In April 1942, amid the hardships of the 900-day German siege of Leningrad, Pavel Gubchevsky, head of security and longtime tour guide at the Hermitage Museum, led a group of army cadets from Siberia on a
tour of the museum. The tour was a token of thanks for their assistance in moving a collection of valuable French furniture, already waterlogged, to a place where it might be protected from the elements and the mischances of war. What made this event remarkable was that the museum’s paintings had already been removed from their frames and taken away to safe storage. As the young soldiers walked past the empty frames and labels that remained, the guide described what they would have seen if the paintings had been there. “That was the most curious excursion in my life,” Gubchevsky recalled. “And it turned out that even the empty frames left an impression.”

This event, one of several Empty Frame tours that Gubchevsky conducted during the war, is the subject of the Dutch artist Melvin Moti’s exquisite short film No Show. What we see on-screen for the twenty-two minutes of the film’s duration is an empty room—not, in fact, the museum’s gallery—graced by three tall windows framing some leafy trees. The only visible movement in the room is the lengthening and softening of the light reflected on the floor through the windows; in this gradual darkening of the room, we witness the passage of time, which lends a sense of historical depth and verisimilitude to the narration of the reenacted tour. This still scene has the effect of foregrounding voices and sounds: the tour guide’s invitation to the soldier-comrades to gather around as he describes in great detail the pictures that had hung there; his admonitions to attend to the broken glass shattered on the floor of some galleries; the sound of heavy army boots as the men move past and pause before the images; their laughter at the tour guide’s jokes. The tour guide makes occasional reference to the pictures’ physical absence. At other times he invites his audience to “look closely” while he discloses what was once there.

Viewers of the film are doubly—or indeed triply, in the case of those who must rely on the English subtitles of the Russian narration—removed from the pictures that had previously inhabited the empty frames. The film constructs “an absorbing aesthetic out of a visual void,” an effect that is heightened toward its conclusion, when the screen turns wholly black. Reflected back to us from this increasingly opaque surface is not only the fantasmatic presence of images and the vivid work of the imagination but also the way in which every image evokes an absence and a beyond.

We begin our introduction with this anecdote because it raises a number of themes that run through this book. In the most literal sense it reflects our shared, long-standing interest in the fate of images in situations of crisis, like the vulnerable, contingent materiality of the artifacts composing the Hermitage collection. Crises often put images at risk physically
and may precipitate movement, in the form of being removed to a place of greater safety or confiscated as loot, the fate from which the Hermitage staff hoped to safeguard the collection by shipping off artifacts to more secure surroundings.3

In situations of social and political turmoil or profound change, images may be at risk not only physically but also conceptually. What images are, where they may or may not go, what they are expected to do socially, politically, aesthetically, epistemologically, psychologically, ideologically, and so on, may become foci of attention and contribute to their revaluing and refiguration. Images may be abandoned, forgotten, disavowed, or even destroyed, as in the drastic refiguration of iconoclasm, in its literal sense of “idol-breaking”—the physical destruction of images of false gods—or the more widespread and commonplace “metaphorical iconoclasms” of commodification (the image as vessel of exchange value) and philosophical negation (the image as false or outmoded representation), both of which find expression in the protective seclusion of the museum.4

Iconoclastic destruction, the collateral damage of incidentally inflicted injury, and even the aesthetics of aging and deterioration can sometimes also be productive and creative. They can initiate a process of literal “re-vision”
that opens a space for new ways of looking or in some cases alters the visual field. Thus—to remain within the precincts of the besieged Hermitage Museum—it was only in the absence of the museum’s art collection, when the buildings’ vulnerability to the forces of war and environment had already been marked on their torn and scarred surfaces, that their architectural beauty came into view. Graphic artist and theatrical designer Vera Miliutina described their exposed, partially ruined grandeur: “The emptied halls were huge and majestic, their walls covered in crystals of frost. They had never before seemed so splendid to me. Before one’s attention had usually been fixed on the painting, sculpture or applied art and the art of those remarkable architects and decorators who created the palaces went little noticed. Now, though, all that was left was their astonishing art (and the traces everywhere of the savage, implacable Fascist barbarity).”

Such destruction itself can become the subject of image-making. A group of Leningrad artists, including Miliutina, produced a series of drawings documenting “the Hermitage’s wounds” the broken windows, the pools of water, the ice-encrusted floors, the damaged façade, and other destruction to the museum buildings resulting from German bombardment and artillery fire. These drawings, now housed in the Russian National Museum, have been the subject of repeated exhibitions, in which they served not only as evidence of “Fascist barbarity” and the indomitable spirit of the Russian people but also as aesthetic objects in their own right.

Beyond the context of endangerment and loss in which Gubchevsky’s Empty Frame tours must be seen, No Show stages the affective power of images and intimates what viewers themselves bring to them: “even the empty frames left an impression,” as Gubchevsky put it. For even if the soldiers on his tour—“country boys” hailing from places like Vologda, Cherepovets, and Ust’-Luga—“came to the Hermitage for the first time and some had never even been to a museum before,” they shared some general reference points and affective resonances with the tour guide who conjured the absent images for them: familiar religious iconography, ideas of natural beauty, perhaps the notion that works of art are—or should be—framed.

Moti’s cinematic “reenactment” of the Empty Frame tour also draws attention to movement—to those processes of circulation, imagination, and reception in which, as Arjun Appadurai puts it, “moving images meet deterritorialized viewers.” The film presumes a movement of objects—antique furniture carried to safety, for which the tour provides a thank-you, as well as the absent paintings themselves—but it equally highlights the tour’s movement as the guide and soldiers navigate their way, unseen by the film’s viewers, through the empty rooms, past the frames and labels that serve as
placeholders for the missing images. Like the tour itself, the film’s imaginative appropriation of it highlights the mobility and instability of images as they circulate across genres and forms, taking on new meanings and engaging different audiences in different ways. The multiple, sometimes unexpected publics that may be called up by these moving pictures; the repurposing or “remediation” of visual images that shift from one medium

Figure 1.3
Vera Miliutina, Broken Window and Vase, 1942. Image © The State Hermitage Museum. Reproduced with permission of the State Hermitage Museum, St. Petersburg, Russia.
or genre to another; the mutually defining yet contingent relation of image and frame, of object and representation, or of text and image; the significance of the “work of imagination” in the travels and stopping points of images in motion; the material, political, and spiritual conditions of possibility that enable and impede the movement of images—these are among the mobile themes, eloquently evoked by Moti’s small film and the tours that inspired it, that play through this collection of essays.

Images That Move is concerned with the ways in which images take place in wider worlds and with the role they play in “poetic world-making” projects and political transformations. Our conceptual framework triangulates three key, interrelated terms: circulation, affect, and publics. These concepts, taken together, inform our title in its double sense, both intransitive and transitive, of images that move around and images that move us.

Looking at images that move may, we believe, illuminate some of the characteristics that apply to images more generally. These include their heterogeneity and inherent instability as forms; the diverse epistemological and aesthetic assumptions that may apply to them; the social, institutional, and historical conditions and ideological formations that inflect their possibilities and limitations; the technologies that delimit and contour their capacities; the media through which images are formed and projected and with which they become identified; the differing status attributed to such media; the translocal circuits along which images move or are restrained from movement; the affective potentiality of images as they encounter, engage, or engender various audiences, or publics, in their travels; and, most crucially, the way in which these myriad elements variously crystallize around, are refracted within, and provide definition to images in motion.

