Language Ideologies in the Expression and Representation of Arizona Tewa Identity

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The concept of language ideologies has proved useful in this volume as a mode of analysis that permits a new appreciation of the role of language in the formation of both national and ethnic identities. In chapter 2, for example, Judith T. Irvine and Susan Gal demonstrate how language ideological processes like iconization, recursivity, and erasure produce patterns of differentiation that can be used by members of language communities and by nation-states to provide “the discursive or cultural resources to claim and thus attempt to create shifting ‘communities,’ identities, selves, and roles, at different levels of contrast within a cultural field.” The attempts by states and their representatives to forge national identities using the anvil of standardized national languages, discussed in this volume as both a case study by Joseph Errington and a more general language development model by Michael Silverstein, suggest the ubiquity and importance of the connections between languages and identities.

In 1949, when Edward P. Dozier ascended the then narrow path up to First Mesa of the Hopi Reservation in northeastern Arizona, he began a remarkable but unappreciated episode in the history of
anthropological confrontations with various forms of identity. Dozier, a Tewa Indian from Santa Clara Pueblo in New Mexico, was one of the earliest “native” anthropologists. He studied the Arizona Tewa descendants of transplanted Southern Tewas who had abandoned colonial New Mexico in the wake of the Second Pueblo Revolt of 1696.¹ His earliest published descriptions of this group presented them as paragons of ethnic “persistence” (Dozier 1951:56). But he soon reversed this representation and emphasized their assimilation into the Hopi majority (Dozier 1954, 1966:97).

Enjoying the great benefit of retrospection, I want to use the concept of language ideology to better understand its linked roles in the Arizona Tewas’ project of maintaining their ethnic identity and Dozier’s anthropological misrecognition of their multiethnic adaptation. Dozier was an especially gifted ethnographer, but his failure to more fully attend to local Arizona Tewa language ideologies and speech practices and his predisposition to emphasize assimilation can be viewed as products of the marginalized treatment of language and the influence of acculturation theory associated with his professional language ideology as a cultural anthropologist working in the mid-twentieth century. By professional language ideology, I mean the assumptions about language in general and indigenous languages in particular that shaped professional discourse within cultural and social anthropology, especially in the treatment of language and identity.

This emphasis on professional language ideology complements Charles Goodwin’s (1994:606) concept of “professional vision,” or “socially organized ways of seeing and understanding events that are answerable to the distinctive interests of a particular group”—by extending focal concern beyond “seeing” to “hearing” and the sometimes invisible assumptions about language and communication that influence ethnographic practices. It also extends professional vision by emphasizing the role of macrolevel political economic factors (here the influence of U.S. national policies regarding Native Americans) in shaping actual anthropological research.²

In examining the influence of this professional regime on Dozier, this chapter joins several others in this volume in demonstrating the role of these discourses in constraining interpretation. Jane H. Hill’s work, for example, treats the competing discourses of truth and theater
in the perception of George Bush’s promise of no new taxes, and Susan U. Philips’s chapter examines the role of Tongan magistrates in imposing and enforcing traditionalizing models of speech behavior by extending the avoidance behavior of brother and sister to all Tongans. By attempting to get at the language ideological assumptions underlying Dozier’s ethnography, my chapter also resembles Michael Silverstein’s essay on the presuppositions of Benedict Anderson’s language ideological assumptions and their putative role in the formation of national identity. And since the professional ideological emphasis on acculturation theory is closely related to national policies and programs emphasizing Indian assimilation, my analysis attempts to expose linkages between national Indian policy and conventional theories and practices of cultural anthropology, which, in turn, significantly influenced Dozier’s ethnographic observation and analysis.

In an age when the image of diaspora is routinely applied to the increasingly common dislocation and transnational relocation of cultural groups, it is sobering to remember that this process is not new to indigenous peoples like the Arizona Tewas. Almost three hundred years ago, their Southern Tewa ancestors left the oppression of the Spanish colonial regime based in Santa Fe, New Mexico, to accept repeated invitations from Hopi clan chiefs to move west and help rid Hopi lands of marauding enemies. In exchange for their mercenary activity, the Southern Tewas were to be given land adjacent to that of the First Mesa Hopis. Today, despite significant change and accommodation to both Hopis and Euro-Americans, the Arizona Tewas continue to live as a distinct cultural group—the only post–Pueblo Revolt diaspora group to maintain its ancestral language and associated ethnic identity.

This chapter is about the association of language and ethnicity. In particular, I am concerned with the role a dominant language ideology plays in providing cultural resources for language and ethnic boundary maintenance and in shaping the multilingual and multiethnic adaptation of the Arizona Tewas to their Hopi neighbors. I will also confront the professional misrecognition of the multiethnic adaptation of the Arizona Tewas. Since professional ideologies of language tended to marginalize communication and language use in favor of a reflectionist vision of language that recognized only its referential functions, even a native anthropologist like Dozier did not—and perhaps could not—
view either language use or language ideology as contributing factors in the creation of an Arizona Tewa repertoire of identity (Kroskrity 1993:178–210), a form of multiethnic adaptation.

Dozier was limited both by neglect of language use and by uncritical use of then dominant professional language ideologies. He imported many of the assumptions about language and identity that characterized Linton’s (1940) acculturation paradigm. Without access to some of the most telling forms of the discursive construction of local identities (use of their linguistic repertoire, codeswitching, language ideologies) and without conceptual resources from his field that would allow for appreciation of the Arizona Tewas’ multiethnic adaptation, even a highly gifted native ethnographer could become confused. In his first writings, Dozier wavered dramatically in his representation of the Arizona Tewas. Initially he presented them as paragons of ethnic persistence (Dozier 1951), but soon he reversed this interpretation and characterized them as moving toward “complete assimilation” to the Hopi Indian majority (Dozier 1954).

My focus on Dozier’s professional language ideology is actually directed at a cluster of influences on his ethnographic treatment of language in his Arizona Tewa research. These influences include the conventional practices and assumptions of the cultural anthropology of the day toward “field” languages and the special status of native ethnographers who knew them, and the “expert” language of the researcher. These influences in turn are informed by such macrolevel forces as the political-economic influence of U.S. policy in administering to Native American tribal groups as domestic colonies and by such microcultural phenomena as uncritically accepted beliefs about language and identity.

This chapter then is a parable (Clifford 1986), or perhaps a cautionary tale taken from the pre-“experimental” (Marcus and Fischer 1986) period of sociocultural anthropology in which British social anthropology and American cultural anthropology were combined in an attempt to achieve an integrated and especially authoritative professional voice. At that time, prior to the current “linguistic turn,” linguistic anthropology existed primarily to teach students of sociocultural anthropology how to learn field languages. Linguistic anthropologists in this period wrote of “the divorce of linguistic work from cultural investigation” (Voegelin and Harris 1945:356–57) and the failure of
ethnologists to study patterns in the use of languages (Greenberg 1948; Hymes 1970). Dell Hymes had yet to name or even invoke the enterprise later known as the “ethnography of speaking” (Hymes 1962).

