authority and Crown control. Edmund Burke, as both political theorist of imperial relations and the prosecutor of Governor-General Warren Hastings for corruption in India in 1788, emerges as a critical figure enunciating the doctrines that closely linked British sovereign rule in India with the “ancient constitution” at home. Scandal was key to the development of the idea that empire was dangerous to British sovereignty and that the company needed to be reined in for sake of the fledgling nation. Dirks contends that this sense of empire as crisis for sovereignty has dropped out of our understandings of modern sovereignty.

In undoing common assumptions of British empire in India as the archetypal imperial form, Dirks sketches a new view of just how contentious imperial projects in India were for the metropolitan British state. The building of empire was neither orchestrated by officials in London nor consonant with their ideas of what empire should look like; instead, empire had an unexpectedly influential role in the shaping of modern Britain. In Dirks’s formulation, however, imperialism and capitalism worked together to craft modern Britain in unforeseen ways. Rather than paving the way for the nation-state, imperial realities (if not ideals) threatened to disrupt the very bedrock of national sovereignty. Using the trial of Warren Hastings to demonstrate this potentiality of empire, Dirks further contends that attention to the erasure of empire evident in the trial and in the histories it has generated allows us to reanimate the story of both empire and sovereignty then and now.

As we have insisted, imperial formations generated ambiguous conceptual frames, social categories, and geographies on which they thrived. As Frederick Cooper writes, they were a “space that was neither sharply differentiated nor wholly unitary.”<sup>118</sup> Such gaps and openings provided room—small though it may have been—for maneuvering within and beyond structures of domination and difference. Taking two points at the beginning and the end of France’s trajectory between revolution (the Haitian-French Revolution, 1789–1804) and decolonization after World War II, Cooper shows that at both times French leaders were not thinking of France as a singular nation-state ruling dominated colonies, but as one presiding over multiple units, each

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with a different relationship to ruling institutions. Not only could the terms of incorporation and differentiation be manipulated to preserve the imperial polity, but some of the most important critics and opponents of the colonial status quo hoped that those structures could be manipulated in different ways, not turning empire into nation but into a more egalitarian form of multinational polity. In between, one does not find a stable relationship of colonizer to colonized, of citizen to subject, but unequal struggle over forms of inclusion and differentiation.

As importantly, Cooper argues that views of France as the epitome of modernity—modern empire, modern nation, modern state—fail to adequately explain nineteenth- and twentieth-century French history. Holding that “France became national at the same time as its colonies,” Cooper takes on the project of “provincializing France.” This is not, he argues, a new project, nor one derivative of recent work in postcolonial studies, but an endeavor to be recommenced. In the 1940s in both Senegal and France, progressive local leaders and colonial officials sought to reframe French empire to advance new ideas about the plurality of imperial community. The awkward fit between the multiple allegiances of empire and the homogenizing impulses of nationalism was put to use by elites such as Senegalese political activist and president Leopold Sedar Senghor. During decolonization, Senghor and others effectively invoked French ideals of citizenship to promote their power within the French imperial system (as well as at home). Cooper suggests that the historical reassessment of both empire and nation that this case requires must be routed through Napoleon’s France just as much as through French Morocco, Algeria, or Senegal. It is France, as much as its empire, that needs to be rethought.

## **WRITING IN THE IMPERIAL PRESENT**

We write in a time in which the concept of empire appears and disappears as a political analytic. Urgently called upon and debated when the war in Iraq began, empire was then almost abruptly left aside, despite the war’s continued virulence. But such has been the strategic invocation of empire at other times as well. Those large territorial states that do dominate different cultures and suppress resistance from them (e.g., China in Tibet and Xinjiang, Russia in Chechnya, Israel in Palestine) have claimed and continue to claim these territories as

essential parts of the nation, not as imperial possessions. Some might argue that there are few colonies left.<sup>119</sup> But we do not concede that point so quickly. Imperial vocabularies have narrowed over time, such that the French range of meanings for *colonie* with which we began appears merely metaphorical in the present, rather than definitional or operational. The histories behind the terms often tell different stories. Discarding the term *colony*, therefore, also “discards the histories that have found quiet refuge within it.”<sup>120</sup> In its contracted, singular form—of formal, often overseas settler colonies—the colonial is the target of critiques from all sides.