The chapters in this volume were first presented, in some cases in radically different form, at the advanced seminar “Images without Borders” held at the School for Advanced Research on May 4–8, 2008. This original title was intended as a provocation and challenge to consider the implications of the hardly novel yet radically enhanced “borderless” traffic of images often said to be characteristic of our current moment. The proliferating effects of new media technologies, in which certain visualizable events appear increasingly “to be taking place everywhere and nowhere in particular,” are, of course, crucial to any understanding of a globalizing modernity. But we also wished to qualify the “newness” of such media experiences by examining a wider range of modes of image production and reproduction, from such “traditional” media forms as painting to “once new” media like photography and cinema, and, as in our opening anecdote, the mutual imbrication of media forms both old and new.
Introduction

Attending to images, we believed, could reveal new forms and modes of circulation, from the most narrowly informational to the referentially more open-ended, along with the publicities and publics that these precipitate and from which they emerge, and the wider political, historical, and cultural implications of these circulations and precipitations. As our initial anecdote of frames without images is meant to suggest, such a proposition quickly became both too circumscribed and too expansive. Over the course of our discussions, particularly as these developed among the participants during the seminar, we began to shift our conceptual rubric from the purposefully ironic utopianism of “images without borders” to the richer set of propositions about affect, agency, circulation, and spectatorship implied by the multivalent, troubling notion of “images that move.”

Recognizing not only the uniqueness of the present moment in a range of locales but also its historical antecedents and prophetic foreshowings—the movement of images not only through space but also through time—we convened an interdisciplinary group of participants from the fields of history, art history, anthropology, and literature. We aimed to move beyond disciplinary “turf wars” that would align Western, modern, or elite art with history and art history; non-Western art with anthropology; and contemporary mass art with sociology and cultural studies. Each of us used a particular image or set of images as a jumping-off point to reflect on what images are, what they do, and how they do it. The images under consideration ranged from medieval European representations of Islamic idolatry and iconoclasm (chapter 2) to contemporary art in postapartheid South Africa (chapter 7), from real estate brochures for upscale gated communities in the new “world class” of “India Shining” (chapter 3) to the work of Chinese studio and amateur photographers around the turn of the twentieth century (chapter 5), and from the high art of postmodernity to such “low” forms as Internet pornography and teen horror films (chapters 8 and 10, respectively). Each chapter is at once closely tied to its particular locale(s) and moment(s) and closely attentive to the global and subglobal circuits and vectors along which images travel, to the common pathways and unique detours of images in motion, and to the fragile patterns that emerged as we brought together these disparate, moving pictures.

With varying emphases, all chapters in this collection are concerned with problems of images that move, in both a transitive and an intransitive sense, as well as with the necessary relation between the two. Because of the range of themes that connect and at times divide these chapters, we have not sorted them into topical sections but rather have thought in terms of adjacencies and echoes, clusters and conflicts. There is a rough continuum,
from those chapters that are concerned more with the images themselves than with their audiences and publics, to those for which the calling up of publics is the predominant focus.

The first three chapters, by Finbarr Barry Flood, Christiane Brosius, and Patricia Spyer, address images on the border between social and political domains. Taking as a point of departure the controversy surrounding the publication in a Danish newspaper of a series of cartoon depictions of the Prophet Muhammad, Flood (chapter 2) foregrounds the contested image itself as a border phenomenon, a site of confrontation between different visual economies in relations between the Islamic world and the secular/Christian West. This confrontation, he argues, is part of a longer history of Christian (mis)perceptions of Islamic hostility to and overvaluation of representational art reaching back to medieval encounters between the two faiths. Brosius (chapter 3) introduces the term “enclave gaze” to characterize the imagery of upscale real estate development advertising in India, which pictures a cosmopolitan lifestyle of “world-class” enclaves of Greek temples and imperial nostalgia, while simultaneously blocking from view the adjacent “barren arid stretches” that mark the landscape of “a poor country that looked and felt poor.” Spyer (chapter 4) also discusses a form of pictorial enclaving, in this case the reclamation of Christian public space in the aftermath of religious conflict in Ambon, Indonesia. In a “dramatic retooling of visual imagination,” Ambonese Christians reconfigure public space through the creation of massive murals linking biblical themes to local identities and experiences of suffering, creating a new landscape of trauma and salvation that enframes daily life within a Protestant version of the passion play that is literal rather than allegorical.

The four chapters that follow form a loose cluster addressing connections among the material apparatus of image production, sociopolitical transformations, aesthetic vision, and relations of temporality. The chapters by Oliver Moore, Christopher Pinney, and Rosalind C. Morris are concerned with photography and its “prophetic” potential. Moore (chapter 5) traces the problematic category of “Chinese” photography in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, moving between pictures of China and pictures by Chinese photographers, pictures intended for Chinese and for other audiences, pictures that measure the “Chineseness” of their subjects and those that index the modernity of the (Chinese) subject. He frames this discussion through the concept of “retrospective aura,” in which later audiences read a kind of authenticity or meaning into the picture that may be at odds with its initial status as an image. Pinney (chapter 6), in what could be described (with a nod to Walter Benjamin) as a “little history of
Indian photography,” takes up the prophetic capacity of camerawork rather than pictures as such. Presenting a series of episodes in Indian photography between 1840 and 2008, he tracks the changing “technical practices” of photography as its gaze shifts from the “physiognomic landscape” of the human face to the “social landscape” of public space and finally to the internal landscape of bodily interiority. Objects of this increasingly prostheticized gaze become, in his account, both less visible to the unaugmented eye and more fully dedicated to the forensic demands of detection and surveillance.

Pinney’s opening admonition, borrowed from Walter Benjamin, that the “task of the photographer…is to reveal guilt,” is poignantly realized in Morris’s (chapter 7) analysis of images of animal-human hybridity in South African art photography and literature. Here the conjoined themes of the human-animal hybrid, with its implications of bestiality, of rape and miscegenation, and of the disguising mask, provoke a deeply ambivalent approach to the multiple violences of apartheid and to the struggle to “think beyond” it from a subaltern or disenfranchised point of view.

The disturbingly beautiful images of Morris’s chapter, with their cryptic or absent titles and captions, point as well to a picture’s capacity to “move us” beyond words. For Morris, art works compel attention precisely by eschewing “information,” thus, perhaps bypassing the issue of translatability in its literal sense altogether. This possibility connects her chapter to Ernst van Alphen’s (chapter 8) analysis of the “release of affect” in contemporary society, as particularly exemplified in certain works of nonrepresentational art. A painting such as Roni Horn’s Gold Field, van Alphen argues, “neither deals with signification, the meaning of the work, nor articulates the work within a discursive framework.” It is thus crucial to develop a way to comprehend the affective force of the image as what “leads to thought” and is “felt” rather than what is “thought” or “recognized or perceived through cognition.”

The final three chapters in this volume, by Brian Larkin, Mary Margaret Steedly, and Steven C. Caton, deal with cinematic images and their publics. How do they engage or call up certain “publics“ at certain times and places? How do they achieve recognition by— or create— the audiences they, either intentionally or not, address? Larkin (chapter 9), looking at the reception or “uptake” of Indian film in Hausa communities of Nigeria, argues that the capacity of images to reach their publics depends on the “intensities of desire” they incite. This desire in turn involves “complex acts of identification and translation,” or what Larkin calls “commensurability,” as images move across terrains of cultural difference. Questions of uptake similarly animate Steedly’s (chapter 10) examination of contemporary horror films.
in Indonesia. These films, she argues, play on the ambivalent desire for and fear of visibility that constitutes a novel regime of visuality among urban youth of today’s “post-Reformation” generation, who have come of age in the aftermath of the fall of the dictatorial New Order government. Finally, Caton (chapter 11) looks at the “modular image” of the “white sheik” of Western popular media, an ambiguously sexualized figure who is both white and Arab. The avatars of this “ideologically laden” liminal figure are as diverse as Rudolf Valentino’s passionate sheik of silent film, General Norman Schwarzkopf emulating the cinematic “Lawrence of Arabia,” and the “embedded” anthropologist of military counterinsurgency programs. Caton’s chapter demonstrates how an image circulates through time and space, appearing and disappearing, taking on new significance in different social contexts—racial ambiguity here, sexual ambivalence there, warrior self-fashioning or counterinsurgency poster boy.