But this chapter is not so much a historical account of some dark age of linguistic anthropology as an opportunity to appreciate more fully the role and utility of languages, including the ideologies of their speakers, in the formation of ethnic groups and boundaries and to recognize more fully the power of professional language ideologies in the ongoing anthropological construction of identity (Barth 1969; Kroskrity 1993) and community (Anderson 1983; Silverstein 1996b).

This parable, then, consists of two stories: (1) how a local language ideology contributed to the maintenance of Arizona Tewa as both a language and an ethnic identity, and (2) how a professional ideology of language produced a very different representation of that identity.

**LOCAL IDEOLOGIES OF LANGUAGE**

Language ideologies have served the Arizona Tewas as resources for the discursive construction of ethnic, village, and other social identities (Kroskrity 1992, 1993, 1998) in two major ways. First, as a group of microcultural preferences that extend the ideals of ‘ceremonial speech’ (te’ie hiili) well beyond the strictly sacred domain of the kiva, they promote a unifying model for speech behavior that crosscuts clan and class divisions. Second, individual or component ideological preferences such as indigenous purism and strict compartmentalization provide specific cultural resources for maintaining maximally distinctive languages that can serve as the symbolic and communicative vehicles for their indexically associated social identities. In this section I briefly summarize some of the previous discussion on Tewa language ideologies that is particularly pertinent to the theme of erasure (Irvine and Gal, this volume) of social difference as a means of creating group identity and to the emergence of Arizona Tewa in a repertoire of languages and identities.

For the first of these themes it is useful to begin with recent research on the Western Pueblos that has greatly undermined earlier images of groups such as the Hopi as “an apolitical, egalitarian society” (Whiteley 1988:64). In both Peter Whiteley’s (1988) *Deliberate Acts* and Jerold Levy’s (1992) *Orayvi Revisited*, we find a welcome examination of
political-economic concerns and a confrontation with Hopi social inequality. Far from representing the Hopi as a kind of Redfieldian “folk society,” these works examine intracultural diversity and suggest the stark disparities within and across Hopi classes and clans. Though neither book specifically treats the Arizona Tewas, the pattern of social stratification described is generalizable to the traditional social organization of all Pueblos and is especially germane to understanding Arizona Tewa social variation, since their Southern Tewa ancestors adopted many features of kinship and social organization from their Hopi neighbors (Dozier 1954:305; Ortiz 1969).

In Whiteley (1988), for example, we see a clear distinction between *pavansinom* (‘ruling people’) and *sukauusinginom* (‘common people’). Levy’s (1992) reanalysis of earlier research by the anthropologist Mischa Titiev reveals how inequality of land distribution made some large clans into virtual tenant farmers for other clans. Levy demonstrates a patterned relationship between ceremonial standing and the control of land, indicating that clans that “owned” the most important ceremonies also controlled the best land. Levy goes still further, stating that the ceremonial system not only rationalized a hierarchy but also masked it by offering an alternative ideology of equality and mutual dependence. For both the Hopis and the Arizona Tewas, a village’s ritual success depends critically upon the participation of almost all villagers and not just the members of the sponsoring clan or clans. The cumulative effect of these practices, and of related practices such as clan exogamy and the extension of kinship relations along ceremonial lines, promotes a sense of ceremonial mobility and produces what Levy (1992:76) calls a “ceremonial ideology”:

> Although an ideology emphasizing the importance of all Hopis and all ceremonial activities was probably an essential counterbalance to the divisiveness of social stratification, it is important to recognize that the integrative structural mechanisms [e.g., clan exogamy, ceremonial “parents”, and so on] were also an important ingredient. Opportunity for participation in the ceremonial life was sufficient to prevent the alienation of the common people under the normal conditions of life.

Here Levy builds on earlier ethnographic work by demonstrating
how the ceremonial system works to provide what the Pueblo ethnologist Fred Eggan (1964) had earlier identified as “major horizontal strands holding Hopi society together” and by preventing what Titiev (1944:69) saw as clan divisiveness and “the constant potential danger of [Hopi towns] dividing into their component parts.” Ceremonial activity, then, like the kiva speech performed in religious chambers when sacred altars are erected, has the net effect of erasing clan and class distinctions by indexing these activities to the ethnic group as a whole. Levy’s “ceremonial ideological” analysis thus provides a complementary view to that of a language ideological analysis as mutually dependent processes in a “duality of structure” (Giddens 1984).

Levy’s analysis invokes the role of political economy and the macro-culture of social and ceremonial organization, whereas the language ideological perspective emphasizes how these macrocultural features are produced and reproduced in the cooperative and communicative displays of members. This linkage of social forms associated with the ceremonial ideology and the discursive practices of kiva speech also helps to explain the emergence and appeal of kiva speech as a dominant language ideology (Kroskity 1998), a contestable but ultimately “naturalized” belief (Bourdieu 1977:164). For ceremonial activity does not only validate the authority of a ceremonial elite (the ‘Made People’, or paa t’owa); it also motivates the participation of the relatively powerless (the ‘Weed People’, or wae t’owa), both through the promise of ceremonial mobility and the microcultural production of group identity, thus providing a critical complicity (Bourdieu 1991:113). Today even those Tewas who challenge the specific dictates of the political or ritual order, through personal disaffection or conversion to a Euro-American religion, still view the ceremonial system as an appropriate medium for constructing their local identities as Arizona Tewas. Given the importance and power of ritual performance as a rite of unification, it is no wonder that the kiva serves as the paramount “site” of the Arizona Tewa dominant language ideology (Silverstein 1998).

The specific discursive preferences traceable to kiva speech as a model have also provided useful resources in the historical project of ethnic boundary maintenance. In the diaspora of the Pueblo Revolts of 1680 and 1696, the Arizona Tewas were the only outmigrating group to retain their language into the present. Maintenance of the Tewa
language served not only to perpetuate an ethnic boundary but also to mask a pattern of dramatic cultural change in adapting to Hopi dry-farming techniques and patterns of kinship and social organization that emphasize wide distribution of limited resources and that evolved in response to the harsh Western Pueblo environment (Dozier 1951). The Arizona Tewa saying *Naa-bi hiili naa-bi woonwaci na-mu* ‘My language is my life (history)’ reveals the intimate relationship between language, history, and identity that this migration promoted and the cultural salience of the connection. The unique history of the Arizona Tewas magnifies a pan-Pueblo emphasis on language.

Though the role of native language maintenance in response to their Hopi hosts is somewhat peculiar to the Arizona Tewas, the cultural prominence of ‘kiva talk’ (*te’e hiili*) is common to all Pueblo societies. As a key site of Tewa language ideology, kiva talk embodies four closely related cultural preferences: regulation by convention, indigenous purism, strict compartmentalization, and linguistic indexing of identity. I have described these preferences elsewhere (Kroskrity 1992, 1993:36–39, 1998) and will provide only an abbreviated summary here.

*Regulation by convention.* In the kiva, ritual performers rely on fixed prayer and song texts, and innovation is neither desired nor tolerated. Ritual performance should replicate past conventions; if such repetition is impossible, the ritual should not be performed at all. Culturally valued genres involving either histories or traditional stories must conform to the formal precedents associated with those genres.