Anticolonial sentiment of the twentieth century cleared the way for the quiet persistence of colonies officially sidelined by the narrower model. As a result, several volume authors—especially Prasenjit Duara—suggest that empire without colonization is the prevalent twentieth-century model.<sup>121</sup> In this dual formulation—of empire without colonies and of colonies as a singular form—US global hegemony is the case par excellence. While current US actions in Afghanistan and Iraq are the impetus for much of the renewed debate about imperial formations, part of our collective motivation is to provide a framework within which to consider American empire in a broader range of imperial formations and in a specific genealogy of American imperialism that well predates the Cold War.<sup>122</sup>

How to imagine the history of imperial formations to work as effective knowledge today remains the pressing question, for some more than others. Frederick Cooper urges us not to become caught in marking out genealogies but “to look at what possibilities were available to people at different moments in history and not only to see where those concepts in use today come from.”<sup>123</sup> Others hold fast to an insistence that genealogies of a longer *durée* provide a more telling history of the present. Fernando Coronil endorses the latter, calling for attention to the imperial effects on people subject to the organizing power of contemporary imperial forms.

Most papers in this volume do both, tracking imperial possibilities and practices as well as the spatial and temporal genealogies that inform them. Some authors work up close, in the familiar quarters of everyday lives amid imperial projects or inside the muddle of imperial projects themselves—Makdisi’s missionaries and converts, Perdue’s

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emperors and authors, McGranahan's rebels and soldiers, Cooper's intellectuals and officials, and Dirks's politicians. Others track imperial formations at broader levels, assessing constructs, intentions, and consequences across wider geographic, historic, or institutional sweeps—Burbank's detailing of rights and inclusions, Khalid's analysis of the interventionist state, Duara's outlining of a developmental imperialism, Coronil's scrutiny of imperial effects and persistence, and Silverblatt's tracing of a new colonial biography for modern torture. In the context of specific empires, volume authors address analytic questions that are shared but are not one and the same.

Despite the range of topics covered in this volume, some issues slip through. Questions of gender and race are minimal; the voices of imperial subjects are few. We had not anticipated how easily the project would move away from the microsites of rule, those arenas of the domestic and intimate that have so transformed our understanding of imperial governance, of how and where it takes place. No simple answer explains this slippage. As we collectively worked to assess imperial formations, not just as historical polities but as a flexible analytic term—one relevant and at work well beyond (and before) nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe—this project on refiguring the imperial took root at a different level. If our labor here tends more toward the institutional or the familiar than the domestic or intimate, our questions in general (and some of our collective findings) open to both, to an institutional *and* intimate analytics of imperial formations representative of the multiplicity of communities caught within and between empires.

Analyzing such systems of imperial domination via “their significance for subjected populations, rather than solely by their institutional form or self-definition,”<sup>124</sup> is as much an ethnographic venture as it is historic and textual. Sitting down with imperial agents and subjects, as Carole McGranahan does with former CIA agents and Tibetan guerrilla soldiers,<sup>125</sup> is not the same as reading their stories in the archives. A different set of seductions is involved in each venture such that these are complementary but not interchangeable projects.<sup>126</sup> Effective histories of contemporary empire need both. Catherine Lutz makes an appeal for more ethnographies of contemporary empires, arguing astutely that “empire is in the details.”<sup>127</sup> As Ann Stoler has



long argued, such details are deeply embedded in the changing social and affective lineaments of the everyday.<sup>128</sup> The “human and material face and frailties of imperialism” at home and abroad haunt the present in ways that create new methodological demands: to recognize both the complex interiorities of those living in and off empire and the creative terms of critique of those living under the imperial spotlight or in its shadows.<sup>129</sup>

One thing is clear: more examples from a wider field are not enough to unsettle prevailing models. Stockpiling cases is hardly the point. Collectively, if differently, we seek to reconceptualize what constitutes imperial forms and to ask what advantages are gained for whom by doing so. Rather than rush to distance ourselves from a field declared as fraught with traps, we have chosen instead to pause, to take advantage of this moment when efforts to rethink empire are not coming only from the North Atlantic center but taking place in many locales, among people with different stakes and political agendas.<sup>130</sup> We stay resolutely concerned with the politics of comparison to foreground the relational quality of imperial formations and the uses to which knowledge of them is and should be put.