In each of these chapters, the author goes beyond a simple interrogation of what pictures are or what they mean, to consider how certain images come into being and are taken up affectively; how they spread as if by contagion or “stick” in one particular place or another; how they renegotiate the limits of the visualizable or of vision itself or—far from circulating in a “borderless” medium of free communication—can operate as physical or conceptual borders policing the limits of public space or social identity. Our aim is to begin to appreciate the rather different trajectories and publics that may be available to images through a variety of modes of dissemination and distribution.

In the rest of this introductory chapter, we outline the general framework of the book and stake out some conceptual starting points for the chapters that follow. We begin with a brief discussion of what images are and why they might be worthy of special consideration. Next we take up the issue of movement: how images circulate and problems that circulation raises. We then proceed to questions of enframement and context, the containment of images, and how images might escape such boundaries and embeddings. The next set of issues has to do with how images move—through, on the one hand, the enabling and limiting conditions of material, technological, and infrastructural possibility and, on the other, the surges of affect that they provoke in their audiences. Finally, we address the relation between (moving) images and their (contingent) publics. How is it that certain images are taken up (or not) by certain audiences at certain moments? How, in other words, are images apprehended by the multiple publics—diverse, sometimes unexpected, occasionally obtuse—that they encounter? What can we make of these encounters?
Introduction

WHY IMAGES?

It may be, as W. J. T. Mitchell speculates, that “the problem of the twenty-first century is the problem of the image.” At the least, the proliferation of academic studies devoted to the image makes it seem so. This is not because of the emergence of some profound analytical frame reorganizing the field of culture theory, but rather because images have come to be “a point of peculiar friction and discomfort across a broad range of intellectual inquiry.”

The “friction and discomfort” that Mitchell identifies come in a variety of forms and approaches, signaling both the long-standing fascination and the iconophobic anxiety of popular and academic critics toward the image. So, to focus on our own discipline only, anthropology has in recent years produced studies of scientific technologies of visibility and representation, including its own historically troubled relationship to them; colonial politics of representation; art worlds and markets; museums and monuments; alternative and indigenous media; the creation (and critique) of ethnographic film; popular photography; art as ideology or media as ideological mode; cultures of viewing or consumption; infrastructures of circulation and distribution; advertising; tourist art; and public art, among others.

Yet, despite all this interest in images and image-making, there is not much clarity about what images are or what they do. “The simplest way to put this,” as Mitchell noted in an essay on the “pictorial turn” first published in 1992, “is to say that, in what is often characterized as an age of ‘spectacle’ (Guy Debord), ‘surveillance’ (Foucault), and all-pervasive image-making, we still do not know exactly what pictures are, what their relation to language is, how they operate on observers and on the world, how their history is to be understood, and what is to be done with or about them.”

Mitchell’s argument was framed in response to a section of a 1988 National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) report entitled “Word and Image,” which attempted to mark a sharp distinction between the two, with the former symbolically represented by “the book” and the latter by “television.” Mitchell quite rightly points out that neither medium can be so neatly categorized, because books have “since time immemorial” been illustrated and television is as dependent on words as it is on images. The distinction, he suggests, has more to do with “deeply contested cultural values” that pit elite against mass culture, academic against public humanities, and “past” against “future” media forms.

More recent works, such as Kajri Jain’s study of Indian calendar art, push these points further, with less discomfort and “disillusionment”
than Mitchell expresses. For Jain, the internal heterogeneity of the image demands an approach that recognizes its “irreducibility to a visuality mediated exclusively by language.” The image, in other words, is always more than what can be said—or written—about it. Indeed, Jain takes this proposition further, arguing in effect that images are ontologically distinct from language and thus cannot be “read” in linguistic terms. She insists on the importance of attending to other aspects of the image—its material existence as an object (as well as a commodity), its circuits of technological reproduction and transmission—and to its audience as “embodied beings” with whom the image engages in more or less significant, more or less lasting, social relationships. This approach opens up new possibilities for “an expansive notion of reception,” beginning with an emphasis on both the “corporeal” form and the efficacious presence of the image, in terms of the myriad affective and libidinal engagements on the part of persons and collectivities that it may elicit.

The visual, as Chris Pinney has similarly argued, should not be understood merely as a “kind of language, discursively constituted,” an approach that would “disallow any confrontation with the figural and resistant properties of certain visual forms,” but neither should it be regarded as entirely antithetical, and inaccessible, to signification. “Perhaps,” Pinney suggests, “the visual should be conceived of as a continuum,” ranging from the strictly discursive to the “figural” or affective. The image is thus “neither one thing nor the other, but encompasses instead a diverse set of forms, differently constituted,” which are always open to novel figurations and framings.

Theories of the image and imaging necessarily adjudicate what counts as an image and what does not. According to Bruno Latour’s definition, an image is “any [visual] sign, work of art, inscription, or picture that acts as a mediation to access something else.” Many of the images dealt with in this book fall easily within the parameters of Latour’s definition. Yet, even this loose gloss is perplexing and incomplete. Not all images are material or even mimetic. Must an image represent something else? Must the representation be visual? Or, if it is, must it be primarily experienced as visual? Can we imagine a sonic image, for instance? What about the visual representation of a concept, process, or plan in the form of a Venn diagram, a graph, an organizational chart, or a “strategy map”? One might think of a range of interiorized or immaterial images—dreams, fantasies, drug-induced hallucinations, the visual impressions evoked by a piece of music or a poem, or the verbal description of a landscape (or, as in No Show, an absent painting). What of optical illusions, daydreaming imaginings of cloud-pictures, or mirror reflections? What about the visual imagery of written words, as in
calligraphic art or even a signature?\textsuperscript{32} What of artworks that depict something invisible or even nonexistent, an image perhaps derived from the imagination of the artist; artworks that hover “at the edge of perception”\textsuperscript{33} or reject representation altogether? Or objects intended to house or evoke a sacred presence, such as a printed god portrait or a fetish object, or to not be seen by a human audience at all? How would a fingerprint, an MRI, or a genome map be categorized? Must an image be something “made,” either through actual labor or through the “work of imagination”? Might it be understood as “found” or revealed, as, for instance, when veined patterns in the carefully placed, marbled paneling of mosque interiors disclose traces of human and animal forms in a space from which all anthropomorphic and zoomorphic images have otherwise been excluded?\textsuperscript{34} Should it bear a physical resemblance to the thing represented? Is the image always, necessarily, the sign of an absence, designating the not-there or the not-that of the thing represented?

Most important for our purposes, what is the place of the image? Notions of what counts as an image and how it operates depend on disciplinary perspective, each field singling out certain kinds of images as legitimate and worthy of attention while relegating others to a background of “illegitimate,” inferior, or second-order images. Academic disciplines “place” the image in another sense as well, by defining the appropriate or relevant context for its examination, study, or appreciation: historical, political, ideological, cultural, aesthetic, and so on—a subject we discuss further in the section “Enframement and Refocalization.”\textsuperscript{35}

Images are legitimized and delegitimized not only by disciplinary boundaries. Concerns about images often emerge at cultural or political border zones where intolerance is at play and where different stakes and interests are mobilized.\textsuperscript{36} In 1994 the runway showing of a strapless bustier-dress decoratively inscribed across the bodice with a Qur’anic passage (mistakenly understood by designer Karl Lagerfeld to be a love poem) led to public protests and death threats against the model, Claudia Schiffer. In an overzealous expression of regret for this religious affront, the dress—nicknamed in the Western press the “Satanic breasts”—was subsequently burned by the fashion house, an iconoclastic move more vehement than the request by Islamic clergy to simply withdraw images of the offending garment from public circulation.\textsuperscript{37}

A more recent example of the trouble that may ensue when images move across boundaries of difference is the case of the notorious Danish “Muhammed” cartoons, discussed in Barry Flood’s contribution to this volume (chapter 2). In 2005 a small Danish newspaper, the Jyllands-Posten,
commissioned and published twelve cartoon depictions of the Prophet Muhammed as a protest against restrictions on freedom of expression. The cartoons, repeatedly reproduced in the Euro-American and Muslim press, triggered demonstrations and counterdemonstrations, riots, lawsuits, and diplomatic protests around the world. The cartoons’ creation and reception engaged, “rhetorically at least,” a notionally European (secular) public that self-identified with tolerance and freedom of expression, in contrast to an imagined (Muslim) counterpublic allegedly “inhibited by the persistence of archaic taboos on image-making.” At the same time, the cartoons—whether actually seen or merely heard about—mobilized an Islamic public that perceived their publication as a desecration of faith or, equally important, as a sign of virulently anti-Muslim sentiments given authoritative expression in a legitimate organ of public discourse.