This ideological preference for traditional form, perhaps better understood as a preference for “traditionalizing” discursive practices (see, for instance, Bauman 1992), has its most visible model in the unchanging discourse of kiva speech. As a resource in ethnic identity maintenance, it serves as an instruction to not only “speak the past” by including traditionalizing discourse conventions like the particle *ba* ‘so, it is said’ (Kroskrity 1985, 1993:143–61) but, more generally, to use the past as a model for the present. As in other communities where a dominant theocratic ideology prompts members to carefully reproduce the future on the model of the past, this ideological preference for convention and precedent clearly supports the maintenance of traditional speech practices such as kinship terms for address forms, conventional greetings, public announcements, and, of course, the Tewa language in
which they are encoded. Public announcements for secular activities, for example, show remarkable intonational and content similarities to the chants of crier chiefs and are uniformly encoded in Tewa (Kroskrity 1992, 1997). By speaking their traditional ethnic language, Arizona Tewa people retain it as a vehicle for expressing their oldest ethnic or social identity.

*Indigenous purism* and *strict compartmentalization* are two dimensions of Arizona Tewa language ideology that, though analytically distinguishable, are intimately joined in most linguistic practices, especially those of the kiva. During ritual performance, ceremonial leaders require and enforce an explicit proscription against the use of foreign words and/or native vocabulary clearly identified with an equally alien social dialect (such as slang, defined as recently manufactured words lacking any association with prestigious individuals or activities [Newman 1955:345–46]). As for enforcement, consider the experience of Frank Hamilton Cushing, anthropology’s “original participant-observer” (Eggan 1979), who was struck forcefully across the arms by a whipper kachina for uttering a Spanish word in a Zuni kiva. After being so purified, he was instructed to say the Zuni equivalent of “Thank you.” The fact that such “verbal crimes” receive such swift and public sanction in ritual contexts makes them especially salient to all villagers.

In everyday speech, speakers regulate language mixing from languages that they highly value and use proficiently. Certainly many Arizona Tewa social identities are performed in the nonethnic languages of Hopi and English (Kroskrity 1993:177–210). Hopi is an essential medium of intervillage communication and the appropriate language for relating to Hopi kinsmen. Command of English has permitted the Arizona Tewas to gain significant economic and political advantages over the Hopis in their role as cultural brokers, mediating between Euro-Americans and the more conservative Hopis (Dozier 1966). Fluency in these languages is necessary for full participation in Arizona Tewa society. Such fluency is never criticized by the Tewas, but language mixing between languages is routinely and consistently devalued. The absence of loanwords from other languages indicates, in part, both a promotion of the indigenous language and a preference for extending native vocabulary. When the Arizona Tewas needed to develop a word for ‘clan’, for example, they chose to extend their word
for ‘people’ (t’owa) rather than to borrow the Hopi term. Thus, even though Arizona Tewa kinship was remodeled along Hopi lines, Tewa terms were consistently retained. This treatment is not unique but rather part of a well-established pattern that has also limited the number of incorporated Spanish loanwords to seventeen despite about 130 years of Southern Tewa contact prior to the Pueblo Revolts.

The third value, strict compartmentalization, is also of great importance to the understanding of Arizona Tewa language ideology. Essential to kiva talk is the maintenance of a distinctive linguistic variety dedicated to a well-demarcated arena of use. Kiva talk would lose its integrity if it admitted expressions from other languages or linguistic levels. Likewise, the use of kiva talk outside of ceremonial contexts would constitute a flagrant violation. This strict compartmentalization of language forms and uses has often been recognized as a conspicuous aspect of the language attitudes of Pueblo cultures (Dozier 1956; Sherzer 1976:244). What is novel here is the recognition that this value, like regulation by convention and indigenous purism, is traceable to the kiva as the ideological site that confers its “naturalizing” linguistic prestige. Just as ceremonial practitioners may not mix linguistic codes or use them outside of their circumscribed contexts of use, so Tewa people, ideally, observe comparable compartmentalization of their various languages and linguistic levels in their everyday speech.

As an ideological preference, strict compartmentalization is tangible not only in the “practical consciousness” of Arizona Tewa speech behavior but also in the “discursive consciousness” (Giddens 1984) of some members. One older man who was very experienced in ceremonial matters offered the following agricultural imagery in describing kiva talk:

This way we keep kiva speech separate from our everyday speech reminds me of the way we plant corn. You know those different colors of corn just don’t happen. If you want blue corn, if you want red corn, you must plant your whole field only in that color. If you plant two colors together you get mixed corn. But we need to keep our colors different for the different ceremonies and social dances which require that color. That’s why we have so many fields far from one another. Same way our languages. If you mix them they are no longer as good and use-
ful. The corn is a lot like our languages—we work to keep them separate.5

This discussion suggests that Tewa strict compartmentalization is not always unconscious but on occasion can surface as a discursively conscious strategy. Despite the natural imagery of the corn simile, botanical or linguistic distinctiveness is not seen as being “in the nature of things” but rather emphasizes the contributing role of humans in maintaining an existing “natural” order.

It is important to note the selectivity of most members’ awareness since some compartmentalizing practices, like codeswitching, are routinely outside of the awareness of Tewa conversationalists. Trilingual Tewa individuals, when asked to describe their use of different languages, usually report an idealized spatial determinism in which Tewa is said to be the language of the home and the village and Hopi the language of Hopi villages and the Hopi Tribal Council. Although such folk correlations with cultural spaces do partially capture a statistical pattern, members’ models rarely acknowledge the interactional dynamics of codeswitching and instead conform to putative universal patterns of member awareness that locate folk consciousness at the level of the word rather than of the grammar (Silverstein 1981). Thus, despite the complex nature of codeswitching, which involves the alternation of three very different languages, members show little awareness of its practice and may even deny its occurrence because they view it as a form of inappropriate linguistic borrowing (Kroskrity 1993:194).

By permitting linguistic diversification without apparent convergence between languages, the preferences of indigenous purism and compartmentalization have a clear impact not only on the Arizona Tewa linguistic repertoire but also on its associated repertoire of identity. In practice, this preference fosters both native language maintenance and the development of a linguistic repertoire of maximally distinct codes such as languages, dialects, and registers. These distinct codes thus become symbolically available for signaling discrete indexical identities (for instance, ethnic, social, and gender identities) as members iconically (Irvine and Gal, this volume) construct and naturalize connections between linguistic differences and social categories.

Linguistic indexing of identity. The final dimension of Tewa linguistic
ideology is the preference for locating the speaking self in a linguistically well-defined, possibly positional, sociocultural identity and the belief that speech behavior in general expresses important information about the speaker’s identity. The model of ritual speech foregrounds the importance of explicit positional rather than personal identities and the use of appropriate role-specific speech. Outside of kiva talk, we find similar emphases in the more mundane genres of traditional stories and public announcements, where Tewa speakers mark relevant social identities through the use of self-reference and evidential particles (Kroskrity 1993:143–63).