### Notes

1. Translated from Tourdonnet, *Essais sur l'éducation des enfants pauvres*, vol. 1, 26. The quote reads: “*Pour nous, une colonie agricole est une institution rurale qui étend ses bienfaits sur tous ceux qui y ont accès, à quelque titre que se soit, et dont les bénéfices leur appartiennent, dans less et dans les limites de la fondation, sou la condition d'un devoir à accomplir. Que ce devoir consiste dans un travail de défrichement ou de culture régulière, dans un service plus ou moins assujettissant, ou dans une simple obligation de séjour; peu importe au fond; la règle s'applique à tous, l'obéissance est de rigueur pour tous. Chacun contribue dans la mesure de sses forces det de ses aptitudes, selon la teneur de son contrat, s'il y en a, ou des obligations que lui impose son admission; chacun perçoit proportionnellement aux droits communs à tous, ou aux droits spéciaux qui lui sont réservés. Tout individu qui habite la colonie est colon, quelque rôle qu'il y joue, quelque treavail qu'il doive exécuter, quelque droit particulier qui lui sont attribué.*”

2. See Tourdonnet, *Essais sur l'éducation des enfants pauvres*, vol. 1, 26.

3. On the Portuguese expansion of empire through “criminals, sinners, orphans and prostitutes as colonizers,” see Coates, *Convicts and Orphans*.

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4. For two different treatments of the relationship between penal colonies, colonial expansion, and the people who inhabited and moved between them, see Price, *Convict and Colonel*, and Redfield, *Space in the Tropics*.

5. While we highlight pauper, penal, and settler colonies here, leper colonies were of equal importance in this frame of reference. See Anderson, "States of Hygiene."

6. In using the term "social etymology," we look to Michel Foucault's notion of "historical ontology" and Ian Hacking's elaboration on this notion in *Historical Ontology*, page 5. What intrigues Hacking about Foucault's use of "historical ontology" is how it points to "the beings that become-things, classifications, ideas, kinds of people, people, institutions," with emphasis on knowledge, power, and ethics. With "social etymology" we think particularly of the enduring social relationships of power that remain buried and suspended in political terms.

7. On Russia's new "framework of comparison," see Sunderland, *Taming the Wild Field*, 45.

8. Bassin, *Imperial Visions*.

9. For a discussion of some circuits of knowledge production in a US context, see Stoler, "Tense and Tender Ties."

10. Tourdonnet, *Essais sur l'éducation des enfants pauvres*, vol. 1, 16-17.

11. Tourdonnet, *Essais sur l'éducation des enfants pauvres*, vol. 2, 179-80.

12. Tourdonnet, *Essais sur l'éducation des enfants pauvres*, vol. 2, 17.

13. Verdes-Leroux, *Les Français d'Algérie*, 195.

14. Montagnon, *Histoire d'Algérie*, 180.

15. Verdes-Leroux, *Les Français d'Algérie*, 195. J. P. T. Bury's count is fifteen thousand arrested. Four hundred and fifty of these were deported to Algeria. See Bury, *France*, 77.

16. Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 69; Belvaude, *L'Algérie*, 36.

17. See Ussama Makdisi, this volume.

18. Representative of much of this literature is Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*.

19. *Colon*, as used in the mid-nineteenth century to refer to children housed in rural assistance programs, is wholly absent from the lists provided in the three etymological dictionaries consulted here. A possible vestige may remain in the term *colonie de vacances* for children's (usually rural) summer camps.

20. Bassin, "Inventing Siberia," 771.

21. Althusser and Balibar, *Reading Capital*, 313.

22. Williams, *Marxism and Literature*, 117.

23. As an analytic that focuses on the formative and transformative aspects of

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empire, we see our notion of “imperial formation” as related to, but differing from, Mrinalini Sinha’s concept of an “imperial social formation” as a “mode of analysis that is simultaneously global in its reach and conjunctural in its focus.” We thank an anonymous reviewer of an earlier version of this introduction for pointing out Sinha’s use of a similar vocabulary of which we were both unaware. See her “Mapping the Imperial Social Formation,” 1078, 1082; “Teaching Imperialism as a Social Formation”; and *Colonial Masculinity*.