It is, of course, important to recognize that the trouble with images at the border between “Christians” and “Muslims” is a quite different one from the status and problem of images internal to Islam or Christianity and that multiple, contradictory impulses toward image-making and image-breaking have existed in both traditions. It is possible to trace, as Flood does, a history of Christian attributions of both idolatry and iconoclasm to Islam reaching back to the European Middle Ages, one both cited and reactivated in commentaries regarding the cartoon controversy. And despite Western attributions of “primitivism” and “barbarism” to Taliban leaders responsible for the destruction of Afghanistan’s Bamiyan Buddhas, iconoclasm, as James Simpson argues in his study of the problematic status of the image in Anglo-American Protestantism, “is not ‘somewhere else’...it lies buried deep within Western modernity.”

Besides the specificities of any given “border situation,” what are at stake in such controversies are also larger questions concerning the “ethics, politics, and polemics of the visual in an era of mass media and transregional information flows.” These are questions having to do with the very locus of existential value as articulated, for instance, by the Taliban envoy to the United Nations, who, in the controversy over the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas, highlighted the hypocrisy of Western institutions like New York’s Metropolitan Museum that appear to treasure artworks over human life: they “will give millions of dollars to save an un-Islamic stone statue but not one cent to save the lives of Afghani men, women, and children.” But also at stake are the image’s location in public space (whether on the postwar streets of Ambon City or on Claudia Schiffer’s breasts on the international fashion runway); the transnational traffic in which it is caught
up; and the different image economies through which it moves and is vari-
ously taken up, positively and negatively. It is to these topics that we now turn.

**IMAGES IN MOTION**

Images, Kajri Jain writes, are “bodies that move.” Even when they take the form of still pictures, they are always in motion. They travel from their place of origin to where they are sold, consumed, used, displayed, or watched. They change identities, being at different times embodied ideas, commodities, decorations, icons, souvenirs, amusements, gifts, trash. They flicker across the experiences of daily life, dulling or invigorating the routines of the everyday or opening up vistas beyond it. They activate memory, preserve traces of past events; they offer an escape or another way in. They “act on bodies and create relations between bodies.”

Today, photographed, digitally produced, globally disseminated images impinge on us from all directions; the intimate zones of everyday life increasingly serve both as subject matter for public display and as screens upon which a multitude of images can be projected. The extraordinary proliferation and rapid circulation of visual images via media both new and old, high- and low-tech, contribute to a feeling of global intimacy on the one hand and to a pervasive sense of danger, instability, and dread on the other. Writing this in the days immediately after the tenth anniversary of the September 11 destruction of the World Trade Center, we cannot help but be struck by the extent to which the experience of watching events unfold, repeatedly, on television was recalled by many as a traumatic, transformative event: “Before 9/11 I didn’t know to be afraid,” one woman, a schoolteacher from Sikeston, Missouri, remarked on PBS’s “Video Quilt” interactive multimedia project, “and because of the footage, it brought to life that there are people out there who want to do damage to me, you know, personally.”

Never before has the violent imagery of global crisis and catastrophe been such a fixture of news and entertainment media, nor the boundary of the skin been so permeable to technologies of visual imaging. Nor has it been so easy to purchase, use, and then toss away a camera, so common-sensical to expect the everyday images that crowd one’s day to cover the globe, or so unsettling to see the specter of total visibility granted such legitimacy. This enhanced visibility begets even more visual surveillance, from aerial traffic control and streetside security cameras to nannycams and full-body scan technology. In this climate of enhanced attention to visible signs and mobile images, fear of secrecy and exposure saturates the political imagination.
It is not only the sheer quantitative increase in the circulation of and access to images that demands attention, but also the ways that particular technologies shape certain kinds of images, certain modes of circulation, and certain kinds of audiences, as well as how they affect one another. The fantastic extent and global stretch of such proliferations, the enhanced fetishistic appeal of the spectacle, the heightened sense among social actors of the multiple, overlapping audiences to which they are or wish to be beholden, the ready and repetitive iterations and imitations that images open themselves to, and the growing legitimacy of, and indeed the desire for, total visibility and surveillance are all tele-technical dimensions of this fluid image-environment. Never before, we suspect, has the process of mediation itself been so central to media accounts of global events, as the florid debate about the significance (or not) of social media such as Facebook and Twitter to the rolling demonstrations of the so-called Arab Spring of 2011 demonstrates. In this play of mediation and remediation, it seems that no event is truly “over” if it can be referenced, reenacted, rehashed, or recapitulated in the interests of thickening the media plot.

Unmoored from their sites of production, mobile images may still retain traces of their initial provenances even as they are variously inflected, refracted, reframed, remixed, digitally enhanced, cropped, hijacked, and amplified and their effects intensified or muted. Their presence is reproduced through an array of after-images with lives of their own, moving across different places or emerging rhizomatically in dispersed and disparate sites, perhaps with different senses and agendas. What, to borrow a phrase from W. J. T. Mitchell, do images such as these “want”? What do they demand and desire from us? Or, to put it differently, how might we tell the life histories of such images and their audiences? How do we trace the tangled paths of their travels and returns, unfold their effects and aftereffects, and scan the collectivities—fixed or ephemeral, situated or dispersed—that they invoke or address? What, we might also ask, do we want from them? How are they energized—or materialized—by our desires and demands, and to what ends do we direct them?

Striking in all of this is how the widely acclaimed surplus of images in the contemporary world often, upon closer scrutiny, reduces itself to more modest proportions. Whatever quantitative increase there may have been in image capacity does not necessarily translate into an increase in image variety, as even a facile perusal of Facebook or Flickr will demonstrate. As Pierre Bourdieu points out, the options for what can be considered “photographiable” in any particular context are always extremely limited. The iconic postures of the news photo, the repetitive gestures of “riot porn,” and
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the banality of the snapshot are measures of what counts as a viewable image; so too are the redundant pathos of humanitarian public service announcements and the conventionalized horror of atrocity photographs—which, as Judith Butler notes, are emotionally numbing not because of their sheer surplus accumulation but rather owing to the predictability of their framing, which generates the recurrent sense that one has seen this before.47

ENFRAMEMENT AND REFOCALIZATION

“Imagine the damage caused by a theft which robbed you only of your frames, or rather of their joints, and of any possibility of reframing your valuables or your art-objects.”48 Jacques Derrida's provocative suggestion draws attention to the significance of frames, or rather of processes of enframement, in the generation and circulation of images. By “enframement” we mean the various ways the image is foregrounded or separated from its general environmental surround in order to be apprehended as an image. Enframement can be the provision of a material enclosure—the wooden frame of a painting, for instance, or the boxed screen of a television or computer—or a marked edge, like the bordering line of a cartoon cell or the application of a “frame template” or “border effect” to a digital image via Photoshop. It can take the form of the segmented interior of multiple “windows” through which information is displayed on a computer desktop screen. Enframement can denote the choice of depth of field or camera angle for a photograph, which compositionally “frames” the image as it is created. It is also at work in the techniques of montage: the relational ordering or juxtaposition of images in a cinematic sequence; the placement and organization of photos in a family album; or the overlay of contrastive or contradictory images in photomontage.