This use of linguistic resources that enable Tewa speakers to sociolinguistically claim opposed but nested identities, the intraindividual aspect of the language ideological process of “recursiveness” (Irvine and Gal, this volume), provides evidence of the inadequacy of the reification of the individual that seems to be foundational to a Barthian (1969) notion of ethnic boundary maintenance. For the Tewa have symbolic rights to many different identities and will use their linguistic resources to signal relevant interactional identity. Barthian imagery seems excessively brittle and inappropriate in its emphasis on a single, continuously ascribed ethnic identity. A model based on a repertoire of identities better fits the pattern of intraindividual variation and the preference for explicitly signaling relevant identity through selection of an associated language form.

In the following brief example of codeswitching, note how speaker G uses languages iconically and recursively to construct an interactional identity as a Tewa. Three older men are talking in a home overlooking the plaza in Tewa Village atop the Hopi First Mesa in the summer of 1985. Their conversation is immediately contexted by news that, after years of contention, the Hopi Tribal Council has selected a site for a high school on the eastern reservation. Significantly, the site, as for other public buildings including a jail built about five years earlier, is on Arizona Tewa land. Although Tewa is the expected language in Tewa homes, these trilingual (Tewa, Hopi, and English) men are following a conversational norm of talking about the Hopi Reservation as a whole by using Hopi.

F: [Hopi] Tutuqayki-t qa-naanawakna.
Schools were not wanted.


They didn’t want a school on their land.


It’s better our children go to school right here rather than far away.

Embedded in almost two hours of conversation on a wide range of topics, this brief passage clearly demonstrates how the Arizona Tewas identify both as Hopi and as Tewa and use these distinct languages to interactionally construct discrete identities from their repertoire of identities. For the Arizona Tewas can rightfully claim identities as members of the Hopi Tribe (in accord with official, federal recognition) as well as members of the Arizona Tewa ethnic group. As the Arizona Tewa elder Albert Yava (1979:129–30) wrote,

We are interrelated with Hopi families in all the villages. Many of us have become members of the various Hopi Kiva Societies. We share dances and festival days with the Hopis. We belong to the same clans. We are usually represented on the Hopi Tribal Council…In many ways we are indistinguishable from them, and often you hear us say in conversations, “We Hopis,” not because we have forgotten that we are Tewas but because we identify with the Hopi in facing the outside world.6

Just as Yava helps us to understand how Arizona Tewas can invoke Hopi identities, the previous interactional segment illustrates how quickly Hopi identity can be cast aside in favor of constructing the speaking self as a Tewa. Speaker G’s abrupt shift to Tewa, and the reference to the Hopis as “they,” clearly show how a new we-they dichotomy is invoked. The Tewas may identify with the Hopis in facing the outside world, but in political confrontations with the Hopis, Tewa ethnic identity readily emerges. Here the codeswitch to Tewa underscores the speaker’s disapproval of the Hopi conservatism, indecision, and intra-group discord that led to the failure to locate a new high school on the reservation for several decades beginning in the mid-twentieth century. Since many Tewas advocated for a local school long ago and a large
majority of both Hopis and Tewas regard the off-reservation boarding schools as failed experiments, many Tewas take special satisfaction in their role in finally bringing a high school to the reservation in the mid-1980s. A discussion of schools therefore often produces a switch to Tewa in order to disassociate speakers from the “incorrect” Hopis and align themselves with the “correct” stance endorsed by the majority of their own ethnic group.

In the comparative study of codeswitching in multilingual social groups, researchers such as Myers-Scotton (1993:478–81) often recognize cases in which “unmarked” codeswitching is used to signal a “mixed” or bicultural identity, as in Monica Heller’s (1988) study of strategic ambiguity in the use of English and French in Montreal, where a speaker’s seemingly unmotivated switches from one language to another are designed to show a third identity not available through the exclusive use of either of the other languages. But in the Arizona Tewa case, a local ideology works to eliminate ambiguity by encouraging speakers first to speak multiple languages without reducing their distinctiveness and, second, to iconically index each of these languages to particular identities. In sum, the dominant language ideology of the Arizona Tewas has promoted the production and reproduction of a repertoire of languages and identities that offer critical resources for providing multiplicity while maintaining maximal distinctiveness. As in the growing of distinct colors of corn, this was for many Arizona Tewa people at least partially a deliberate cultivation of difference.

**DOZIER’S PROFESSIONAL LANGUAGE IDEOLOGY**

In examining Arizona Tewa language ideology, I have attempted to locate its source in the model of kiva speech and identify it as a contributing resource for the expression and maintenance of an Arizona Tewa ethnic identity in a multiethnic society. In this section I demonstrate that these are patterns that Dozier did not recognize, in part because of his own professional socialization and the selective attention to language and communication that it entailed. Though this may seem to be an especially ironic instance of professional socialization desensitizing a native to an indigenous cultural pattern, closer examination reveals something quite different. If, as Clifford (1986a) contends, cultural description can be viewed as consisting of partial truths,
then perhaps all cultural members can be usefully construed as partial members.

As the son of a Santa Clara Tewa mother and a Franco-American father, Edward P. Dozier inherited the resources of two quite distinct cultures. From his mother and her family he heard the Santa Clara dialect of Tewa and became a native speaker of it. His father’s influence is more difficult to characterize and is customarily ignored by most anthropologists. Despite the bilateral pattern of descent in Euro-American kinship and the patrilineal emphasis among the Santa Clara Tewas, most anthropological writers emphasized the matrilineal connection as better suited to constructing Dozier as an unambiguously indigenous anthropologist. Marilyn Norcini (1995) provides the first biographically based treatment of Dozier that permits us to see a paternal influence. Dozier’s father seemed very interested in the Tewa heritage into which he had married; he wrote about Tewa history, kinship, and culture and involved his son in such efforts (Norcini 1995:42–47). The younger Dozier was not ceremonially initiated at Santa Clara and was thus ineligible for full participation in the traditional religion of his native pueblo (Norcini 1995). My goal here, however, is not to further examine Dozier’s biography but rather to use his published work as evidence of his professional stance on language, communication, and identity.

It is useful to begin by examining Dozier’s status as a native anthropologist. Today this notion has been significantly problematized and exemplified so as to call attention to the need for such anthropologists to position themselves within local communities, to ask, as did Kirin Narayan (1993), how “native” a native anthropologist is (Abu-Lughod 1988; Kondo 1990; Limón 1991). But as one of the earliest native anthropologists, Edward Dozier did not enjoy the benefits of more recent critical discussion. Whereas today the literature critically treats such issues as the internal diversity of cultural groups, the dual accountability of “member” anthropologists, and the need for ethnographers to use culturally appropriate styles of discourse to legitimate their status as members (Morgan 1997), in Dozier’s day the appeal of native anthropology lay in its promise of validation of anthropological authority. Native anthropologists knew the cultures they studied as insiders and also acquired the approved methodological sophistication and the
endorsed technologies of scientific representation (Clifford 1983).

My goal here is not to inventory all of the social science tropes that had acquired some conventionality in American anthropology at the time of Dozier’s ethnographic research but rather to focus specifically on those involving language and communication. One of the validating appeals of native anthropologists to an anthropological paradigm that emphasized objective description and analysis was their special linguistic qualifications, which preadapt them both to establish rapport with members and to interpret the insider’s point of view. In their foreword to Dozier’s *Hano, A Tewa Indian Community in Arizona*, George and Louise Spindler (1966:v–vi) write,

This case study is unusual. It was written by a man who knows Hano, the Tewa Indian community of which he writes, in a somewhat different way than most anthropologists know pueblo communities. He is accepted as a friend, as an insider, and speaks the language fluently. He never violates this friendship and acceptance in what he writes about the Tewa and yet the reader achieves a feeling of directness and intimacy that is often lacking in descriptions of pueblo life.