24. The following section draws on Stoler, “On Degrees of Imperial Sovereignty,” which in turn drew on insights of participants in this conference.

25. Winichakul, *Siam Mapped*, 130

26. Anthony Pagden makes a similar point that empires consist of and rely on mobility; see his *Peoples and Empires*.

27. As Carl Schmitt once noted, “every true empire around the world has claimed such a sphere of spatial sovereignty beyond its borders...a space far exceeding the boundaries of the state proper.” Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth*, 281.

28. Nor, as Nicholas Dirks contends in this volume, was sovereignty safely located in London or even solely in England.

29. Armitage, *Ideological Origins*, 6-7.

30. Stoler, “On Degrees of Imperial Sovereignty,” 138.

31. Aleinikoff, *Semblances of Sovereignty*.

32. Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 296. See also, for example, Sandars, *America’s Overseas Garrisons*, esp. 142-145 on Guantanamo’s history; Hernon, “The Falklands,” 43-48; and Richardson, *When Allies Differ*.

33. Jane Burbank, this volume.

34. For an argument that this is part of a new “new imperialism,” see Prasenjit Duara, this volume.

35. For an example of a protracted contest over degrees of sovereignty, see Osborne, “*Empire Can Wait*.”

36. As Said noted, “Every single empire in its official discourse has said that it is not like all the others, that its circumstances are special, that it has a mission to enlighten, civilize, bring order and democracy, and that it uses force only as a last resort.” Said, *Orientalism*, 2003, xxi.

37. Stephen Rosen, professor of national security and military affairs at Harvard’s Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, makes a similar point when he argues that “the organizing principle of empire rests on the existence of an overarching power that creates and enforces the principle of hierarchy, but is not itself bound by such rules.” Rosen, “An Empire, If You Can Keep It,” 53.

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38. These are some of the attributes Ronald Suny provides in “Learning from Empire.”

39. Fernando Coronil, this volume.

40. Frederick Cooper, this volume.

41. Makdisi, this volume.

42. Coronil, this volume. See also Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World* and *The Nation and Its Fragments*; Guha, *History at the Limit*; and Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs*.

43. Coronil, this volume.

44. See Dubois, *A Colony of Citizens* and *Avengers of the New World*.

45. Peter Perdue, this volume.

46. Dirks, this volume.

47. Imperial polities might also be imperial in some realms of their domains and not others. As Adeeb Khalid argues in this volume, the Soviet Union can rightly be considered imperial in relation to its external empire but not in his estimation in relation to its internal domains.

48. For a volume that productively explores some of the definitional quandaries of empire in relationship to contemporary political interventions of the United States, see Calhoun, Cooper, and Moore, *Lessons of Empire*.

49. As Selim Deringil argues in the case of the Ottoman empire, imperial officials considered the Ottoman state “somehow sui generis and [therefore it could not]...be compared to any other polity.” Deringil, *Well Protected Domains*, 5; see also his “They Live in a State of Nomadism and Slavery.” For a comprehensive review of American exceptionalism in a range of historical fields, see Tyrell, “American Exceptionalism.” Also see Kramer, “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons.” An argument that “the Netherlands does not belong among the imperialistic powers” is discussed by van Goor, “Imperialisme in de Marge?”

50. For a description of some features that have defined understandings of European colonial empires, see Stoler and Cooper, “Between Metropole and Colony,” and Catherine Hall, *Cultures of Empire*, 1-36. For a history of theoretical approaches to European colonialism, see Wolfe, “History and Imperialism.”

51. For a comparable approach, see the collected essays generated by the Colonialism and Its Discontents conference at Academia Sinica in Taiwan in 1997. As conference organizer Allen Chun argues, “understanding colonialism as an abstraction must begin by understanding colonialism as a concrete, historical experience. Moreover, this is the only basis for understanding colonial experiences comparatively, as well as for understanding what may be considered colo-

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nial violence in political regimes not literally defined as colonial (given the conventional definitions of European colonialism).” See his “Introduction: (Post)Colonialism and Its Discontents,” 382.