Enframement includes frames of reference as well: sets of ideas or assumptions that direct how the image should be evaluated, viewed, or comprehended. Representational genres (the medium of production) and academic disciplines establish and enforce this sort of enframement by determining what counts as a “proper subject” or a “proper style,” as well as by setting up proper evaluative mechanisms for these. For instance, Indian calendar art, as Kajri Jain points out, has generally been regarded as “kitsch” and thus of anthropological rather than aesthetic significance, to be treated as a “symptom” of social processes rather than as an expressive object of interest in its own right.49

Language, in the form of textual commentary, captions, or talk, frequently serves as an enframing device, even, or perhaps especially, when it is located within the body of the image itself, like the time stamp on a
digital photograph or the thought balloon of a cartoon character. In cinema, of course, images and words are inherently intertwined, but such too is the case with photographs or cartoons and their captions. Consider, for instance, the way that captions can serve an “anchoring” function, to the extent that photographs, even those iconic images for which “no caption is needed,” may even be perceived as calling out for them. Many actually require some textual explanation in order to function pictorially, not to mention to establish their status as visual icons. The famous “Times Square kiss” photo, Dorothea Lange’s Works Projects Administration photograph of the “migrant mother,” or the image of Kim Phuc, the Vietnamese “Napalm girl,” may be so familiar to us that we provide a mental frame for them, but if we follow Derrida’s suggestion rigorously and “un-frame” these images, we may find that they immediately lose their iconic impact.

Enframements may aspire to fix the image in a particular place, to a particular audience, in a particular sociohistorical context, drawn sharply. Morris, in her contribution to this volume (chapter 7), complicates this notion of enframement through what she refers to as “refocalization.” Focalization, she writes, “is more than a way of seeing or a point of view; it is...an ideologically inflected perspective that permits one or another object not only to appear but also to cohere as an object of attention.” It is through refocalizations of the perceptual field, as in transitional historical moments, that what was previously seen in one way may take on a radically different appearance, stand in a different relation to its general cultural surround, or disappear from view altogether. At such moments the apparatus of prior enframement, formerly rendered transparent or “natural,” may also come into view within the refocalized field.

Along with aspirations for “transparent immediacy,” images may draw attention to the artifice of genre or medium. Rather than stake claims to the representation of “real life,” “actual events,” and the like, contemporary image production frequently depends on its self-representation as media object. Self-representation may involve the application of outmoded or already refocalized media practices and technologies—photomontage, for instance, or the application of “handmade” digital overlays on a photograph. Processes such as these serve to remind us of “the inherently delicate, transitory nature of the associations that pertain between any given setting and the image world to which it is provisionally conjoined.” The need to attend to the particular constellations and transformative possibilities of such provisional life- and image-world affinities follows from this insight, as does an awareness of how it might be possible to conceive of “a
history of images that treats pictures as more than simply a reflection of something else, something more important happening elsewhere.53

At one extreme of the visual continuum are highly “enframed” images, directed toward (and producing) a very specific audience, with very particular intent: advertisements, political cartoons, portraits of public figures, “niche” marketing campaigns. Such images frequently aim to exclude, demonize, or even erase other potential viewers. Even here we increasingly find that reenframements are at work as images move beyond their intended audiences. Reenframement was, of course, the problem with the Danish cartoons, which originally appeared enframed in a discourse of democratic free speech but were taken up elsewhere as expressions of Western hostility toward Islam, moral hypocrisy, and political calculation.

Other images seem to lend themselves to—indeed to relish—reenframement. Take the famous image of the handsome young guerillero heroico based on Alberto Korda’s 1960 photograph of Che Guevara.54 Korda’s clever cropping, showing Che abstracted from any historical and political context and looking off into an unseen distance, prepared this image for extensive circulation. Changes in artists’ technique and technology during the pop art revolution, together with the political circumstances of the late 1960s, enabled versions of the image “to breed like rabbits,” in the words of Irish photographer Jim Fitzgerald, who in 1967 produced the stylized Che poster that later became the basis of the notorious fake “Warhol Che,” among a multitude of other reproductions. Techniques such as silk-screening and bleach-out methods, which reduced the gray tones in photographs and heightened black-and-white contrast, induced a “flatness” and a simplification of the image, turning it into something like a statement, a brand, or an uncluttered icon more than anything else.

“The most important thing about the image of Che as seen in mass reproduction is that it is not a photograph, its incredible longevity, power, and malleability as an image rests on its rejection of photography...it remains connected to the original photo in some way so as to retain a reference to the real world in which it arose, but it also bluntly distances itself from any claim to convey that reality...‘it is saying this is ink on paper; it is an idea, it is not a representation of the world.’”55 This (re)enframement is presumably what makes it possible for Che’s image, stripped of any reference to Marxist ideology, to figure in a “Muslim Power” mural photographed by Spyer on the island of Tidore, Indonesia, in 2008, alongside depictions of such other historical heavyweights as Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno; the local eighteenth-century anticolonial hero Nuku;
Indonesian protest singer Iwan Fals; Muammar Qaddafi; and Osama Bin Laden. Note how the mural not only captures images in motion but also stages the very medium through which they move, the photographic film roll that serves as the portrait gallery's frame.

A similar process of reenframement can be seen in the iconic image of Barack Obama on Shepard Fairey's 2008 poster captioned “HOPE.” Like the “Che” image, HOPE was a remake of a photograph, in this case a 2006 digital photo of then senator Obama at a press conference on Darfur alongside actor George Clooney (who was the photographer’s actual target). Reproduced—and relabeled, the original caption “PROGRESS” being replaced by the campaign-friendlier “HOPE”—in silk-screen format as a poster, a bumper sticker, a refrigerator magnet, or other donor “gimmies,” the HOPE image, notwithstanding the copyright infringement lawsuits brought against Fairey by the Associated Press and the photographer and despite the fact that it was an “unauthorized” political image, in many ways defined the 2008 Obama presidential campaign. What made the image both striking and effective was its transformation from an ordinary news photograph into a graphic illustration—an “icon”—through the process of retrogressive
remediation or, as it is termed by Cartwright and Mandiberg, “demaking.”\textsuperscript{57} Degrading the quality of the image by “reach[ing] back to older media forms, playing up their uses and strictures over those of newer technological platforms,” the process of demaking both highlights the technics of image production and loosens the hold of indexicality on our interpretation of the image. Cartwright and Mandiberg argue that rather than engage in a debate over the authorship of the original image and the poster’s status as a copy of the photograph, a more fruitful approach is to seek out its other associations. One such referent for the HOPE poster, they propose, is Robert Rauschenberg’s \emph{Retroactive I} (1964), a silk-screen collage featuring a reworked photograph of John F. Kennedy, whose presidential demeanor is echoed in Obama’s lofty gaze, as well as in the “iconic and generic” quality of the image being reproduced. What is being reproduced, they assert, is not so much the image content of a photographic “original” but rather the “remedial act itself.” It is, in short, a “stylistic homage to past technologies of political art,” constituting a body of resonant images.\textsuperscript{58} An even more obvious referent (curiously unmentioned in their account) is the guerillero heroico image of Che and its various remediations as generic political icon, pop art, and global fashion statement, echoed by the international pop-commercial ubiquity of the Obama portrait.

\textbf{Technologies of Visualization}

Attending to the complicated operations of enframement means registering the ebbs as much as the frequently naturalized frictionless flow of circulation; it highlights the often less than global yet more than local trajectories along which images travel, along with the foreclosures, inhibitions, or even “stickiness” that may come into play whenever the movement of images is concerned. Technologies of image production and dissemination compose one key aspect of this seemingly natural movement of images through space and time.