Dozier’s special linguistic qualifications are also a central theme in professional reviews of his monograph “The Hopi-Tewa of Arizona” (Dozier 1954):

Not the least of its virtues lies in the simplicity and lucidity of Dozier’s English. He is capable of expressing himself without resort to the esoteric jargon…One may infer that his facility with his native Tewa is equally fluent, a fact that adds measurably to the reader’s confidence in his understanding and interpretation of his informants.8 (Smith 1956:325)

Smith, like the Spindlers, presupposes that Dozier had an insider’s level of fluency and further assumes Dozier to be a “balanced bilingual” whose fluency in English must indicate comparable skill in Tewa. But in order to construct Dozier as an authoritative native anthropologist, both Smith and the Spindlers avoid seriously examining his actual level of fluency.

What *does* it mean to say that someone “speaks the language”? As a
linguist, I am first struck by the effect of the definite determiner “the,” which contributes to the uniformist assumption of a singular, undifferentiated language. As a linguistic anthropologist who has conducted approximately three years of cumulative research in the Arizona Tewa community over a twenty-five-year period (Kroskrity 1993), I am further struck by the erasure of relevant regional, class, clan, gender, and other voices in order to create an idealized, shared, and uniform code spoken by all Tewa Others. To what extent could Dozier be said to be fluent in “the language”? Certainly he was highly fluent in his maternal language, Santa Clara Tewa. His pronunciation of words, use of morphologically complex verbs, and ability to use the language in spontaneous conversation can be readily established from published work, recorded materials, and the reports of the Arizona Tewas9 (although there is no evidence that he possessed any esoteric knowledge of the language, since he received no specialized training in his home pueblo).

But Dozier was not a native speaker of Arizona Tewa, a form of the language even more dissimilar than a regional dialect. Although the basic vocabulary in both Arizona and Santa Clara Tewa is about 90 percent cognate, significant phonological and grammatical differences make it difficult for many Arizona Tewas to follow Santa Clara speech. Santa Clara is the most divergent of the Rio Grande Tewa dialects, and even cognate terms can sound quite exotic when pronounced with \( r \), \( j \), and \( f \)—sounds that do not occur in Arizona Tewa. Dozier’s treatment of Arizona Tewa in the orthography section of his 1954 monograph (Dozier 1954:261–62) makes any extension of his fluency in Santa Clara to Arizona Tewa quite problematic. The system he detailed is his native Santa Clara system, not that of the Arizona Tewas, as evidenced by his inclusion of the distinctive sounds mentioned above and his exclusion of Arizona Tewa’s aspirated stop series (\( ph, th, kh, kyh, kwh \)) as well as \( hy \) and \( hw \). I do not think that Dozier merely lacked the linguistic sophistication to represent Arizona Tewa properly; this orthographic treatment suggests, rather, that he did not speak the local form of Tewa. Although many older speakers I talked to reported that they were able to use Arizona Tewa with him and to understand his Santa Clara speech after a period of adjustment to its sound system, they also mentioned that Dozier’s speech marked him as someone from outside the village. Those current elders, who were in their twenties at the time of Dozier’s
fieldwork, also described difficulties in understanding Dozier’s speech and continue to regard Santa Clara as less than completely intelligible.

Dozier thus may not have enjoyed quite the linguistic advantages that his colleagues were willing to confer on him. He himself seems to have been aware of social boundaries erected by the Arizona Tewas that excluded him from the complete participation ascribed to native anthropologists, but he nonetheless attempted to claim a special insider status. Thus, for example, he writes,

In June 1949, I visited First Mesa for a preliminary survey of the Hopi-Tewa. As a native Tewa-speaking member of Santa Clara Pueblo, a village of the Rio Grande Tewa in New Mexico, I was received with considerable warmth—as any visitor from my village would have been. Only after several weeks did I make known my desire to study, and even then, I mentioned only the language. (Dozier 1954:260)

Here Dozier not only makes a special claim to insider status but also reveals his attempt to conform to expected standards of scientific objectivity—a requirement of both the Boasian and functionalist theories that so influenced him (Norcini 1995) and one from which Dozier, even as a native anthropologist, was hardly exempt (Smith 1956). Dozier himself acknowledges that his access to insider knowledge had its limits, particularly with regard to gendered knowledge and ceremonial knowledge. In the first case, Dozier (1954:325) notes his inability to attend birth rites, which are normally performed only by women and religious specialists. In the second, Dozier hits the wall of “internal secrecy” (Brandt 1980) and admits his inability to even “learn the names for the second and fourth katcina [sic] ceremonies” (Dozier 1954:347).

In unpublished field notes Dozier concedes, “I was able to secure only very sketchy and inadequate information about societies. There are societies among them but I was unable to learn how they fit into the clan system” (Norcini (1995:187). He questions the information he did receive about initiation, because society members refused to provide independent data and only seemed to agree with him that the system worked as it did at his home pueblo. Dozier interpreted this as a polite refusal to disagree with his leading questions but, in retrospect, it seems
more likely a result of his status as an outsider subject to strict rules of information control. Thus Dozier’s linguistic skills and the special access to community knowledge they supposedly ensured must be problematized in light of a close analysis of his own writings, inferences regarding his apparent skills, and the perceptions of them reported by the Arizona Tewas.

In addition to unpacking assumptions about native anthropologists, this attempt to disclose Dozier’s professional ideology of language includes two additional key points, one regarding his reflectionist ideology of language, the other an ideological stance on language and identity. Dozier’s ideological position on language is an academic variant of the reflectionist stance so common in Western Europe and the United States. In this view language is epiphenomenal, removed from the social structures and processes as well as the cultural artifacts and activities produced by members; it thus merely reflects the “real” world.

In Dozier’s version of this position, language structure is privileged over language use, resulting in a view of language as simply referring to a preexisting sociocultural world. An alternative view, one preferred by most linguistic anthropologists today, might see language use as a form of social action that plays a creative role in the social reproduction of cultural forms (Blom and Gumperz 1972; Gumperz 1982). But this was neither Dozier’s view nor one that was available in the academic marketplace during the time when he wrote.