52. On Edward Said’s own attention to U.S. empire, see Stoler and Bond, “Refractions off Empire.”

53. We think here of a number of key monographs and edited volumes, such as Dirks’s *Colonialism and Culture*; Cooper and Stoler’s *Tensions of Empire*; and Prakash’s *After Colonialism* (which expands the purview to Latin America), and the dense body of work in subaltern studies focused on South Asia and the British empire, including *Subaltern Studies*, vols. 1-10, and *Subaltern Studies*, vol. 11.

54. Bhabha, *Location of Culture*; Said, *Orientalism* and *Culture and Imperialism*; Spivak, *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason*; and Robert Young, *White Mythologies* and *Colonial Desire*.

55. In addition to the cases highlighted in this volume, see also recent and forthcoming works on other European empires, such as Ben-Ghiat and Fuller, *Italian Colonialism*; Palumbo, *Place in the Sun*; Steinmetz, *Devil’s Handwriting*; and Wildenthal, *German Women for Empire*.

56. See Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, and Stoler and Cooper, “Between Metropole and Colony.”

57. Cooper and Stoler, *Tensions of Empire*.

58. While not advocating a formal comparative model, our project could be considered in dialogue with George Steinmetz’s notion of “critical realist” comparison. As he outlines it, “a critical realist comparative research strategy . . . [compares] across mechanisms and across events. Empirical phenomena may be selected for comparison for explicitly political or ‘interested’ reasons or because they are believed to be relevant to uncovering or illuminating the causal mechanisms and structures of interest.” Steinmetz, “Odious Comparisons,” 393.

59. For a fuller treatment of the politics of comparison, see Stoler, “Intimidations of Empire” and “Tense and Tender Ties.”

60. Cooper, this volume.

61. Duara, this volume.

62. Irene Silverblatt, this volume.

63. See also Dirks, this volume, for a rethinking of nation and empire in the British context.

64. Burbank, this volume.

65. Appadurai, “Globalization and the Rush to History.”

66. Grewal, *Transnational America*, 21-22. Grewal defines “transnational

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connectivities” as constituting webs of “connections that move along historicized trajectories.”

67. Grewal, *Transnational America*, 209.

68. Silverblatt, for example, pushes us to reassess “our sense of modernity,” contending that we must “trace its elementary forms back from the nineteenth century to the seventeenth.” See Silverblatt, this volume.

69. On the Qing empire, see Crossley, *Translucent Mirror*; Elliott, *Manchu Way*; Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise*; Millward, *Beyond the Pass*; Perdue, *China Marches West*; and Teng, *Taiwan’s Imagined Geography*.

70. New works on the Russian empire include Barkey and von Hagen, *After Empire*; Bassin, *Imperial Visions*; Brower and Lazzarini, *Russia’s Orient*; Burbank and Ransel, *Imperial Russia*; Hirsch, *Empire of Nations*; Khalid, *Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform*; Northrop, *Veiled Empire*; and Sunderland, *Taming the Wild Field*.

71. On Manchuria and Japan, see Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*; Matsusaka, *Making of Japanese Manchuria*; Tamanoi, *Dreaming Manchuria* and *Crossed Histories*; and Louise Young, *Japan’s Total Empire*.

72. See Lewis, *Hall of Mirrors*; Mallon, *Peasant and Nation*; Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs*; Seed, “Taking Possession and Reading Texts,” *American Pentimento*, and *Ceremonies of Possession*; Silverblatt, *Modern Inquisitions*; Thurner, *From Two Republics*; and Thurner and Guerrero, *After Spanish Rule*.

73. Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise*; Silverblatt, *Modern Inquisitions* and this volume.

74. As argued by both McGranahan and Perdue, this volume.

75. Rai, *Rule of Sympathy*.

76. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*.

77. McGranahan, this volume.

78. McGranahan, this volume.

79. Schmid, *Korea between Empires*. Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson contend that colonial and postcolonial studies of Korea are a matter of “theory run[ning] ahead of history.” See their preface and introduction, along with accompanying essays, in *Colonial Modernity in Korea*.

80. Bulag, *Mongols at China’s Edge*.

81. For the literature on British India, starting points include Cohn, *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge*; Dirks, *Castes of Mind*; and Guha, *Dominance without Hegemony*. In comparison, English-language scholarship on Portuguese and French colonies in India is still scant; see Coates, *Convicts and Orphans*; Miles, *Imperial Burdens*; and Siqueira, “Postcolonial Portugal, Postcolonial Goa.”