In recent years, Brian Larkin (chapter 9) notes, the “transnational movement of images has occupied a simply enormous amount of attention... as scholars try to come to terms with the speed and intensity of image economies brought about by new technologies” of information storage and transmission and by concomitant social and economic transformations on a global scale. Mass-produced images, those technologically reproducible, nonauratic artworks that Walter Benjamin attended to,\textsuperscript{59} travel with incredible speed and diversity, and it is this dramatic mobility that has drawn the interest of many subsequent scholars and critics, us included. But it is equally important to note that images do not move just anywhere or in
any way they (or their makers) please. Technological reproducibility entails an entire infrastructure of creation, production, and distribution, which enables this flow of images but also channels it in very specific directions and ways.

Global flows are neither frictionless nor ubiquitous; they depend on particular media platforms and their infrastructures, which regulate and restrict the direction and transmission of information; they face interruptive forces, including institutional forms of censorship or the requirements of capitalization or the routine degradation of technological capacities; they generate static as much as signal; they create novel aesthetic experiences and replicate or revamp existing ones. Material infrastructures "create the channels by which media move, and these are crucial to processes of circulation." These channels, or "vectors," as McKenzie Wark refers to them, constitute the specific but indeterminate trajectories linking points of media transmission and collection with their termini: from satellite to television set, from movie studio to screening room or theater, from pirate DVD-burning operation to home player, from cell-phone camera to Facebook page, from one computer to others. Vectors are inevitably selective: their trajectories and destinations are uneven and unequal. Media infrastructures incorporate weaknesses, limitations, and "breakdowns"; they not only define content and format but also reinforce inequalities in reception and access. Moviegoing depends on the creative and economic vitality of the film industry but also on the presence of movie theaters (or, now, on a VCR or DVD player) and on an audience that wants to enter theaters and can afford to do so. Watching television requires access to a TV set and the creation of programming but also depends on the massive, often state-supported, industrial investment necessary for broadcast networks, satellite access, or the extension of fiber optic cable.

It is easy to imagine media forms as "predestined by the technology," but as Kristin Roth-Ey points out in Moscow Prime Time, her engaging study of media in the mid twentieth-century Soviet Union, they are equally shaped by ideological frames and political choices. The enthusiastic popular response to Soviet TV "was authorized by a centrally planned Soviet industry that produced sets primarily for individual, rather than group, consumption, and by financial incentives (pricing policies, the end to licensing fees) that made owning a TV broadly accessible." The decision of the Soviet state to invest massively in infrastructural development for television broadcast, even at a time of economic austerity, can be understood as a "symbol of Soviet scientific prowess to observers at home and abroad," as well as a potent ideological tool delivering a mass audience for
the dissemination of closely controlled information and “cultural uplift” programming. During the same period, television in the United States, as a private industry, flourished largely as a vehicle for advertising, its temporal formatting shaped by the imperative to sell structured bits of time to advertisers and its content determined by the need to deliver an appropriate audience for those commercials.

Visual media technologies not only “select” particular audiences but also “train” those audiences in specific modes of spectatorship and enjoyment. Viewers may also be self-taught, becoming adept at reading the gaps in media delivery, teasing out significance from the static or “noise” in the signal, envisioning the unrepresented, or finding authenticity in technological insufficiency or the naïve immediacy of the untrained operator. Or they may simply “switch channels,” like Soviet television viewers in the 1960s and 1970s, who, far from passively accepting the social uplift of state programming of the “model bricklayer” sort, turned to escapist formats such as game shows, sports, and entertainment programming.

If someone like Susan Sontag holds out the fantasy of immediacy in her essays on photography, she can do so only by forgetting not only that certain technologies—for instance, today’s high-definition television—produce immediacy’s effects but also that these “reality effects” are bolstered by discourses that claim and elaborate upon them. Infrastructures may offer enhanced resolution or build in noise or distortion in the visual signal. These effects then feed back into the image as an aesthetic choice or a value, a mode of exclusivity, or a particular aesthetic. A history of photography’s purported technological immediacy can be traced from the initial, grainy depictions of simple inanimate objects, like Niepce’s table setting or Atget’s unpopulated landscapes and street scenes, to the physiognomy of the human face, the portrait or “type.” Studio portraiture, with its slow shutter speeds and extended delays, erased human movement from the surface of the photographic image but also generated mysterious traces that were interpreted as the presence of spirits or mediumistic ectoplasm imperceptible to the naked eye. The formally posed studio portrait gave way, in terms of its perceived authenticity, to the amateur snapshot taken with a cheap Kodak or Polaroid camera, to the extent that the aesthetics of the latter, with its artlessly unposed, “caught on the run” style, came to index immediacy even in the realm of art photography and painting. Digital photography has foregrounded both high-resolution precision and simultaneity—the immediate uploading of pictures to social media sites, for instance—but also falsification, as the seeming ubiquity of the Photoshopped image, whether as comic montage or as manipulated news photo, demonstrates.
It is not merely a matter of the technical verisimilitude or "catchiness" of the image that is at stake here, but also the kind of object that becomes available for observation. One might track, as Pinney does in chapter 6 in this volume, the changing nature of photography's subjects as a succession of different interiorities made public and thus available to a range of political, medical, and sociological surveillances and scrutinies, a trajectory culminating—for the moment anyway—in the utilization of new technologies like retinal scans, magnetic resonance imaging, nanophotography, and full-body X-rays, through which bodily interiorities, the "entrails" composing divination's classic locus, are turned literally inside out in a move that reveals the most intimate private spaces, making them fully exposed to public view. Webcams similarly create new modes of (self-)exposure and new objects of display and observation, from "live sex acts" and the pseudo-reality of "lonelygirl15" to the multitude of owlcam and other "cute baby animal" Internet observation sites and animal livefeeds. New technologies and the objects they bring into focus have not only increased and transformed the nature of surveillance but also exploded the work of detection. As former NYPD detective Edward Conlon wrote in a post-9/11 meditation in the *New Yorker*, "DNA, cell-phone and computer data banks, social media... and, especially, the proliferation of surveillance cameras have provided unimaginable investigative opportunities that require commensurate amounts of labor," resulting in a predictable decline in police morale and creating a general mood of public mistrust verging on paranoia.

**THE "RELEASE OF AFFECTS"**

The Conlon example above demonstrates the relation between what Ernst van Alphen (chapter 8) identifies as the "explosion of information" and the "release of affects" in contemporary life. Far from reducing insecurity and enhancing confidence in public safety measures, new modes of observation and detection—this proliferation of forensic technologies and objects of visualization—seem to have led to an increase in anxiety about security itself. Each new revelation calls for still more intimate forms of surveillance and exposure, more intense affective responses.

Following Gregory J. Seigworth and Melissa Gregg's definition, we take affect to consist of "those forces... beneath, alongside, or generally other than conscious knowing, vital forces insisting beyond emotion—that can serve to drive us toward movement, toward thought and extension, that can likewise suspend us (as if in neutral) across a barely registering accretion of force-relations, or that can even leave us overwhelmed by the world's apparent intractability." Affects are "intensities" or excitations, which are, themselves,
without specific content or meaning but which, in Gilles Deleuze’s formulation, “lead to thought.” Deleuze speaks of the image in its affective sense as an “encountered sign,” apprehended via sensuous engagement rather than cognition; it is not something already known, a codification of information, but rather something that creates “impressions which force us to look, encounters which force us to interpret, expressions which force us to think.” Attending to the affective power of images—other than conscious knowing yet neither beyond or primordially before it—means tracking the various and variable surges of excitation they provoke and exploring “those resonances that circulate about, between, and sometimes stick to bodies and worlds.” This approach takes us beyond questions of what images “want” or what they “say,” as well as what their audiences “see in them” in terms of a message or code.