As mentioned above, Dozier’s writings on the ethnic identity of the Arizona Tewas display important inconsistencies that suggest the influence of both additional field research and further professional socialization. His 1951 article, which he described as “a preliminary report on one aspect of a research project on culture change now in progress at Tewa Village…based on four months of field work; the study will continue for another eight months” (Dozier 1951:56), focused on the Arizona Tewas’ “resistance” as their most remarkable attribute:

The most pronounced feature of the Tewa of First Mesa, Hopi, Arizona, is their persistence in maintaining cultural, linguistic, and personality distinction from a numerically larger group, the Hopi. In a contact situation which seems favorable for complete acculturation and assimilation, this insistence on uniqueness is
provocative. Moreover the Tewa have succeeded, while maintaining cultural distinctiveness, in elevating themselves from a subordinate, minority status, to a respected and favored position on First Mesa. Investigation of this phenomenon promises to reveal significant information on the dynamics of culture change. (Dozier 1951:56)

Framed in this manner, Dozier’s article examines “cultural manifestations which seem to have been accommodating devices fostering or maintaining the distinctive minority group” (Dozier 1951:57). Foremost among these devices was the presence of the “linguistic curse” placed on the Hopi by the Tewa and entextualized in Arizona Tewa clan migration legends:

This curse has probably been the most important cultural mechanism for maintaining Tewa self-esteem. It is a constantly recurring theme in the traditional myths as well as in topics of conversation among themselves and with visiting Indian and white confidants and sympathizers. Invocation of the curse in ceremonials, reference to it in their informal talks, teaching children about it—all these have given the Tewa confidence as individuals and reassured them as a group of their respected, dominant position on First Mesa. (Dozier 1951:60)

In addition to the linguistic curse, which I further treat below, Dozier notes three other devices. Two of these involve kinship: the proscription of intermarriage in the early period of intergroup relations, and Tewa kinship change toward a Hopi model in the more recent period. Regarding the former, Dozier (1951:60) explains,

In the early contact period, restriction of marriage was probably an essential mechanism to provide an atmosphere in which cultural distinctiveness could be maintained and ideas of group pride could be implanted. In time the restriction was lifted, and today the Tewa are thoroughly mixed with the Hopi; in fact an examination of present-day marriages makes Tewa village appear to be an exogamous pueblo. So strong was the feeling for cultural independence, however, that the autonomous Tewa pueblo endured despite biological assimilation.
Regarding the second kinship device, Dozier observes that the Arizona Tewa kinship system has shifted from its former patrilineal descent pattern to produce a matrilineal system involving clans, like that of the Hopi. He concludes,

It is interesting that when elements could be incorporated within the Tewa pattern without endangering aloofness, borrowing was in order...The kinship system, although similar to the Rio Grande in terminology, is structurally like the Hopi...so much so that intermarriage causes no disruption in residence or kinship behavior. (Dozier 1951:61)

Here Dozier fails to note the role of Tewa language ideology’s emphasis on indigenous purism in effacing local awareness of kinship change by maintaining Tewa vocabulary, thus naturalizing the application of traditional kinship terms to kinsmen who embodied changed kinship roles and practices.

The fourth device Dozier lists is the Tewa maintenance of a discrete set of ceremonial practices from which Hopis are excluded. The essay concludes with an extended discussion of Merton’s (1948) “self-fulfilling prophecy” and the importance of local definitions of the situation as an important factor in “the successful execution of the accommodating mechanisms” (Dozier 1951:62). This is interesting for at least two reasons. First, the notion of a self-fulfilling prophecy was one of the few available models to focus on microworld production of cultural patterns rather than the more usual materialist emphasis on macrolevel economic determinism. By emphasizing local definitions of the situation, such an approach opened the possibility of appreciating the role of linguistic and discursive practices in making a “false” definition evoke a new behavioral response, which, in turn, makes the originally false conception come true. As an analytical tool, this notion seems quite attuned to an emphasis on the role of both Tewa discourse and Tewa language ideology. Given Dozier’s emphasis on the linguistic curse and his somewhat neglected opportunity to interpret the role of language in promoting kinship while masking apparent cultural change through the proscription of borrowed kinship terms, his early data clearly suggested the wisdom of an approach that emphasized the roles of Tewa discourse practices, native perceptions, and local ideologies.
Although Dozier seemed inclined to emphasize Tewa resistance on the basis of his early fieldwork, another eight months of research offered evidence to suggest that in both kinship behavior and ceremonial activity the Arizona Tewas were not maintaining the level of distinctiveness he had valorized. The additional field research revealed them to be so like their Hopi neighbors that Dozier found them to be “assimilating” and “merging.” This reversal apparently was caused not solely by additional field experience but also by a theoretical change that emphasized social structure, functionalism, and acculturation theory (Norcini 1995:153).

In Dozier’s most extensive monograph on the Arizona Tewas (Dozier 1954), language enters in a more highly circumscribed fashion than in his earlier article. The opening chapter identifies the Arizona Tewas as “the Tewa-speaking community in Northern Arizona”—a professionally acceptable way of identifying bounded sociocultural units in accordance with what Barth (1969:11) has called “the ideal type” anthropological definition of an ethnic group in which race = culture = language = society. This survival of a Herderian view dominated anthropological thinking throughout more than half of the twentieth century and, as Blommaert and Verschueren (1998) have reminded us, is still highly visible in European nationalist ideologies.

Dozier next mentions the Tewa language as a methodological resource, emphasizing its dual role in the establishment of rapport and the collection of data. The remainder of the monograph incorporates few details about language and discourse other than a reflectionist treatment of kin terms (to be discussed later), but Dozier does treat one culturally salient feature of language ideology and use: the linguistic curse that the Arizona Tewas placed on the Hopi as a form of cultural revenge. The text of this narrative is represented solely through Dozier’s translation (Dozier 1954:292):

When our ancestors had defeated the Utes and made life safe for the Hopi, they petitioned for the land, women and food which had been promised to them. But the Hopi refused to give them these things. Then it was that our poor ancestors had to live like beasts, foraging on the wild plants and barely subsisting on the meager supply of food. Our ancestors lived miserably,
beset by disease and starvation. The Hopi, well-fed and healthy, laughed and made fun of our ancestors. Finally our clan chiefs dug a pit between Tewa Village and the Hopi towns and told the Hopi clan chiefs to spit into it. When they had all spat, our clan chiefs spat above the spittle of the Hopi, the pit was refilled, and then our clan chiefs declared: “Because you have behaved in a manner unbecoming to human beings, we have sealed knowledge of our language and our way of life from you. You and your descendants will never learn our language and our ceremonies, but we will learn yours. We will ridicule you in both your language and our own.”

Here Dozier reveals more narrative detail than in his earlier article. But he reveals less than an insider’s knowledge when he says, “Like all Pueblo Traditions, those of the Tewa are couched in a mystical, fanciful language. It is impossible to tell what is fact or fancy in the migration legend” (Dozier 1966:18). Rather than appreciating or explicating such legends as discourse genres of another culture, he instead implicitly imposes the evaluation metric of truth. Although he never explains what he finds so “fanciful” about these narratives, Dozier does reserve for the “linguistic curse” the only effort he extends to understand a local language ideology and related language use. He notes, for example, that Hopis may acquire the Tewa language through marriage yet comply with the curse by not speaking it except, perhaps, when social restraints are relaxed due to inebriation (Dozier 1954:292).

Dozier observes the role of the curse in maintaining self-esteem at a time when the Arizona Tewas were stigmatized by the Hopi majority at First Mesa, but this point is not highlighted. More elaborate treatment, including chapter-length development, is devoted to such topics as ceremonial organization and social structure, with linguistic topics and native discourse receiving only brief mention. In a short section titled “Linguistic Ability,” Dozier (1954:302) states that the Arizona Tewas are “completely bilingual in Hopi and Tewa. They change from one language to the other with great facility.” He goes on to remark that many Arizona Tewas also know English and Navajo, but he never explores multilingualism as a key element in Tewa adaptation to the Hopis. Instead of treating the linguistic curse as an indicator of the
tremendous importance of language practices and beliefs in this contact situation, he dismissively exoticizes it as an aspect of native discourse, reducing it to a functionalist account in which it instills ethnic pride.