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82. On Italian colonialism in Africa, see Ben-Ghiat and Fuller, *Italian Colonialism*; Hess, *Italian Colonialism in Somalia*; Negash, *Italian Colonialism in Eritrea*; and, Palumbo, *Place in the Sun*.
83. Powell, *Different Shade of Colonialism*; Sharkey, *Living with Colonialism*.
84. Powell, *Different Shade of Colonialism*.
85. See McGranahan, this volume.
86. On these points, see Teng, *Taiwan's Imagined Geography*.
87. Dudden, *Japan's Colonization of Korea*.
88. For a detailed examination of the decolonization process of European colonies, see Muriel E. Chamberlain, *The Longman Companion and Decolonization*.
89. Ching, *Becoming "Japanese"*; Teng, *Taiwan's Imagined Geography*.
90. Barlow, "Colonialism's Career in Postwar China Studies."
91. Hevia, *English Lessons*, 26.
92. Perdue, this volume.
93. Perdue, this volume.
94. Hevia, *English Lessons* and *Cherishing Men from Afar*.
95. Nor was China outside the US imperial realm at the time. See Scully, *Bargaining with the State from Afar*.
96. Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise*.
97. Moving beyond, or at the very least alongside, a story of European imposition and Chinese resistance, we find a series of relationships between Qing rulers and Europeans abroad. The Kangxi Emperor (1654-1722) was a cosmopolitan ruler in a noncosmopolitan society, an intellectual drawn to global currents of technology and information in a society that prized Chinese cultural epistemes and scholarly pursuits. His coterie included Jesuit European as well as Han Chinese advisers and administrators.
98. Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise*, 21.
99. The idea of "capture" is taken from Duara's *Rescuing History from the Nation*. See also Partha Chatterjee, *Nation and Its Fragments*, and Dirks, "History as a Sign of the Modern."
100. Perdue, this volume.
101. Coronil, this volume.
102. McGranahan, this volume.
103. McGranahan, this volume. See also Duara, this volume, for a perspective that reaches back further in terms of "new" imperial projects.
104. Khalid, this volume.
105. Steinmetz, "Return to Empire."

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106. McGranahan, this volume. See also Cooper, this volume, for a discussion of the range of concerns with imperial citizenship in the French context.
107. See Burbank, this volume, and Suny, "Learning from Empire."
108. Compare with Enrique Dussel, who argues on the contrary that colonialism is the "underside of modernity." Dussel, *Essays: The Underside of Modernity*.
109. McGranahan, this volume.
110. Coronil, this volume.
111. McGranahan, this volume.
112. Coronil, this volume.
113. Wright, "Tradition in the Service of Modernity."
114. Silverblatt, *Modern Inquisitions* and this volume,
115. Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*.
116. Silverblatt, this volume.
117. Dirks, this volume.
118. Cooper, this volume.
119. On contested and continuing European colonies in the present, see Aldrich and Connell, *Last Colonies*.
120. David Bond, personal communication.
121. As Duara argues, "the costs of direct colonial rule increased while the conditions for indirect rule were enhanced."
122. See Bender, *Rethinking American History*; Briggs, *Reproducing Empire*; Go and Foster, *American Colonial State in the Philippines*; Kaplan, *Anarchy of Empire*; Kaplan and Pease, *Cultures of United States Imperialism*; Love, *Race over Empire*; Rafael, *White Love and Other Events*; Stoler, "Tense and Tender Ties"; and Trask, *From a Native Daughter*.
123. Frederick Cooper, personal correspondence.
124. Coronil, this volume.
125. McGranahan, this volume
126. On the seductions of the ethnography of empire, see Gill, *School of the Americas*, and Lutz, *Homefront*.
127. Lutz, "Empire Is in the Details."
128. See Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power*, and *Haunted by Empire*.
129. Lutz, "Empire Is in the Details," and Stoler, "Toward a Charmless Colonial History."
130. In Russia, for example, a new generation of scholars critiques conventional approaches to Russian empire in favor of a critical, poststructural approach. See Gersimov and others, "In Search of a New Imperial History."