The kind of shock that leads to thought, or that draws and holds attention, is perhaps most evident in the case of images of war and violent death. From Picasso’s Guernica to the S-21 photographs of victims of Khmer Rouge executions, the eye is drawn to the scene of violence even as the imagination is repelled by it. Whatever the maker’s intention may have been, such images have a force that pushes them beyond interpretive closure, into the bodily shock of affective engagement.

The second Gulf War (GW2) has been perhaps the most aggressively mediatized event in history. Whereas Operation Desert Storm was televised via the distancing mechanisms of military briefings, technologically amplified perception, long-focus shots of army convoys moving through the desert, and the barely visible flares of nighttime bombardment, in GW2, visual immediacy was at stake from the start. From the moment we watched the destruction of the World Trade Center on television, first live and then reliving it in the repetitive tape loops of planes hitting towers, crowds fleeing amid dense smoke, the rain of debris, the grief of firefighters, the speeches of politicians— but not the bodies falling from the towers or the thuds they made when they hit the ground, which were deemed too horrific to publicize—we were caught up in the reign of encountered signs. There were the faces of alleged terrorists and enemies staring out from passport photos, mug shots, and terrorist playing cards; the humanizing photos, mystifying in their clarity, of soldiers at work and at rest, taken by embedded news photographers; the taped messages and recruiting videos from al-Qaeda and its offshoots; the recorded and replayed executions of hostages; the injured bodies and the rubble of unidentifiable buildings; the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s statue and the cell-phone videos that captured the hanging of the man himself; the multitude of soldiers’ blogs, videos, and snapshots, not the least of these being the scandal of Abu Ghraib.
The affective power and, not coincidentally, the possible political power of all these encountered signs are most apparent in what was considered too inflammatory to be shown at all. Like the people who fell or jumped from the twin towers, the severely damaged bodies of soldiers and even their flag-draped coffins were off-limits for public photographic display in the first years of the war. Even the corpse of Osama bin Laden was deemed too provocative to be shown to global audiences, though it was certainly present in the form of incessant talk about it, including the vacillation about whether it should be shown. Bin Laden’s death was instead represented for the American public by the “iconic” image of President Obama and his advisors watching a live video feed of the attack on bin Laden’s compound by Navy SEALs.

Photographs had been taken to prove that the al-Qaeda leader was dead. But it was enough in the end to say that they existed. They were too graphic and disturbing for an American audience, we were told; their display might be offensive to Muslims around the world, thus perhaps inviting retaliatory attacks against US targets.

Despite such efforts of containment or censorship, images like these are capable of escaping the restrictive frames placed on them, whether by governments, journalistic ethics, or reticence or simply by the limits of visual interest and toleration. Pictures alleged to be of bin Laden’s corpse circulated widely on the Internet, though it is not clear whether these were actual photographs of his body or doctored ones. (They were soon debunked as a Photoshopped “hoax,” at least one of the pictures having been posted on the Internet as early as 2009.) It hardly matters, however, whether the images in circulation were the ostensibly suppressed originals, other “actual” photos taken surreptitiously at the time, faked photographic stand-ins for these, or even imaginative re-creations inspired by the apparent existence of such images. What does matter is the affective potency of the image, which is one among other crucial components that enable it to circulate, spreading virally, bringing into being new and unexpected publics in the process, reinforcing older ones, and indeed contributing to the dissolution of others.

PUBLICS AND UPTAKE

A public, according to Michael Warner’s definition, is a social entity or hypothetical group that comes into being in “relation to texts and their circulation” and “by virtue of being addressed” by those texts. In this sense, publics are self-made, created by what he calls “stranger relationality,” that is, a form of imagined commensality existing among unfamiliar others. Public discourse, says Warner, is poetic. This means that it is not
just “self-organizing, a kind of entity created by its own discourse, or even that this space of circulation is taken to be a social entity, but that in order for this to happen all discourse or performance addressed to a public must characterize the world in which it attempts to circulate and it must attempt to realize that world through address.”75 This is loosely akin to what Louis Althusser means by interpellation, the calling-up or “hailing” of subjects by the various ideological arms of the state, whereby one recognizes oneself as if already subjected to state authority.76 To put it somewhat differently, public discourse creates its subject-audience—“its public”—by acting as if that public already existed and then specifying its dimensions in a compelling manner. Thus, Warner continues, “there is no speech or performance addressed to a public that does not try to specify in advance, in countless highly condensed ways, the lifeworld of its circulation: not just through its discursive claims—of the kind that can be said to be oriented to understanding—but through the pragmatics of its speech genres, idioms, stylistic markers, address, temporality, mise-en-scène, citational field, interlocutory protocols, lexicon, and so on. Its circulatory fate is the realization of that world.”77

Although Warner recognizes that such “texts” can also be visual or auditory—speech acts, musical works, films, advertisements, and the like—his primary argument focuses on and derives from the circulations of the printed word. But what if we were to theorize publics as formed in relation to images in circulation—that is, not just in terms of a “space of discourse” but also according to the diverse circulatory addresses of images in motion?78 What difference would it make if analytic emphasis were placed on the viewer of images rather than on the reader of texts?

In focusing attention on images that move, we do not intend to assert a radical separation of images from text or voice. All media are, of course, always and already mixed media.79 A cartoon’s meaning or a news photo’s message is located in the interplay between its caption and its pictorial aspect; likewise, much of the artistic work of a film consists in its narrative structure, sound effects, characterization and dialogue, the emotional cues of the musical score, and other nonvisual elements, most of which would be erased if the film were regarded strictly as a series of flickering images. Images themselves frequently have a semantic component. While acknowledging this mutuality of visual, acoustic, and discursive elements in images and in texts, we also recognize an important difference in the modes of linguistic and figural circulation and reception. Figural representations are relatively less bound by the constraints of legibility and translation than are textual ones, less restricted by the limits of language competence in discursive communities, arguably more vulnerable to the unexpected release
of affect. The circulation and reception of images may be more promiscuous, less containable, and less predictable in their effects than those of verbal texts. It is this greater mobility of the image, its affective capacity and greater potential for resignification and appropriation, that we wish to draw attention to here.

Publics are created by virtue of being “addressed” as such. What we might want to ask, however, is, Why this public, this discourse, this moment, and not some other? Is it the simple coincidence of myriad, more or less random addresses, some of which are able to more effectively capture “their” publics than others? What about the possibility of a “wrong address,” through which an utterly unanticipated public is formed? How do we think about the multitude of divergent publics encountered by a single image that moves from one address to another, like the imagined and presumably antithetical audience/s for the unseen photograph of Osama bin Laden? What happens to a public once it has so recognized itself? What kinds of temporalities characterize different publics? Are some publics more prone to dissipate and be re-formed at each separate hailing? Do some retain a residual recognition that is reactivated by further, perhaps even different, forms of address? Where in this model do we make room for belief—or, perhaps, love—which, one imagines, might grip its public in a particularly visceral and lasting manner?

In rethinking publics through images, it is necessary to take into consideration the relation between certain technologies of image production and image dissemination on the one hand and the kinds of publics that crystallize around them on the other. This includes, but is not limited to, considerations of the chronotopic dimensions of image circulation, including scale and scope, interval and duration. The specific nature of plausibility and the generation of reality effects are important to examine in any given medium. Material considerations also include the level of capitalization necessary to produce or consume particular media images and the physical housing that media technologies require for the storage and display of images: in computers or TV sets, on cheaply produced VCDs, painted on public walls, or reproduced xerographically on broadsheets.

Another set of issues involves the social dimensions and location of image reception and transmission. Do audiences come together in theaters or public meetings or on the streets, or do they inhabit the private or semiprivate zones of home, automobile, or cybercafé? Are audiences “ambushed” by unanticipated images, like graffiti, or must they choose to view them, as in a museum? Do images come with explanatory labels or captions, like the museum tour, or, contrariwise, derive their power precisely
from the absence of labeling? To what extent does commercial sponsorship or state censorship shape both the form and the content of the media image, and how does this shaping affect audiences' engagement with those images? To what extent can images “leap” across media to travel beyond their originally imagined audience and, in conjunction with other factors, produce unanticipated publics and counterpublics elsewhere? In what ways does media technology itself transform the “message” of the image?