Dozier’s functionalist views of language are also apparent in a brief section of his chapter on social organization (Dozier 1954:339–42), in which he describes gossip as “the most common form of social control” and notes the Arizona Tewas’ fear of witchcraft accusations even though “there are apparently no open accusations of witchcraft, no trials, and no executions” (1954:340). An extended quotation from “a highly acculturated Hopi-Tewa man” (1954:340) provides an especially valuable local perspective:

People are never told they are witches to their face…No one wants bad things said about him or his family, and this family will then try to help the village in work and with the ceremonies. If this family does not do this, then people will continue to think that they are witches and the family will have a hard time because “people will talk about them and act strangely toward them.”

Dozier observes that both sacred clowns and volunteer or appointed clowns “often ridicule individuals during plaza dances” and quotes an anonymous Arizona Tewa consultant (1954:339):

According to informants, the antics of the clowns today are mild, and it is said “they are afraid to make fun of town members.” Instead, Navaho and whites become the subjects for ridicule.

Dozier describes his own experience at a plaza dance, when clowns ridiculed his heavy smoking by yelling “Fire! Fire!” and dousing him with a bucket of water.

Dozier limits any further mention of Tewa in this monograph to the role of language as reference, or “names for things.” In this he follows then-current cultural anthropological linguistic practice, Western scientific discourse in its quest, since Locke, to limit language to reference (Bauman and Briggs, this volume), and folk models that locate language in lexical reference (Silverstein 1981). Dozier’s linguistic rep-
resentations of the Arizona Tewas suggest that even “native” anthropologists must display appropriate attention to the “validating” (Hymes 1970) function of the native language and must send lexical “postcards from the field” to show “you were there” (Tedlock 1979). Rather than focusing on native discourse, Dozier treats only terms or terminological sets. In the chapter on social organization, for example, he employs Tewa terminology to invoke various sets of dyadic relationships and organize information about norms of kinship behavior and actual practices that he observed in Tewa households. The following discussion is representative (Dozier 1954:320):

Older Sister <———> Younger Sister

\[
\text{kaakáh} \quad <———> \quad \text{tíyee}
\]

The relation of sisters to one another is very intimate and lifelong. Sisters rear and care for their children in the same household and cooperate in all household tasks. An older sister may often assume an importance equal to that of the mother in the household, particularly if she is the oldest daughter in the household and the other children are considerably younger than she. There is in Hopi-Tewa a special term, \text{kaakáh}, to distinguish older sister from \text{tíyee}, younger sibling.

This treatment goes beyond strict reference by including information about typified role relationships and their behavioral routines. Rather than appealing to genealogical positions alone in unpacking these kin categories, Dozier also equates the kin terms with typical kinship roles and behaviors.

Absent from this discussion, although briefly noted earlier in the monograph (1954:305), is any treatment of how \text{kaakáh} is an unusual Arizona Tewa word. It is, in fact, the only kinship term borrowed from Hopi and one of very few Hopi loanwords into Arizona Tewa, despite at least three centuries of Arizona Tewa multilingualism and a century of intermarriage between the groups (Kroskrity 1993:73). Dozier does not explore members’ awareness of the source of this term or the ideological preferences for compartmentalization and indigenous purism that make it so anomalous in Arizona Tewa. Since, in his view, language only
labels kinship and social organization, its manifold roles in Arizona Tewa multiethnic adaptation are ignored. He includes many other dyadic relations to give a more complete sense of the kinship system. But here, and in the naming of ceremonies, Dozier defers to linguistic standards of anthropological authentication, which seem to fetishize the denotational function of language.

Dozier’s reflectionist stance is even more clear in “Two Examples of Linguistic Acculturation: The Yaqui of Sonora and the Tewa of New Mexico” (Dozier 1956), a contrastive study of Spanish loanwords in Yaqui and Rio Grande Tewa. Here Dozier explains why the former language shows a pattern of syncretism while the latter displays compartmentalization. Rather than considering the possibility that differing linguistic ideologies may affect contact outcomes, Dozier attempts to demonstrate that the facts of the contact situation (for example, whether it is forced or permissive) alone determine the pattern of linguistic diffusion. This is a critical dismissal of language ideologies or even language attitudes, excluding the role of local knowledge and local interests as well as the limits of members’ linguistic awareness (Silverstein 1981). For Dozier (1956:147), “linguistic acculturation…reflects acculturation in other aspects of culture,” and the results of language contact are a residue of historical forces that language merely reflects. This dismissal of a “culture of language” has interpretive consequences. Compartmentalization and indigenous purism are traced to resistance to the Spanish colonial regime rather than located as indigenous products of local theocracies. Regarding the Tewas’ preference for neologisms rather than Spanish loans, Dozier (1956:157) states,

The reticence of the Tewa in this regard is paralleled by their reluctance to give out information about their way of life. This is a typical Pueblo linguistic trait, apparently deeply rooted. It is undoubtedly associated with the suppression of native customs by missionaries and Spanish authorities experienced by their forefathers and handed down by word of mouth to the present generation.

Here again Dozier’s reflectionist stance reduces language to a mirror of historical factors. Were the Pueblos missionized by more tolerant Jesuits rather than the militant Franciscans, he suggests, the Tewas, like
the Yaquis, would have produced a linguistic syncretism. I think this is especially doubtful, even outright wrong. Dozier’s attempt to view purism and compartmentalization as a version of secrecy traceable to Spanish hegemonic rule critically ignores the fact that the most tenacious control of sacred knowledge is directed from within, in what Brandt (1980:125) has called “internal secrecy.” The power of a priestly elite rests in part on its detailed, strictly controlled knowledge of ceremonial performance. Dozier also fails to account for Southern Tewa indigenous purism, which preexisted contact with the Spanish, as well as that of the Arizona Tewas in response to the Hopi (Kroskrity 1993:60–77).

Dozier’s ideological position on language and identity is also noteworthy. His early images of the “ethnically persistent” Arizona Tewas were based on his early welcome, including the introductions and establishing of clan relationships—encounters in which the Arizona Tewas spoke their native language and emphasized their Tewa ancestry. Dozier (1954:261) brought several Santa Clara Tewas to Tewa Village for a visit and a social dance and also transported Tewa Villagers to Santa Clara. This exposure to the Tewa side of the Arizona Tewa multicultural adaptation confirmed the persistence of a Tewa culture and the language metonymically associated with it. It was only later, when Dozier’s long-term fieldwork exposed him to Hopi aspects of this adaptation, that he realized how Hopi this same group could be. But rather than looking to their multilingual practices as a key to their multicultural identity, Dozier was guided by ideal-type understandings of language and identity (such as that mentioned above) and the theory of “acculturation.”

In principle, acculturation theory admitted the possibility of a spectrum of culture contact (see, for example, Linton 1940), but in practice it seemed to presuppose assimilation as an ideal (Nagata 1974) and to rationalize hegemonic rule over native populations which, through (Euro-)Americanizing in any way, would lose their right to a distinctive cultural voice (Jorgenson 1971). These “narratives of assimilation,” which Edward Bruner (1986) describes as typical of the period, were the academic rationalization for an assimilationist federal Indian policy that treated reservation communities as domestic colonies.

Dozier was no stranger to acculturation theory. Ralph L. Beals, a prominent member of his UCLA dissertation committee, was a Latin
Americanist whose work at the time strongly emphasized this theme (Beals 1953) and whose 1950 presidential address to the American Anthropological Association was entitled “Urbanism, Urbanization, and Acculturation” (Beals 1951). Like functionalist theory, acculturation theory depicted cultures and cultural groups as organic and integrated wholes. Since even minimal changes caused by culture contact would impact all parts of the system, cultural contact was represented as an especially stressful state. In a textbook formulation on applied anthropology and acculturation, Beals and Hoijer (1953:735) wrote,

Cultures, because they are integrated wholes, do not merely add or subtract traits in the process of change. Each new element accepted is, rather, fitted into a functioning whole, often undergoing considerable modification in the process; if it can not be fitted it may not be accepted.

This emphasis on integration and the possibility of rejection provides a very democratic vision in which systems in contact mutually regulate according to cultural compatibility. But Beals (1953:626–27), in distinguishing “acculturation” from “diffusion,” noted an association of the former with “force”: “In such discussions, force is broadly treated to include not only overt or naked force but pressures resulting from deprivations, introduction of compelling new goals, or psychological pressures arising from sentiments of inferiority and superiority.” Americanists were well aware that Native American societies were the objects of acculturative forces arising from subordination within nation-states and that any culture change, with the exception of the appropriation and commodification of native cultures, would be unidirectional and shaped to the interests of the nation-state (see, for example, Urban and Sherzer 1991).

Although Hopi Indians would never have the hegemonic powers available to nation-states, their superior numbers and control of local resources, in comparison to the Arizona Tewas, permitted an extension of the acculturation model that would predict assimilation. In addition, the professional ideology that prescribed an iconic linkage of language and identity promoted only confusion when confronted with a stable, multilingual adaptation. The Arizona Tewas were either Tewa or Hopi; they could not be both. By not attending to either their multilingual
practices (such as compartmentalization and codeswitching) or their ideology of language, Dozier could not hear the Arizona Tewa people using their languages as resources in the creation of multicultural identities. Instead of being guided by Tewa discourse, Dozier was influenced by English language academic discourse modeled on the same assumptions that shaped federal policy.

As U.S. nationalism’s postwar emphasis on the melting pot metaphor became hegemonic, federal programs of “termination” and “relocation” (Fixico 1986; Jorgenson 1978:22; Officer 1971:45–47) were offered by legislators to promote what they termed “assimilation and freedom” to Indians. This ironic label did little more than signal a new form of state oppression to Indian people as a sequel to “underdevelopment” (Jorgenson 1971). Although they were presented in a discourse of liberation and national integration, “the policies adopted were based not only on the needs of an expanding economy for land and other natural resources, but also on the need for ready supplies of cheap labor” (Littlefield 1991).

CODA

Having concluded my two stories, I am reminded that Euro-Americans, unlike the Arizona Tewas, may expect a moral as part of this blurred genre. Despite Edward Dozier’s preadaptation as a native anthropologist and his extraordinary skill as an ethnographer, his lack of attention to Tewa language ideology and use and his uncritical use of then current ideologies of language and culture contact inherent in “narratives of assimilation” (Bruner 1986:124–25) deafened his ability to hear the discursive production of Tewa identity by the Arizona Tewa themselves.

Notes

1. For a more complete discussion of the Pueblo diaspora, interested readers should consult Knaut (1995), Sando (1992:63–78), Schroeder (1979), and Simmons (1979). This extended use of “diaspora” follows the descriptive model suggested by Clifford (1994) rather than the prescriptive one endorsed by Safran (1991) and others. For additional discussion, see Kroskrity (1998:118–19).

2. This influence is quite profound when one considers that the Indian
Claims Commission employed anthropologists as expert witnesses to testify about such topics as traditional land usage. National policy, in attempting to provide some tribes with resources that would make them self-sufficient and possible candidates for termination of reservation status, clearly encouraged a past-oriented study with heavy emphasis on the oral testimony of elders rather than a more participant-observation-based study of contemporary patterns (Fixico 1986; Jorgenson 1978).

3. I am using a slightly different orthography here than the one I used in an earlier treatment (Kroskrity 1993:xv–xvii). As in the earlier treatment, all secondary articulations conventionally represented in Americanist practice with superscripts (like aspiration, labialization, etc.) appear as digraphs. Vowel length is represented here by doubling the vowel (e.g., aa) as opposed to using a colon (e.g., aː). The apparent vowel cluster, ae, is simply a low, midfront vowel, an accent mark indicates high tone, and subscripted hooks indicate nasal, as opposed to oral, vowels.

4. One of only two words from Hopi that appear to be loanwords is kaakáh ‘older sister’ (Kroskrity 1993:73). It should be emphasized that though the Arizona Tewas have managed lexical convergence by proscribing mixing, grammatical and discourse convergence has occurred between the two languages, in part, because these other linguistic levels escape the same awareness, scrutiny, and evaluation that speakers more routinely impose on the lexicon (Kroskrity 1993:71–77; Silverstein 1981).

5. This quotation is translated from a senior Corn Clan man’s response to my informal questions about growing corn. We were relaxing one morning in July 1983 after cultivating a field near Keams Canyon. I used the social credit my assistance provided to inquire about why this individual, like many older and relatively “traditional” men, seemed to have many fields that were not at all contiguous. Although the connection between corn and language was not coaxed by any leading questions on my part, my professional interest in the Tewa language was recognized by all of my senior consultants, who occasionally helped me see connections between language and cultural practices that they believed to be important and not obvious to me. I never heard this metaphor used in discussions among Tewa people themselves, but it emerged on several occasions in intercultural encounters like this as a rationalization from the perspective of “Others.”

6. Albert Yava, an Arizona Tewa man, was the official interpreter for the Hopi Tribe. He was also ceremonially active in Hopi and Tewa ceremonial soci-
eties. For more on Yava, consult his life history (Yava 1979) and my brief com-
ments (Kroskrity 1993:208).

7. According to the late Alfonso Ortiz (personal communication), the fact that Dozier was not initiated into the ceremonial life of his native pueblo should not necessarily be viewed as an indication of his individual or family stance on participation in native religion. Initiation was not available during his youth because of the breakdown of Santa Clara’s moiety system and the requirement that both moieties be cooperatively involved in such ceremonies.

8. I am indebted to Marilyn Norcini for locating and interpreting this useful review.

9. I was able to obtain information from a number of Tewa people who interacted with Dozier during his fieldwork on First Mesa. This group includes Albert Yava, Dewey and Juanita Healing, and Edith Nash.

10. This reference-dominated view of language is a robust part of non-academic folk models (Silverstein 1979, 1981, 1985, 1996a).