Some publics, such as the street demonstrations provoked by the Danish cartoons, may be relatively spontaneous, short-lived, and rhizomatic. Some may spread globally, cascading from one site to another, like the 2011 demonstrations of the Arab Spring or Occupy Wall Street and its many offshoots. Such publics may have wide, long-term political implications, both at the level of international relations and quite locally, for the ambitions and profiling of particular groups. Once called up, publics such as these may be provoked or reanimated by new image incidents, in conjunction, inevitably, with other factors; indeed, they may form the basis for relatively stable political action groups or come under the influence of state or other political actors. Other sorts of publics may take the form of momentary “flash mobs,” political movements, fan groups, neighborhood associations, charitable donor networks, diasporic “imagined communities,” dispersed activity-, faith-, or interest-based groups, or simply spectators whose flickering attention, like that of the strolling flaneur of nineteenth-century Paris, is momentarily drawn by whatever passes before them. Indeed, in a kind of reverse interpellation, publics today frequently constitute themselves as such in anticipation of being seen—by others or by themselves—as media images. This act of prefiguration is an increasingly crucial component of politics not only at a broad national and international scale but also within the dynamics of much more local aspirations and designs. What Jodi Dean refers to as “publicity” is predicated on the desire to imagine oneself as a “celebrity subject.” This “drive to be known, and the presumption that what matters is what is known, provides a different economy of subjectivization, one in which the technocultural subject is configured as a celebrity.... Much ink has been spilled lamenting the effects of the surveillance society but relatively little on the enjoyments that may accompany the sense that one is known, that people know who we are, that we are somebody.” This claim is echoed in Ernst van Alphen’s argument that technological innovations such as the webcam have prefigured a shift and a consequent release of affect, from the voyeurism of passive image consumption to a “more active attitude of self-positioning” in the exhibitionistic impulses of self-display.
If for Warner the “mere attention” of an audience is sufficient to constitute it as a public, examples such as these suggest that analytical attention should also be paid to the intensity or direction of affective engagement of a public with its constitutive image/text. This is especially true in the context of images’ cross-cultural movement. “Images that move are polyvocal,” Larkin (chapter 9) acknowledges, but for images to move across cultural differences, they must be both accessible and legible: “Circulation is not an automatic reflex but something that must be made to happen.” As McKenzie Wark puts it, “the trouble starts when one opens a vector between cultures which are not usually in communication with each other and taps the affective responses of peoples one knows only through other images, transmitted along other media vectors. The audience has to decide whether to read the image in terms of ‘our’ frame of reference, or in the frame of what we know about the other.”

This movement depends not only on material and technological infrastructures of visibility and circulation but also on those affective and semiotic engagements crucial to their relative “stickiness” or slipperiness in a particular context. What Larkin (chapter 9) refers to as the “uptake” or reception of particular media forms is contingent on the intensity of desire they face, which can “range from mere attention to full immersion.” But desire is not merely the response to a visceral, affective shock that draws or holds the attention; it also depends on recognition—the discovery of some (imagined, perceived, even utterly mistaken) points of contact or commensurability between the image and its audience(s). These can be thematic or stylistic; they may be parsed according to the intention of the producer or reframed in terms of local meanings and sentiments. They may be taken up as familiar symbols or reinvested with the currency of foreignness. The central issue here is thus not so much how images move but how they move us: in fragile and fitful engagements of desire shaped by the (im)possibilities of translatability and equivalence.

We are certainly not the first to look at images that move: from transport art—images that whiz by on buses and trucks or, more slowly, rickshaws—to the metaphorical conceptualization of images as migrants, ill at ease and maladjusted within novel environments; from the elaborate cultural production involving complicated efforts of translation, curatorial interventions, exhibition catalogs, privileged collectors, museums, and the like, to the appropriation of foreign or outsider images for local purposes. All of these instances of the visual continuum require different ways of highlighting and addressing the problematics of images in motion. We have emphasized the often considerable work involved in getting images to move and
to stay put, the unpredictable passions that images may provoke or address, the multifarious ways that images move and in the process move us, their anticipated and unexpected audiences. We have foregrounded the necessary processes of uptake, enframement, and “stickiness” that abet, hinder, or slow such movement. Throughout, we have endeavored to keep the image in view—even in those instances, from No Show to the invoked but unreproduced death photos of Osama bin Laden, when it is absent, obliquely invoked, or merely anticipated. The chapters in this volume represent a range of possible ways to trace the tangled paths of images’ travels and returns, to unfold their effects and aftereffects, and to scan the diverse and variable publics—fixed or ephemeral, situated or dispersed—that these moving images call into being.

Notes
3. Moti, No Show, 44.
5. Vera Miliutina was a graphic artist who was among those Leningrad artists who produced sketches of The Hermitage under Siege. See http://www.hermitagemuseum.org/html_en/05/hm5_3_3_03.html (accessed December 5, 2011). See also S. Varshavsky and B. Rest, The Hermitage during the War of 1941-1945, trans. Arthur Shkarovsky-Raffe (St. Petersburg: Slavia, 1995).
6. Moti, No Show, 43
10. Appadurai, Modernity at Large, 5.


16. Ibid., 527.


26. Ibid., 12.

27. Ibid., 20.


33. MASS MoCA, Invisible: Art at the Edge of Perception, exhibition, Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art, North Adams, MA, February–June 2010. The text of the exhibition folder notes how “moments of visual quiet can take on unexpected power... amidst a world saturated with a relentless stream of images and stimuli.” See also Ralph Rugoff, A Brief History of Invisible Art, catalog published in conjunction with the exhibition A Brief History of Invisible Art (San Francisco: California College of the Arts, 2005), 7.


35. Mitchell, Iconology, 9–14; see also Jain, Gods in the Bazaar, 14–16, on postcolonial denigrations of “vernacular” art.
38. Flood, chapter 2 in this volume.
41. Flood, chapter 2 in this volume.
50. The phrase “no caption needed” is taken from the study of “iconic photographs” by Robert Hariman and John L. Lucaites, *No Caption Needed* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). On the “anchorage” achieved by the linguistic


60. Larkin, chapter 9 of this volume.


62. Raymond Williams, Television: Technology and Cultural Form, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2003), 16. Cited in Kristin Roth-Ey, Moscow Prime Time (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 178. The complete passage, which Roth-Ey does not quote, continues: “This predestination, however, when closely examined, proves to be no more than a set of particular social decisions, in particular circumstances, which were then so widely if imperfectly ratified that it is now difficult to see them as decisions rather than as (retrospectively) inevitable results.”
63. Roth-Ey, Moscow Prime Time, 209.
68. On the “lonelygirl15” scandal, in which a wildly popular online video “diary” turned out to be a scripted drama, see Joshua Davis, “The Secret World of lonelygirl15,” Wired Magazine 14, no. 12 (December 2006): 232–239. Perhaps the most famous of the many “owlcam” and wildlife/zoo observation sites is the “owlbox” of barn owls Molly and McGee (http://www.ustream.tv/theowlbox), which, on December 7, 2011, claimed to have had more than twenty-one million live views. In addition to the live streaming site, Molly the Owl has her own Facebook fan page (http://www.facebook.com/mollytheowl), blog (http://mollysbox.wordpress.com/), and Twitter account, in addition to books, a documentary DVD, and a range of other “Molly-endorsed” merchandise.
71. Deleuze, Proust and Signs, 161; on the “encountered sign,” see also Bennett, Empathic Vision, 7–8.


78. A notable recent exception is Hariman and Lucaites’s No Caption Needed, which accords visual imagery, especially iconic photographs, a central role in the constitution of liberal democratic public culture.


82. Warner, Publics and Counterpublics, 87.
